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Free Markets and Economic Development in Postwar Developing Countries
 
S)stained economic growth is the key to improving the living 
standards of several billion people who inhabit the poorer countries in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In the post-World War II period, a 
handful of countries have successfully grown their way out of poverty to 
provide their people with sharply higher living standards. Most have 
not! These few remarkable cases have an important common feature: most 
have emphasized free market economic policies as the keystone of their 
overall developmental strategy.
 
The object of this study is to identify and analyze the successful,
 
market-oriented examples of economic development. This identification 
process consists of two steps. The first step is to pinpoint those 
countries whose overall economic policy relies on competitive markets in 
the private sector as the main vehicle for growth. (I use the phrase 
"economic policy" as shorthand for the several dimensions of fiscal, 
regulatory, investment, trade, monetary, and exchange rate policies.) 
Since these countries are few in number, a second step is to identify 
examples of incentive-enhancing reforms that have been introduced in 
-countries which otherwise ex~ibt A high degree of government control or 
direction. The purpose of the second step is to demonstrate that it is
 
possible to aid the process of developmeqt throixgh a variety of modest
 
policy changes which promote economic efficiency in less open economies.
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Thus, policymakers need not 
be faced with an either/or prospect--either
 
install free market policies wholesale to stimulate growth or do nothing
 
at all.
 
The organiation of 
this study is as follows. Economic 
theory
 
establishes the 
essential conditions for the existence of 
free, or
 
competitive, markets, demonstrates
and 
 that free 
markets maximize
 
economic efficiency. 'ut economic activity does not exist in a vacuum;
 
it depends on government to provide an institutional frdmework in which
 
the market 
 function. Section
economy can II considers what mix of
 
fiscal, monetary, regulatory, and international policies are appropriate
 
to the free market economy. Sections III VII
through examine, in 
detail, the postwar policies that have been pursued and their results in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, the Ivory Coast, Chile, and Sri
 
Lanka in order to deteruine which components of economic policy are most
 
central to rapid growth.
 
Most countries do 
not stress free market policies. Still, many
 
have experimented with one or more incentive-enhancing liberal measures.
 
Any reform that increases reliance on market forces is likely to foster
 
greater efficiency in that sector of the economy. The remaining portions
 
of this paper turn from the overall economy-wide "macro,, analysis to an
 
assessment of "micro" changes in 
policy, exploring how modest reforms
 
improve efficiency. 
I examine a variety of partial liberal reforms that
 
have been tried to assemble a shopping basket of possible measures that
 
leaders in developing countries could select, given owntheir peculiar 
circumstances.
 
It is important to have a 
e.dar picture of the free market model of 
development. Although countryno fully reflects the textbook model of 
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the perfectly efficient, competitive market economy, such a model
 
provides a set of standard4 against which real world economies can be 
studied. What are the main features of a free market economy?
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I. Free Markets
 
The term "free markets, is shorthand for the economist's concept of
 
"perfectly competitive markets." 
 While economists differ on the merits
 
of free market Policies as basis
a of economic organization and
 
activity, virtually 
aj agree on the eaning of the term and its
 
consequences for economic efficiency.
 
The science of economics is concerned with the allocation of scarce
 
resources in a society. Scarcity implies 
that choices must be made
 
among alternative uses of any Choice, in
one resource. 
 turn, entails
 
costs--the money one uses to import railway equipment cannot be used to
 
purchase jet aircraft. 
The resources available to people determine how
 
much and what mix of goods and services they can feasibly produce. Of 
course, it makes sense to produce much
as as possible at the
 
least-possible cost, which means that there are more goods and services
 
to go around for everyone. This is just a common-sense notion of 
economic efficiency: 
 to the extent that economies produce
 
inefficiently, there is simply less to go around.
 
A mar;:et is a place 
or device enabling people to negotiate 
exchanges. In the marketplace, individuals compare their personal 
valuations with other aseach they buy 
or sell goods and services. 
Buyers and sellers conclude their exchanges after settling on a price,
 
which is typically expressed 
in the units of some currency. In the
 
modern electronic age, markets can in from
range scope the Sunday 
morning village bazaar to interconnected 24-hour gold markets in New 
York, London, Zurich, and Hong Kong, in which all buyers and all sellers
 
throughout the entire world can negotiate exchanges at a single price.
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Let's define the market mechanism more precisely. The market is a
 
method of organization in which owners of property and labor services 
make individual decisions to consume, produce, and distribute on the
 
basis of unregulated prices. To say that a free market is synonymous 
with competitive markets implies that no one imposes price regulations 
on economic exchange, and that buyers and sellers are free to enter and 
exit. Free entry and unregulated prices satisfy the requisites for 
competition. To repeat this important statement, to have free markets 
means that there must be no legal or arbitrary barriers to access, nor 
any legal restraints on the pricing decisions of buyers and sellers. 
The notion of perfect competition, or perfectly competitive markets, is
 
satisfied under the following conditions. First, no one buyer or seller
 
is dominant enough in the market to set prices. Rather, each buyer and
 
seller is small in size and is a "price-taker," rather than a "price 
maker." In economic parlance, there are no monopolists or monopsonists, 
who can by themselves set the buying or selling price of any item. 
Second, goods have standardized qualities, which means that buyers know 
what they are getting for their money. Third, there must be free 
movement of resources. New producers must be allowed the right to 
compete with existing suppliers and existing producers must be allowed
 
to go out of business if they wish. Otherwise, resources are "locked
 
in" and cannot be released for use in more highly-valued activities. 
Fourth, buyers and sellers are assumed to have complete knowledge of 
market conditions, especially prices. When these four conditions are 
satisfied, the abstract definition of perfectly competitive markets is 
fulfilled. The model of perfect competition is, of course, only an 
abstraction about the real world, but one that economists have found 
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helpful in explaining observed regularities in economic behavior.
 
In a free market economy, the government does not interfere with 
the prices established by market forces, the supply and demand
 
conditions resulting from millions of individual decisions to buy and 
sell, nor does it protect existing firms from the pressure of 
competitors. Government imposes legal restrictions limiting market
no 

entry of buyers or sellers. Nor can there be private collusion among
 
buyers or sellers which would restrict output and raise prices.
 
Welfare economics is that part of economic analysis that seeks to
 
identify the conditions under which societies use their resources in the
 
most efficient way. Economic efficiency means getting the largest
 
possible benefit from any given level 
of etfort; or, attaining any
 
specific level of benefits with the possible
least cost--in short, 
getting the biggest bang for the buck! 
The central theorem of welfare economics is that perfect 
competition yields an optimal ali'ocation of resources. Perfectly 
competitive markets, or free markets, are allocatively efficient.
 
Perfect competition in every market yields a set of prices for inputs
 
and outputs which places maximum valuation on every economic good. 
 In
 
such a market, the value of any item to 
each consumer--how much he is
 
prepared to pay--is 
 exactly equal to the marginal cost to any
 
producer--how much he 
must spend to produce it. (In economics, the
 
marginal utililty of commodity x equals;the marginal social cost of x.)
 
It is the price mechanism which equates consumer value to producer cost.
 
The free movement of price in competitive markets insures that
 
production costs are minimized, and that profit-maximizing producers
 
will produce the goods that consumers most desire. Resources will not
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be wasted either producing at higher cost than is necessary or in
 
supplying goods consumers do not want. In thij sense, the free market
 
economy is the most efficient system of economic organization.
 
What is the proper role of government in the free market economy?
 
Its role is limited to defining property rights, enforcing contracts,
 
protecting people from fraud, and similar activities that establish the
 
rules of the game. It does not, to repeat, interfere with prices or
 
competition.
 
The rationale for government can arise, in purely economic terms,
 
when the conditions of perfect competition are not satisfied. Examples
 
include the presence of monopolies (the absence of competition;9,
 
externalities which inflict costs that ore not compensated (e.g., 
pollution), and the need to provide such public goods as national 
defense, because private suppliers havo no practical way to charge for 
the benefit of their services. Governments also negotiate international 
agreements. Most governments provide a monetary framework. Some people 
dislike the way a market economy allocates incomes and want the 
government to redistribute income in accord with different values, an 
extr me example of which would be absolute equality of incomes.
 
Apart from an economic role for government, many attribute to
 
government a number of social and political purposes. Examples include
 
advancing education, imposing religious values, preventing abortion, and
 
so on. These activities cost money, and often force people to behave in
 
ways they would otherwise not behave. Only government, with its legal
 
monopoly on coercion, has the power to tax and regulate to attain these
 
goals.
 
In practical terms, governments do many things. As the activities
 
of government move 
the economy away from a competitive market system,
 
efficiency declines, which 
usually means slower growth 
and a lower
 
standard of living.
 
Economics textbooks have less to 
say about social and political
 
objactives than about 
the conditions and consequences of competition.
 
But even if we limit (intellectually, 
at least) government to its
 
minimum economic functions, we have 
created an institution that will
 
tax, spend, regulatde, print money, negotiate treaties, 
and carry out
 
other economic acts. Can we 
define the legitimate scope of government
 
action that would be consonant with a free market economy?
 
-9-

II. The Role of Government in the Free Market Economy
 
Whenever government takes resources from the economy and uses them
 
in ways that do not mqtch consumer valuations with producer costs,
 
efficiency is impaired. Thus only where the market economy cannot
 
supply consumer desires, such as national defenqe, the provision of all
 
private goods and services should reside in the marketplace.
 
The abstract model of perfect competition is found only in
 
economics textbooks. Where competition exists in the real world, it is
 
always found in some political, institutional setting, where government
 
leaders make decisions on economic policy. Economists justify a role
 
for government to provide public goods, enforce contracts, correct
 
market failures (uncompensated externalities), redistributive income
 
(though this is highly qonent1ous), but often they pay less attention
 
to the precise way governments function. Decisions to tax, spend,
 
regulate, manage the money supply, and negotiate international
 
agreements may result in outcomes that seriously distort or regulate 
prices and limit free entry, which harms efficiency. The purpose of 
this section is to identify which public policies least interfere with 
free markets. The general term for these policies is non-intervention,
 
or non-interference, in the market. Let us look at the specifics of
 
taxation, spending, regulation, monetary policy, and international
 
agreements.
 
Taxation. Tax policy should aim at three goals. First, to remove
 
as few resources from the economy as possible to pay for the legitimate
 
activities of government. The reason is that resources in private hands
 
are used more efficiently in producing goods and services than the same
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resources placed in public hands. 
In general, governments do not stress
 
profit-maximizing activity 
nor do government enterprises have to meet
 
the competitive test 
of the market to stay in business. Taxes should 
thus be as low as possible. 
A second goal of policy is that taxes should not distort prices
 
produced by the interaction of supply and 
demand in the market. Tax
 
policy should strive for neutrality between prodqction 4nd consumption,
 
and among products and industries. Government should not use its power
 
to 
tax to alter prices to favor any one industry, or producer. To give
 
but one example, import duties 
 protect domestic producers from
 
competition, penalize consumers, and 
raise the costs of inputs for
 
exporters.
 
Third, the costs of administration and collection of taxes must be
 
minimized. Borrowing from 
Adam Smith, time of payment, manner of
 
payment, and 
amount of payment ought to 
be certain and not arbitrary.
 
Every 
tax ought to be levied in the manner 
in which it is most
 
convenient for the taxpayer to pay it. 
 Overhead should be minimized. 
Finally, high rates of ta"ation must be avoided lest they destroy 
incentives to work, save, and invest. Historically, high customs duties
 
fostered smuggling. Today, high tax 
rates in some countries foster 
growing tax evasion. 
Spending. Spending beshould confined to the provision of those 
essential public and
goods services that only government can
 
provide--defense, public safety, and public works are the most readily 
agreed-upon examples.
 
Apart from the overall size of public spending, the government 
should not grant subsidies to producers, which distort production costs,
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or consumers, which may shift resources from investment to consumption.
 
The public sector should provide a framework within which private
 
employers will find it profitable to create new Jobs, rather than take
 
on the task of employment for its own sake.
 
In the real world, most governments provide commercial services
 
(e.g., airlines, trains, buses, housing) to their subjects. In
 
providing these services, governments or their agencies should set
 
prices to reflect scarcity and full opportunity costs, or contract out
 
the provision of services to private firms on the basis of competitive 
bids.
 
Many scholars hold a popular view that governments have a
 
responsibility to those of its citizens who, through no fault of their 
own, are unable to meet their "basic human needs." This safety-net 
function is widespread in most Western industrial democracies, but its 
growing cost is increasingly cited as cne reason why economic growth has
 
slowed since the early 1970s, as resources are shifted from investment
 
to consumption. Although equity (distribution of income) concerns are
 
admirable, only sustained economic growth, not the politically driven
 
redistribution of income, can lift a nation's people out of poverty.
 
Finally, overall government spending should be linked to the
 
availabililty of tax-generated receipts. The government should avoid
 
domestic or foreign borrowing to finance higher levels of spending than
 
domestic resources can sustain, lest debt servicing costs become an
 
economic burden. Balanced budgets should be the norm of fiscal policy,
 
with borrowing confined to circumstances of national emergency or
 
economic recession, when receipts may temporarily decline and disrupt
 
the financing of on-going essential public programs. But every effort
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should be made to restore fiscal balance as soon as possible. 
Regulation. The to marketskey free is unregulated pricing and 
free entry and exit. Regulations imposed for the general welfare should 
not distort the pricing mechanism, which equates supply and demand, 
nor
 
restrict entry and exit.
 
Some regulation is inevitable in every economy, to 
protect worker
 
safety, standards of air and water quality, 
and so on. In the
 
implementation of 
these policies, public authcrities need to balance
 
benefits against costs--all 
too often the benefits of regulation are
 
cited with little regard for costs, which can raise prices or eliminate
 
jobs.
 
Monetary Policy. 
Stable prices are the target of monetary policy.
 
In a world of purely paper money, lacking any form of gold, metallic or
 
commodity backing, inflation is all 
too common. The controversy over
 
fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes applies as much to poor as 
to rich countries. 
Whatever monetary mechanism is selected, a correctly
 
valued exchange rate a central
is ing edient in the efficient use of
 
national resources. An overvalued exchange rate 
encourages imports and
 
discourages exports, distorting 
 costs for domestic producers and
 
exporters.
 
International Agreements. 
 Governments negotiate agreements with
 
each other on such matters as defense, aid, trade, tariffs, quotas,
 
monetary links, and air landing rights, 
to name few. The
a key
 
principle of these agreements is to 
defend the national interest. In
 
the process, however, 
it is important not to interfere with 
the free
 
movement of prices. 
 Tariffs and export duties, for example, have
 
seriously retarded growth in many poor countries. Foreign aid has often
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been used to subsidize politically favored sectors of the economy, as 
the Korean case study that follows demonstrates, thus postponing
 
internal reforms which promqte efficiency. 1 Quotas have been a chief 
source cf corruption as the artificial scarcity they generate yields a 
very high economic dividend to their holders.
 
This set of categories includes most, but not all, of the economic
 
activities practiced by governments and their agencies. In each
 
category, there is enormous opportunity for government intervention that
 
would radically thwart the efficiency features of free markets, which 
depend on unregulated pricing and free entry. Indeed, one can only find
 
a handful of postwar examples in which governments of poor countries 
adhered to, rather than violated, these maxims of policy.
 
Among postwar developing countries, the closest textbook
 
approximation to the model of perfect competition is Honr Kong.
 
Admittedly, many of its political, social, and economic circumstances 
may be unique, still it atfords.a clear statement that maximum reliance
 
on free markets as a tool of economic policy successfully brought
 
sustained nigh rates of growth and high living standards to the majority
 
of its people--in short, a model for development.
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Ill. Hong Kong: The Textbook Illustration of Free Markets
 
Perhaps 
ihe single best example of the market economy model of
 
development is found in the incredibly successful record of Hong Kong.1
 
Hong Kong has had to overcome many obstacles, and has received virtually
 
no foreign aid in the process. 
 Its land area is virtually resourceless
 
and consists 
 unproductive
largely of granitic rock formations. it
 
suffers a population density 
that ranks it among the world's most
 
overpopulated areas per square mile; and it is dependent on imports for
 
its food, raw materials, and all capital equipment. Located thousands 
of miles away from its most important markets, Hong Kong has been unable 
to control population movements across its borders; and, to this day, it 
continues to be ruled by a colonial government that critics regard 
as
 
obsolete, antiquated and inconsistent with the principles of
 
independence and self-rule.
 
Yet, despite these formidable obstacles, the rate of growth of the
 
Hong Kong economy has been so rapid for so long that it has come to have
 
an almost certain inevitability, despite a 
population that must
 
periodically absorb large waves 
of penniless refugees arriving by land
 
or by sea.
 
The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong lies inside the tropics 
on
 
the southeast coast of China, adjoining the province of Kwangtung.2 
 It
 
consists of a small 
part of the Chinese mainland and a scattering of
 
offshore 
islands, the most important of which 
is Hong Kong Island.
 
Including reclamations through 1980, the total 
land area of the colony 
is 409.3 square miles, of which Hong Kong Island together with a number 
of small adjacent islands comprise 29.2 square miles. Kowloon and
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Stonecutter's Island comprise another 4.3 square miles. The New
 
Territories, which consist of part of the mainland and more than 230
 
offshore islands, have a total area of 375.8 square miles.
 
Of the 409.3 square miles in the colony, only 9.4 percent is used
 
for farming; 74.9 percent is marginal unproductive land. Within the
 
remaining 15.7 percent (about 38.6 square miles) of built-up urban
 
areas, most of Hong Kong's people live and work.
 
The small colony of Hong Kong is almost entirely lacking in natural
 
resources. Its mineral wealth is negligible, consisting of a modest
 
amount of iron ore, building stone, kaolin clay, graphite, lead, and
 
wolfram. Most of the activity in the mining and quarrying industry
 
concentrates on the production of building stone and sand. Only
 
one-seventh of the land is arable; the colony cannot, therefore, feed
 
itself, and throughout most of its history has encountered difficulty in
 
maintaining an adequate water supply. Virtually all the materials of
 
industry, and the vast majority of food stuffs, must be imported.
 
The shortage of land, and on occasion of water, is accompanied by
 
an absence of local coal, oil or other source of power.
 
Between five and six million people live within Hong Kong's limited
 
space. Of these, over 98 perqent can be described as Chinese on the
 
basis of language and place of origin. More than half were born and
 
have lived their whole lives in Hong Kong; the remainder are refugees
 
and immigrants from other countries, mainly China.
 
Historically, Hong Kong became a British possession in 1841 for the 
simple purpose of trade with China. Two Opium Wars forced China to cede 
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon to the British in perpetuity. Mainland 
rulers have long declared these "unequal" treaties invalid. A third 
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conflict in 
1898 awarded the New Territories to on
Britain a 99-year
 
lease, which is scheduled to expire 
on July 1, 1997. (More on this
 
later.) At the outset, Hong Kong was a barren island with no 
large or
 
established community entitled political
to representation. 
 It was
 
established as 
a military, diplomatic and trading station, 
not as a
 
settlement in the normal sense. 
 The colony immediately began to play an
 
influential 
 role in the China trade and attracted a substantial
 
multiracial community of foreign 
traders. It survived as 
an entrepat
 
free port until after World War I, 
when the transition to industrial
 
economy took place.
 
Throughout its history Hong Kong has absorbed political refugees.
 
Several hundred thousand entered Hong Kong in the 1930s duking the 
Sino-Japanese War. Still another influx took place during the Chinese
 
civil war of 1948 and 1949, when nearly half a million people entered 
the colony. Another flood of persons crossed border 1962the in and
 
nearly a quarter of a million persons 
from China and Southeast Asia
 
entered in the late 1970s. 
 Thus Hong Kong authorities have historically
 
had very little control over 
the arrival of new immigrants, which has
 
made it very difficult to implement such social programs as housing, 
schools, health and other services in an orderly manner.
 
Since the end of World War II, Hong Kong has enjoyed a steady 
pattern of utterly remarkable economic growth. In 1948, per capita
 
income in Hong Kong stood at US$180. 
Hong Kong's postwar transformation
 
has been so dramatic that 1981
by per capita income reached
 
approximately US$5,000, 
a more than seventold increase in 
real terms.
 
In the early stages of its industrialization, 
real gross dome:#ic
 
product (GDP) grew about seven percent per year from 1948 to 1960. 
From
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1961 through 1981, real GDP has risen nine percent per year. These
 
rates of growth have doubled per capita income during each of the past
 
two decades. Exports have risen steadily throughout the postwar period,
 
increasing by 9.4 percent a year in real terms during the decade of the
 
1970s.
 
During the 1970s, productivity (measured by output per work-hour) 
increased eight per cent per year at the same time hours worked per 
worker fell two percent per year. Since the oil-induced world recession
 
of 1974, the unemployment rate has generally remained beneath three
 
percent and the economy has worked at full employment despite an inflow
 
of several hundred thousand refugees and immigrants in the late 1970s.
 
Capital formation (savings as a share of GDP) has exceeded 20 
percent throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Hong Kong's economic 
transformation has occurred without foreign aid or special concessions 
to overseas investors.
 
What factors have fueled Hong Kong's outstanding economic success? 
The answers can be found in the territory's liberal economic policies 
and its prudent, conservative fiscal policies.
 
In Hong Kong, economic affairs are conducted in a free-enterprise 
environment. Government policy bias long dictated a virtually hands-off
 
approach toward the private sector, leaving people to pursue their 
self-interest as they see fit. In short, it is an economic policy of 
noninterventionism and minimum regulation.
 
It is a general principle of Hong Kong's economic and tax policy 
not to discriminate between residents and non-residents. On this 
principle, overseas investors may fully own local factories. 
Hong Kong is a duty-free port and allows the entry and exit of most
 
raw materials, consumer goods and commodities, with only a registration 
charge. The absence tariffsof and exchange contro,.s means that Hong 
Kong manufacturers can supply both domestic and foreign markets on the 
basis of least-cost production.
 
The government of Kong not impede the upHong does setting of 
private business enterprise. Free entry is permitted and encouraged 
into almost every line of production. Legal formalities to set up a 
business are few and inexpensive. Except for land grants from the
 
mid-1970s to land intensive industries that inject new technology into 
the economy, no protection 
or government assistance is traditionally
 
given to manufacturing industries, utilities, service industries, or 
private citizens. No attempt is made to distort factor prices in favor
 
of any particular type of development. Market forces are allowed to
 
shape the economy, and industries that lobby for protection from the 
competitive forces of the marketplace are fiercely resisted. As a 
result, Hong Kong enjoys the 
most modern factory facilities in the
 
world.
 
Hong Kong does not impose a statutory minimum wage. Earnings of
 
industrial workers fluctuate with overall 
economic activity. Loyalties
 
to firms are less important than salary and fringe benefits and thus 
workers respond quickly and 
 rationally to alternative employment
 
opportunities. Trade play
unions little part in setting wages or
 
working conditions. Labor is highly mobile 
between industries and 
trades, with little restrictions owing to rigid craft demarcation or 
entry protected by trade unions. Thus Hong Kong enjoys a free market in 
labor. 
In spending only what it can afford, the Hong Kong gove'nment is, 
-19­
by worldwide standards, unique. Few governments so intently hold
 
expenditure within means. Its standard rate of tax on earnings and
 
profits is 16.5 percent for corporations and 15 percent for individuals.
 
It maintains official government reserves which dwarf its miniscule
 
debts or fiscal obligations. The official view in Hong Kong is that a 
low tax system encourages investment and work, thereby generating rapid 
growth, which yields sufficient revenue to finance essential public 
services. Hong Kong has developed extensive housing (about half the 
population receive substantial government housing subsidies), education
 
(compulsory and government-financed through middle school), health (the 
infant mortality rate fell from 99.6 per 1,000 live births in 1950 to 
11.8 in 1980, and smallpox, cholera, and tuberculosis have been
 
virtually wiped out), and other social and community services through 
low rates of taxation, with virtually no need to resort to borrowing,
 
which would burden the economy with debt service payments. Although
 
Hong Kong has minimal defense requirements, the cost of its security
 
forces, borne largely by local taxpayers, approximately equals the same
 
share of national income as found in several small Western democracies.
 
In 32 of the 35 years through 1982, the budget has ended the year in 
surplus, and interest earnings on the accumulated surplus have become a 
major revenue item. For the 1982-83 budget year, these accumulated
 
reserves equalled about half of all government spending, which contrasts
 
with so many countries for which the public debt represents v very large
 
share of national income and an even larger share of public spending. 
The virtue of a net surplus position is that these resources allow the 
government to sustain public services during periods of economin
 
downturn that might reduce receipts below budgeted levels, without 
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having to increase tax rates or 
borrow to make up the shortfall. This
 
is not a strategy of demand management.' 
An open economy is not amenable
 
to demand management since any applied 
fiscal stimulus would 
quickly
 
drain out in higher imports.
 
The government 
has tried to operate its economic services on a
 
commercial basis 
where possible. 
 Once it has determined that it must
 
supply a service to achieve 
social or 
econ'mic objectives, either
 
because the provision of services cannot be found in the private market
 
or because these are 
common facilities that only the public sector can
 
provide (e.g., 
 water supplies), 
 it tries to conduct these public
 
enterprises with minimum cost to 
the general taxpayer, relying on user
 
fees and charges that reflect 
commercial opportunity costs. 
 For many
 
years, the railways, run by a 
government department, turned handy
a 

profit that funded other social objectives. 
Public economic services in
 
Hong Kong have rarely become heavily subsidized.
 
Monetary policy has been the most 
variable element in Hong Kong's
 
postwar 
economic environment. 3 
 When Hong Kong went off the silver
 
standard in 
1935, it adopted a sterling exchange 
rate regime, which
 
remained intact 
until 1972. In 
July 1972, 
the Hong Kong dollar was
 
pegged to 
the US dollar at HK$5.65 to US$1 and stayed tied 
to the US
 
dollar until November 1974. 
Hong Kong, for practical purposes, followed
 
gold standard rules during this fixed 
exchange rate 
period, where 
the
 
domestic money supply was determined by the overall balance of payments
 
situation. 
 Between 
1974 and October 
1983 the Hong Kong dollar floated
 
freely as a pure 
fiat currency. It longer required
no 
 full foreign
 
backing for the note issue. 
 Money could literally be printed at will,
 
though the government maintained external reserves which it could use to
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support the currency. In October 1983, the government refixed the 
exchange rate at HK$7.80 to US$1, and reimposeg full external backing 
for all newly issued currency. Uncertainty over Hong Kong's future in 
light of China's stated intention to recapture sovereignty in 1997 (see 
below) prompted a run on the Fong Kong dollar, which reached a low of 
HK$9.55 to US$1. Repegging the exchange rate quelled the monetary 
panic. During the 1960s, inflation averaged 2.4 percent annually; it 
rose sharply to an annual average of 12.9 percent during 1970-1981.
 
Under the floating rate regime, there were no effective monetary 
control devices available to the Hong Kong government to control the
 
domestic money supply, other than prevailing on local banks to raise
 
domestic interest rates. The 'liquid assets requirement introduced in
 
1964 was easily circumvented by accepting a deposit from a foreign bank
 
and redepositing the funds in the same bank: the Hong Kong branch's
 
deposit counted as a liquid asset while the deposit from abroad was not
 
subject to the liquidity requirement. Proponents of greater monetary
 
stability in Hong Kong forcefully advocated either that the Exchange
 
Fund specify a monetary target or an exchange rate target.
 
Central banks often create money in the process of buying 
government debt. Since Hong Kong has no public debt to speak of, all 
inflationary pressure arises from private demand for money, which is
 
often fueled during speculative binges, in the property and stock
 
markets.
 
Curiously, Hong Kong's period of strongest economic growth, the 
industrial world's highest average annual ratq between 1975-1980,
 
occurred during a period of monetary instability. This observation
 
suggests that monetary stability is neither necessary nor sufficient for
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growth, so 
long as the economy is free to adjust its internal cost/price
 
structure to trade profitably in world 
markets and enjoys business
 
confidence! 
 Through its floating rate regime, Hong Kong's competitive
 
internal prices hAd idjusted to world 
prices through appreciation or
 
devaluation of currency, rather than through increase
its 
 an 
 or
 
reduction in the quantity of money, which, 
now in the presence of a
 
restored fixed exchange rate regime, 
would spur or contract economic
 
activity.
 
Reflecting the economy's internal freedom, Hong Kong is a
 
completely free market in money. 
 No barriers restrict exchange between
 
the Hong Kong dollar and other currencies. Indeed 
 the ever increasing
 
funds that been
have attracted 
to Hong Kong banks helped finance
 
industrial development and have made Hong Kong a major financial center.
 
Government spending employment
and 
 are closely monitored to
 
guarantee that the 
rate 
of growth of the public sector is not out of
 
line with that of the private sector. This is to insure that the public
 
sector, which has a natural tendency to grow over time, does not crowd
 
out the private sector to the detriment of Hong Kong's external 
competitiveness. However, as the Hong Kong economy has prospered, its 
government 
has been unable to resist the pressure to increase public
 
spending. 
 It stood at 7 percent of GDP in 
1950, ranged from 13 to 20
 
percent during the 1970s, and reached about 24 percent in the early
 
1980s. Much thisof increased spending has been financed from sales of 
government land leases, not from borrowing or increases in direct or 
indirect taxes. Whether the current 24 percent ratio is a temporary 
response to the 1981-82 worldwide recession, or reflects a permanently
 
larger public sector, remains to be seen.
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How has the common worker fared under this economic system? 4 The 
evidence on postwar income distribution suggests that the 70 percent of
 
the population in the third through the ninth deciles have gained the 
greatest share of the increase in total national incomo. Low-paid
 
unskilled workers have benefitted most from the rapid increase in
 
employment opportunities. The well-being of the poorest 20 percent has
 
shown dramatic improvement: by 1976, their average household income 
reached US$1,300, which surpassed the poverty index of all Asian
 
countries. Low income households pay little in income taxes. A family
 
of four does not enter the income tax threshhold until it earns beyond 
US$11,000. Indeed, only 218,000 salaried taxpayers of a total 
population exceeding 5 million bore any incoie tax 3iabiltty in the 1982 
tax year. Moreover, 13,000 taxpayers, about 6 percent of the total 
number in the salaried tax 'het, contributed over half the total yields 
from the salaries tax, despite the low standard 15 percent rate. 
From the end of World War II through July 1982, Hong Kong has 
enjoyed remarkable political and economic stability, which has fostered 
prosperity without much internal pressure for the welfare state or
 
outside intervention. What has made this stability possible?
 
One answer is found in Hong Kong's unique political geography.
 
Hong Kong's prosperity has served mainland China's developmental
 
interests, largely through its earnings of foreign exchange doing
 
business in and with Hong Kong. Entrepreneurs frora Britain and other 
countries benefit from commerce in Hong Kong. Finally, the local
 
residents, many refugees from China, have found personal freedom and an
 
opportunity for economic improvement--life in Hong Kong has been
 
materially good. Thus a tripod of consent--Britain, China, and the 
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local people--has fostered this haven of economic freedom.
 
Second, the fact of economic resourcelessness necessitates a heavy
 
dependence on external trade. This open economic 
structure restricts
 
the range of productive economic intervention: the government can do
 
little to alter the cost/price structure of exports or imports to the
 
benefit of Hong Kong. 
 This fact alone encourages a hands-off attitude
 
by government toward the private sector, though other 
developing
 
countries in similar circumstances have been less inclined to follow 
Hong Kong's policy.
 
In August 1982, 
 Hong Kong's economy reacted sharply to an
 
announcement in Beijing that China intended to reclaim sovereignty over
 
Hong Kong by 1997, when the New Territories' lease is due to expire. 
Although the Chinese authorities promised that Hong Kong's free-wheeling 
economy would not be integrated into China's socialistic, state-directed 
system, the shattering of political confidence in Hong Kong's economic 
future sent the stock, property, and foreign exchange markets sharply 
downward. Asset values fell by up to one-third within a few months. 
Although Hong Kong remains attractive for short-term business activity, 
long-run investment has been put in serious jeopardy, thus severely 
damaging the long-run growth prospects of the economy. Investors lack 
confidence that Chinese authorities will preserve the free market
 
eonomic system of Hong Kong after 1997, and have 
begun to transfer
 
resources elsewhere.
 
To summarize, Hong Kong closely fits, the textbook model of perfect
 
competition in its maintenance of unregulated pricing and 
free entry.
 
Its overall economic policies complement market competition. The low
 
tax structure does not distort prices 
nor extract excessive resources
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from private hands. Subsidies are not granted to producers of
 
internationally traded goods or services. Regulations are held to a 
minimum to avoid increasing costs. World commerce is conducted on a 
free trade basis to allow least-cost production. Unstable monetary
 
policy has not severely retarded economic growth, though the loss in 
political confidence in the wake of China's stated intention to reclaim 
sovereignty in 1997 has forced the government to repeg the exchange rate 
to minimize price uncertainty. In short, the period from 1945 through 
1982 vividly demonstrates the benefits to a population from adherence to 
a market model of development.
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IV. Vignettes of Growth: Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea
 
Hong Kong has enjoyed a truly remarkable record of rapid economic
 
growth in the postwar era. 
 But it does not stand alone among developing
 
nations; its geographical cousins of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea
 
have also racked up enviable economic track records. These four
 
examples demonstrate that market economies, 
unencumbered by massive
 
public sectors or heavy-handed government regulation 
of business, can
 
rapidly uplift standards of living. Of course, political, economic, and
 
social circumstances vary from 
case to case, but one can nonetheless
 
discern a common strategy of economic growth.
 
What did Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea have in 
common as they
 
entered the postwar years? 
 Each endured major wartime disruption, each
 
lacked abundant natural and financial resources, and each was a poor
 
country with a low standard of living. All three initially embarked on
 
a program of import-substitution industrial 
development behind a
 
protective wall of tariffs and quotas. 
 All sought foreign aid. Growth
 
under this initial strategy was at best zod~rate.
 
External circumstances prompted the leaders of all three countries 
to switch strategies from a policy of import-substitution for a limited 
domestic market to the development of labor-intensive, manufactured 
goods for export to world markets. International price competition
 
replaced domestic subsidies and tariffs; private firms 
seized the
 
initiative in deciding what to 
produce and where to sell. 
 Government
 
relaxed its grip on the economy and increasingly allowed the marketplace
 
to determine the pattern and scope of economic development.
 
What ingredients go into a successful 
strategy of export-led
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economic growth?
 
1. 	 The exchange rate system 13 reformed to make sure that a 
country's curreney is correctly valued. An overvalued 
currency cheapens imports, makes exports more expensive, thus 
hampering the growth of exports, and invariably leads to a 
balance of payments crisis with its attendant problems.
 
2. 	Tax incentives are used to encourage foreign and domestic 
investment, including the establishment of special industrial 
estates or free trade zones that expedite the production of 
goods for export. 
3. 	 Governments often raise interest rates to encourage national 
savings and capital formation and discourage borrowing for 
consumption or less efficient uses.
 
4. 	 Emphasis is placed on the private sector for the creation of 
jobs 	and the distribution of income and wealth.
 
5. 	Governments consciously try to hold down the size and growth
 
of public spending, lest an expanding public sector crowd out
 
private investment and spending. Government spending is
 
directed at investment in infrastructure that facilitates 
industrialization, rather than on consumer subsidies. Public
 
services are financed from revenue obtained from rapid
 
economic growth, not from higher tax rates. Finally,
 
utilities and government enterprises price their services
 
rationally to reflect full opportunity costs. 
6. Measures are taken to prevent an excessive rise in labor 
costs.
 
These three Pacific Basin economies have coupled high growth with
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no adverse effects on the distribution of income. It has not been
 
necessary to choose between growth and distribution. Because Singapore
 
seems in many respects a twin of Hong Kong, we shall begin our economic
 
travelogue there.
 
A. Singapore
 
Singapore, 
"the Lion City," is an island, city-state economy,
 
located virtually 
on the equator.1 Three-fourths of its 
2.4 million
 
people are Chinese, the balance consisting' chiefly of Malays and
 
Indians. Its land area 
of 600 square kilometers is largely devoid of
 
natural resources and its people must import the bulk of their food and
 
raw materials to survive. Singapore's 
major assets are a strategic
 
location 
on the trade routes connecting Europe and Japan, 
an excellent
 
harbor that does not 
require periodic desilting, a diligent workforce,
 
and an honest, efficient government inherited from British colonial
 
days.2 From a state of relative poverty 
in 1946, with a per capita
 
income in the range of several hundred 
dollars, Singapore is now
 
regarded as a member of the first world, a per capita
with 
 income of
 
about US$5,000. Sustained growth over several decades has enriched its
 
two-plus million citizens.
 
Founded in 1819 by Sir 
Stamford Raffles, an entrepreneurial
 
employee of the East 
India Company, Singapore soon became a well-known
 
port and marketplace in Southeast Asia as well as 
the center of British
 
economic interests in the region. 3 
 Raffles grafted a 
)olicy of economic
 
liberalism onto a strategic location. 
 By making Singapore a free port,
 
he broke the Dutch monopoly over trade in the region. Trade became the 
major economic activity and British influence grew over the entire Malay
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Peninsula. 
For the next centmrY-fnd-va-half, the island's rulers steadfastly 
adhered to its founder's vipion of making Singapore a great emporium 
resting on the Victorian doctrine of free trade. Successive colonial 
governors zealously nurtured the port, maintained a lean and efficient 
administration, and allowed merchants and bankers full scope for the 
exercise of their talents -- a nineteenth century laissez-faire approach
 
to government. Taxes were held to a minimum and no harbor dues were 
levied as these could harm shipping and commerce. Indeed, the voluntary
 
contributions of private citizens, not government taxes, financed the
 
construction of the island's first lighthouse. It was government policy
 
to avoid monopolies and encourage free competition to assure efficient
 
business practices and low costs.
 
Politically, Singapore moved from a trading post under the control 
of the East India Company to become a British Crown Colony in 1867. It 
was integrated into a broader- political unit known as the Straits 
Settlements, which encompassed the British possessions of Penang and 
Malacca. It developed close economic ties with the nine states of 
peninsular Malaya that were under British influence. It adopted a 
financial system which pegged the Singapore dollar to the pound 
sterling, in which the local banknote issues enjoyed 100 percent backing 
in sterling. Its steady growth as a trading center and as home to 
British regional interests was interrupted when Japan conquered and 
occupied the strategic port during World War II. The British returned 
in 1946, but Singapore had a new status as a separate crown colony, 
since Penang and Malacca were joined into a broader Federation of
 
Malaya.
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Political independence was inevitable and elections were first held
 
in 1947. Singapore gradually moved to internal self-government in 1959
 
Lee Yew, became Singapore's fi'st and 

People's Action Party (PAP) took control. PAP 

as Kuan who \ prime minister, his 
The attained full
 
independence through a merger with Malaysia in 1963. 
 However, this
 
merger was shortlived. Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1965,
 
when it became an independent, sovereign nation.
 
Apart from having to rehabilitate a war-ravaged economy, the
 
immediate postwar years placed three major obstacles in Singapore's path
 
to prosperity.4 First, 
a communist insurgency in neighboring Malaya
 
during 1948-1960 spilled over into urban Singapore in the form of labor
 
union agitation. Labor unrest would complicate any plan 
to encourage 
industrialization. Political stability was a sine qua non of develop­
ment. Second, as rising protectionism brought stagnation to entrepft 
trade during the 1950s, rising unemployment threatened to become a 
serious domestic problem.
 
Third, shortly after independence in 1965, Britain announced plans
 
to withdraw its armed forces stationed in Singapore at an accelerated 
pace. Since British military spending accounted for almost 20 percent 
of the gross national product and 6 percent of employment, accelerated 
withdrawal threatenid io create both a severe recession and a defenqe 
vacuum. 
Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP proposed a political union with Malaysia, 
which would provide a good-sized domestic market for an industrial 
strategy of import substitution. Expulsion from the union with 
Malaysia, on political grounds by the government in Kuala Lumpur in
 
1965, destroyed the import-substitution strategy, since after 1965
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Singapore-based goods faced a tariff wall throughout the rest of 
Malaysia. Producing for a much smaller domestic market in Singapore 
alone could not generate enough new jobs. Factories which had been 
established with the hope of a larger market faced excess capacity. By 
the mid-1950s, the British had largely defeated the local comnist 
insurgency in Malayat thus restoring overall stability to the region. 
The PAP set about its task of creating jobs through a policy of 
industrialization, shifting from exclusive reliance on the entrepnt 
trade that historically had been the foundation of the economy.
 
Independent Singapore had inherited the free port and free-trade
 
policies of its colonial past. Up to the end of the 1950s, when 
entrepnt trade was the mainstay of the economy, the only major import 
and excise taxes were on petroleum, liquor and tobacco, levied for
 
revenue purposes. During the import substitutin phase of industriali­
zation from 1959 through 1967, tariffs and quotas were imposed to
 
protect nascent industries.
 
To assist local entrepreneurs and to stimulate the development of
 
import-substituting activities, the government adopted legislation in 
1959 granting approved "pioneer industries" up to five years exemption 
from the 40 percent company profits tax, and generous depreciation 
allowances. 5 It temporarily abandoned the principles of free trade in 
favor of modest import tariffs and quotas. The government actively
 
directed and participated in the economy. It created an Economic
 
Development Board in 1961 to grant loans to approved companies and to
 
take equity positions. The Board was also responsible for planning,
 
construction, and operation qf industrial estatti.
 
External adversity provi4ed a golden opportunity for Lee Kuan Yew
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and the PAP. The withdrawal of British military forces freed-up a large
 
piece of land that the government converted into a major industrial
 
estate, providing choice facilities to foreign investors. Deprivation
 
of a common economic market with Malaysia forced a change in policy away
 
from import substitution to manufacture for world markets. A candid 
internal assessment of the poor performance of highly protected 
"pioneer" industries, along with recognition that Import protectionism 
was damaging the entrep8t trade and inhibiting the development of new 
exports, reinforced the reality of a shrinking domestic market. The 
government also got control of the labor movement with restrictive
 
legislation on labor activists and union activity.
 
Although sudden expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 prompted Singapore's
 
shift from import-substitution to export-led development, other countries
 
have steadfastly held to an import-substitution strategy despite poor 
economic performance.6 An external shock is not sufficienta condition 
for a radical change in developmental strategy. It also takes astute and
 
determined political leadership.
 
Tax Incentives for Exports. After 1965, as a new, independent 
city-state with a sharply contracted domestic market, Singapore shifted 
quickly to the strategy of export-oriented industrialization. The 
government turned to already experienced foreign companies to invest and 
manufacture for export. 7 Adding to the "pioneer status" legislation, 
companies were given incentives to export. In 1965, they were permitted
 
to deduct double 
the expenses of developing world markets from their
 
taxable income. A 1967 act granted tax concessions on profits earned
 
from exports. The consolidated Economic Incentives Act of 1967 remitted
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90 percent of the profits tax if export performance was above a base 
level for eligible industries. Existing industries seeking to expand 
could obtain accelerated depreciation allowances and extension of 
"pioneer status," conferring 100 percent tax exemption for an additional 
period of 10 years. The government treated foreigners and foreign 
capital equally with the local citizenry. 100 percent foreign ownership 
of Singapore firms was allowed. Immigration of necessary business 
personnel was freely allowed. Remittance of profits was freely allowed. 
No controls were imposed on capital movements. In the 1980s, new 
incentives were granted to encourage research ani development work in 
high technology industries, and the maximum personal income tax rate was 
lowered from 55 to 40 percent (similar to the company tax rate) to 
insure that Singaporeans did not view high tax rates as a serious 
disincentive to continued hard work. 
To summarize, the Singapore government installed a raft of economic
 
incentives to woo foreign investprs. Tax holidays, "pioneer status,"
 
accelerated depreciation allowances, export incentives, unrestricted
 
repatriation of capital and profits, relief from double taxation,
 
readily available factory ites accompanied by many amenities, and
 
subsidies for manpower training programs. Many of the tax incentives
 
were appropriate devices to compensate exporters for the excess costs 
they previously endured due to the brief experiruent with protectionism. 
One can construe the offsetting effects of these export incentives as 
moving the overall tax and fiscal system in the direction of greater 
neutrality. The response to these measures was overwhelming (see 
below). 
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Labor Regulation. A second 
target o' economic policy was a
 
peaceful labor movement. 
 To secure this aim, in 1966, the PAP enacted
 
legislation that prohibited strikes unless approved by 
a majority in
 
secret ballot, required registration of all unions, and forbad non­
citizens and criminals from working 
in union activities.8 Further
 
legislation in 1968 placed the promotion, 
 transfer, recruitm-nt,
 
retrenchment, and assignments of tasks of workers the
within sole
 
prerogative of management--these subjects were 
held to be outside the
 
scope of labor-management negotiations. The also
Act encouraged
 
collective agreements of three to five years duration. 
The results were
 
nothing short of spectacular. 
 In 1961, 116 strikes cost Singapore
 
410,000 lost man-days of work. The communist grip on labor unions was
 
broken in 1964. 
 After 1968, only seven strikes erupted in the next 3
 
years. Days lost to industrial unrest fell to 1,011 and
in 1977 

completely disappeared 
in 1978. Although these measures severely
 
curtailed the freedom of organized 
labor, rapidly rising wages and
 
greater choice of jobs during the 1970s muted any desire by most workers
 
to support labor union agitators.
 
In effect the government has sot up a system of wage non­
bargaining. With acquiescent unions, wage levels are 
set annually by a
 
decree on the recommendation of a tripartite National 
Wages Council
 
(NWC) composed of employers, 
unions and government representatives.
 
Wage awards to workers have routinely exceeded inflation, but have not
 
priced Singapore goods out of world markets. 
 To be sure, NWC wage
 
awards have not tried to repeal the laws of supply and demand. The NWC 
has not been so much concerned with holding labor costs below market 
rates as it has been with preventing an organized labor movement from 
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extracting excessive wage agreements from management. Too high labor
 
costs would slow the processes of industrialization and job creation.
 
Peace, stability, and not pricing Singapore goods ocut of world markets
 
have been the goals of labor policy.
 
Public Finance. To begin with, it has been the policy of 
Singapore's government to concentrate on trade, rather than foreign aid. 
Nor has Singapore any foreign debt to speak of.9 Of the government's 
total public debt, only one-tenth is external, which equals about four
 
percent of GNP, low by international standards, and well below the
 
government's external assets. Singapore has consciously financed its
 
own public development expenditure--infrastructure, utilities, ports,
 
housing--from tax receipts.
 
The consolidated public sector consists of the government, which 
spends 60 cents of each public dollar, seven statutory boards, which
 
spend the other 40 cents, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which
 
acts as the government's central bank and holds the country's financial
 
reserves. The government's budget expenditures are divided into two
 
categories: current spending and development spending. Approximately
 
60 cents of each government spending dollar goes for such current
 
services as defense, justice, social and community services, economic
 
services, and debt servicing payments, with 40 cents allocated to
 
development projects. A portion of annual current spending consists of
 
transfers to a Development Fund, which, in turn, loans some of its funds
 
to the seven Statutory Boards. The most important of these are the 
Housing Development Board and the Jurong Town Corporation. The boards 
develop housing, which they rent or sell to the public, industrial 
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sites, telecommunications, port facilities, and so on. The boards
 
conduct their affairs in accord with sound commercial criteria, relying
 
on user charges, rather than appropriations from general tax receipts.
 
Where does the revenue come from to finance Singapore's public
 
spending? In 1981, for example, total government revenue, not counting
 
the receipts of the statutory boards, or the earnings from Singapore's 
official external reserves, came to S$9.6 billion. Of this sum, direct
 
taxes (largely income and property taxes) supplied 32 percent, indirect
 
taxes about 15 percent, the sale of goods and services by government
 
about 8 percent, and investment income and miscellaneous receipts
 
provided 12 percent. The balance consisted of loan repayments to the
 
development fund, drawing down of development fund stocks (which exceed
 
S$8 billion) and contributions from a special payroll tax set up to
 
finance retirement benefits.
 
By 1980, Singapore-had accumulated an apparent domestic public debt
 
exceeding S$13 billion, equal to about 62 percent of GNP. Annual debt
 
service payments appear to consume 23 percent of recurrent government
 
spending. However,, the debt is largely a fictional construct 
of the 
government's bookkeeping structure. Indeed, Singapore's external assets 
exceed its public debt, which, on a consolidated basis, means the public 
sector is a net creditor. 
Treasury securities are largely puichased through the mechanism of 
the Central Provident Fund (CPF). Established in 1955, the CPF is a 
compulsory savings scheme--a tax--to which most employed residents of 
Singapore and all employers are subject. An initial rate of 5 percent 
of payroll imposed both on employer and employee between 1955 and 1968 
has 'risen, by 1980, to a combined payroll tax of 37 percent. This sum 
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is withheld into the national pension fund. The fund, in turn, invests
 
its receipts in Treasury securities, which are issued by and the
 
proceeds subsequently held by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. The
 
proceeds of these treasury debt sales are then funneled into development
 
expenditures and loans to statutory boards; most is invested overseas. 
Conceptually, CPF funds can be treated as public sector assets, which
 
are held by the Monetary Authprity of Singapore. In effect, the CPF
 
acts as an arm of the MAS, withdrawing liquidity (via the payroll tax)
 
from the domestic economy. The proceeds of government securities,
 
"borrowed" from the CPF, are initially deposited with the MAS, which
 
converts these funds in the foreign exchange markets into gold, dollars,
 
yen, deutschmarks, and other external assets, which appear as assets on
 
the MAS balance sheet. The surplus position of the MAS, its assets
 
exceeding liabilities, include CFP contributions, pest budget surpluses, 
and interest earnings on its currency cover, which also consists of 
foreign assets. The total MAS surplus exceeds the total public debt of 
the government. The CPF is, in effect, a mechanism for national savings 
that the government can direct into infrastructure, public housing, and 
external assets.
 
Individual contributions co the fund are credited with annual
 
interest, typically exceeding the inflation rate. Payments in the 1970s 
averaged about 6 percent. (MAS earnings on its invested reserves have 
usually exceeded this rate.) Individuals may use funds contributed to 
the CPF before retirement for the purpose of purchasing a flat in the 
new housing estates developed by the Housing Development Board. After 
age 55, funds may be withdrawn for retirement, but, due to stable 
prices, it has been c4stomary for retired persons to subsequently 
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deposit these withdrawals into the government-run Post Office Savings 
Bank (which also buys some 
Treasury debt offerings). The CPF and the
 
Post Office Savings Bank aee the chief devices by which domestic savings
 
are mobilized and channelled to 
 government to finance development
 
expenditures.
 
In the distant future, as the Sihgapore populat on ages, 
contributions to the CPF may lag behind withdrawals. At that point, 
residents will begin to dissave unless tax rates increase or interest 
payments on CPF holdings 
 of government securities are 
 reduced.
 
Singapore could then face a budgetary problem.
 
Economic grovth 
has made the revenue picture so healthy that the
 
government has been abla 
in the 1980s to reduce marginal rates for
 
individual income taxes and speed up depreciation for companies. High
 
growth has meant greater tax receipts, increased public consumption and
 
investment, 
and rising after-tax income. 
 Contributing to 
sustained
 
growth is the 
conscious determination 
of government to control the
 
growth rate of public spendtng to insure that the private sector is not
 
crowded out. Since independence, public spending 
has remained in a
 
narrow range, usually below 25 percent, despite 
a sharp increase in
 
defense spending following the withdrawal of British forces.
 
The Monetary System. Technically speaking, Singapore maintains a
 
floating-rate exchange 
regime, in thewhich value of the Singapore 
dollar is largely linked to the value of the currencies of its two main 
trading partners, the United 
States and Japan. Responsibility for the
 
domestic Singapore dollar banknote 
issue resides 
in the Board of
 
Commissioners of Currency, which maintains full external backing for its
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note issue in the form :of gold, dollars, sterling, and other foreign 
assets. Until the Singapore dollar was floated in 1973, the Currency 
Board's activities were automatic: it simply bou_,ht and sold unlimited 
quantities of domestic cqrrepcy ,at the fixed exchange rate. Since 1973, 
Singapore has pursued an independent monetary policy. Approximately 
half of the Singapore money supply consists of banknotes and half of 
demand deposits with local banks. The Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS), established in January 1971, serves as the central bank, save 
responsibililty for the note issue, and is responsible for the
 
regulation of banking.
 
Over time, Singapore's money supply is largely determined by the
 
state of the balance of payments. 1 0  Exports of goods and services,
 
earnings from other items for shipping, insurance and services, and
 
capital inflows (including government borrowing abroad) generate
 
foreign-exchange accumulations by the banks. These can be converted 
into Singapore dollars at the Currency Board, thereby augmenting the 
currency in circulation and increasing demand deposits through multiple 
credit expansion. Conversely, imports of goods and services, payments 
abroad for invisibles, and capital outflows (including government 
investing abroad) require the banks to make foreign exchange payments 
abroad, which tends to reduce currency in circulation and contracts 
demand deposits. However, as Singapore's balance of payments has been 
persistently in surplus, the net effect on thq money supply has been 
expansionary, which reflects the growth of Singapore's export-oriented 
economy, and its role as a financial haven for wealthy residents in less
 
stable neighboring countries.
 
The government can vary the size and rate of change of the money
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supply by remitting the proceeds of its large foreign assets or by 
borrowing abroad. In so doing, it produces 
a net inflow of foreign 
exchange, and the of currencycorrespondingly volume 
 local in
 
circulation, to the extent 
that these funds are deposited with the
 
commercial banks. 
 It can also pressure local banks to repatriate
 
capital invested abroad. 
Conversely, to dampen an inflationary upsurge,
 
it can contract the supply of money by investing official funds abroad
 
(rsmoving them from the local banks), 
or require that a fraction of the
 
net inflow of private funds be deposited by the banks at the MAS. The
 
MAS can also reduce or increase the gash-reserve requirement of the
 
commercial banks and finance companies, thereby raising or lowering
 
their capacity to lend and create demand deposits.
 
Overrapid monetary expansion in the United States and Great Britain
 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s prompted Singapore to switch from an
 
exchange-rate systel pegged to the U.S. dollar to a floating-rate system
 
in June 1973 to avoid importing inflation. Since that time, balance of
 
payments surpluses caused the Singapore dollar to appreciate from a
 
value of US$1.00 = S$3.00 to a current value of S$2.12 to one U.S.
 
dollar. The Monetary Authority of Singapore has used its assets in
 
pursuit of stable prices with the result that Singapore, perhaps of any 
market economy in the world, best held inflation in check throughout the 
1970s. So long as Singapore maintains full external backing of its 
currency (in which, incidentally, its gold reserves are only officially 
valued at US$42 per ounce), it is likely to maintain a stable price 
level for the foreseeable future. It current policy tois allow the 
domestic money supply to grow in keeping with the growth of surpluses in 
the balance of payments. One can think of Singapore's money supply as 
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similar to a gold-standard, balance of payments monetary system, with
 
the exception that its huge control over foreign assets allows the
 
government to manage the exchange rate to maintain a stable domestic
 
price level, while remaining mindful that an appreciating local dollar
 
does not damage the competitiveness of Singapore exports. It has done
 
so in a consistently successful manner.
 
Economic Performance. The bottom line test of any poor country is 
the annual rate of economic growth. 1 1  In Singapore, real growth 
averaged about 9.3 percent bptween 1960 and 1980. Throughout this 
period of high growth, prices remained remarkably stable: the Consumer 
Price Index rose a scant 1.2 percent per year during the 1960s and, by 
worldwide standards, a modest 5.6 percent per year during the 1970s. As. 
a result, real wages and purchasing power grew rapidly. A 1960 per 
capita income of S$1,329 became, in 1980, S$9,293 (and the Singapore 
dollar appreciated by 27 percent against the U.S. dollar over this 
period). 
Economic growth can be ascr'.bed to rapid increases in capital 
formation. Gross domestic fixed capital formation grew from 10 percent 
of GNP in 1960 to an astonishing level of 40 percent by 1980, a fourfold
 
increase in the share of national income devoted to investment. Small
 
wonder that the index of industrial production rose 12 percent each year
 
during the 1970s. Although the rise in capital spending has been 
accompanied by a corrresponding shift downward in consumption spending 
as a share of GNP, the absolute level of real consumption rose three­
to-four-fold between 1960 and 1980. The reason is that high growth 
rates provide the means both for greater investmqnt and consumption. In 
turn, rising investment reinforces strong growth., Too, public sector 
spending has focussed on infrastructure, port and site development,
 
and utilities, thus providing an attractive framework within which
 
industrial development could take place.
 
Foreign investment played the major role in the export-led strategy
 
for industrialization and growth. Foreign investment, led largely by
 
American investors, rose at the absolutely phenomenal annual rate of 50
 
percent from 1967 to 1972. It grew from 
S$157 million in 1965 to
 
S$3,380 million in 1975. The number of foreign-controlled manufacturing
 
companies rose 
from 83 in 1959 to 383 in 1973, with an increase in their
 
paid-vup capital from S$56 million to S$1,225 million, triple that of
 
domestic controlled firms. In the decade encompassing 1966-1975, value
 
added in manufacturing ose from S$145 million to S$3,411 million, or by
 
eight times. Domestically produced goods rose from 6 percent of total
 
exports in 1960 to exceed half by 1972. 
 Unlike Hong Kong, the develop­
ment of manufacturing industry for export in Singapore has 
occurred
 
predominantly in the subsidiaries of foreign companies.
 
The export-grdwth strategy of industrialization met its jobs
 
targets. A potentially disastrous unemployment situation in the 1950s
 
gave way to full employment in the 1970s. This result is all 
the more
 
remarkable in that from million in 1960 just
population grew 1.6 
 to 

under 2.4 million in 1980, an increase of about 50 percent. However,
 
the number employed more than doubled, from 448,600 t,, axceed 1,068,900.
 
Jobs were created so fast that Singapore encountered a labor shortage as
 
it entered the 1980s.
 
The statistics on trade are staggering. Total imports and exports
 
,ame to 
about S$7.5 billion in 1960; by 1980, the corresponding total
 
surpassed S$92 billion. Diring the 1970s alone, trade rose at an annual
 
-43­
rate of 20 percent from about S$12 billion to S$92 billion. Total trade
 
is about four to five times the national income.
 
The tourist industry has grown by leaps and bounds from an annual 
number of 90,000 visitors in 1960 to surpass 2 million in 1980--almost 
as large as the Singapore population itself. 
The Future. Success has confronted the government of Singapore
 
with new, but certainly pleasant, problems. Continued political
 
stability make Singapore's free enterprise economic system so attractive
 
to investors that an earlier unemployment problem has given way to a
 
labor shortage. Also, an increasing share of the work force has entered
 
the personal income tax net. Singapore's leaders have thus modified 
their policies in taxation and the determination of wages.
 
First, taxes. Although tax incentives have been a prime vehicle 
for stimulating overseas investment and manufacturing for export, the 
PAP has adhered to a fairly steeply graduated rate structure for the 
island's personal income taxes, ranging up to 55 percent on income 
exceeding S$600,000. Fearing that high taxes could become a disincen­
tive to hard work, the government announced in 1979 its policy to reduce 
gr:.Iually the levels of personal income tax rates in the following three 
years to a top marginal rate of 40 percent--the same as the company tax 
rate. 
To facilitate business, depreciation rates of plants and machinery 
were accelerated. Elaborate tax incentives were also given to promote 
research and development activities in pursuit (%f making Singapore a 
high technology, highly skilled labor force economy. To stimulate the 
growth of the financial sector, stamp duties on certain financial 
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instruments were abolished, and a 10 percent concessionary tax rate was
 
granted to offshore gold transactions.
 
Turning to wages, recall that the Singapore government exercises an
 
effective control 
over basic wage rates. Throughout the 1970s, the
 
National Wages Council set annual wage increases at about 6 percent. 
In
 
1979, as part of a conscious policy to use
make the of labor more
 
efficient (given a labor shortage and stringent immigration controls), 
the government raised the average wage of a semi-skilled worker by 18 
percent. 
However, the ministry of labor stipulated that wage increases
 
must be related to productivity: 
 employees whose work performance or
 
attitude is unsatisfactory should NOT be paid the NWC wage adjustment. 
The government no 
longer wants to attract immigrants from Indonesia and 
Malaysia, who seek low-skilled, low-wage employment. Thus firms are 
being told that investment should seek highly skilled, expensive labor, 
as Singapore's leaders consciously try to upgrade to a higher technology 
economic base.
 
In addition to the employer contribution to the state pension
 
scheme, there is now a compulsory training levy on employers taking
 
2 percent of payroll. This Skills Development Fund is used to subsidize
 
the training of workers and subsidize interest payments on the purchase
 
of new machinery and equipment required to increase labor productivity.
 
B. Taiwan
 
Taiwan, known diplomatically as the Republic of China, is provin­
cial home to 18 million people of Chinese background. 12 It has a 
checkered history. Its most popular name, Formosa, comes from its 
period of encounter with Portuguese traders, who named it "Beautiful 
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Island." Although long settled by a small number of Chinese immigrants
 
from the mainland, it was not incorporated into the united Chinese
 
empire until late in the Ming Dynasty, in the sixteenth century. It 
fell under foreign domination with Japanese occupation in 1895, but was 
returned to China in 1945 at the conclusion of World War II. The civil 
war between Nationalist and Communist forces for control of China 
between 1946 and 1949 brought increased attention to Taiwan. Facing 
certain defeat, the Nationalist government and armies fled to Taiwan in 
1948, where they set up a "temporary" provisional government. They also
 
imposed authoritaiian political rule over the native Taiwanese popula­
tion. For the first decade or so of its island incarnation, the
 
Nationalist government concentrated its planning for a triumphant return
 
to the mainland.
 
By 1980, mainlanders had diminished to a bare 15 percent of the
 
population of Taiwan. Talk of recovering the mainland had been idle
 
rhetoric for the last two decades. In place of past military and
 
political dreams, the leaders of Taiwan have focussed their energies into
 
turning the island of Taiwan into a rich, prosperous economy. Adopting a
 
strategy of capitalist development with some state assistance, the
 
economy of Taiwan had grown so rapidly that a prosperous people of Taiwan
 
stand in marked contrast to an economically less well off one billion
 
Chinese across the straits of Formosa. With a per capita income of
 
almost $2,500 in 1981, Taiwan is among the world's top 20 exporters, and
 
its people enjoy a standard of living manyfold that of their compatriots
 
in neighboring People's Republic of China.
 
As mainland China has established diplomatic ties with more nations,
 
Taiwan has become politically isolated. Still, despite diplomatic
 
adversity, its externally-oriented economy grew at 
about 10 percent a
 
year throughout the 1970s. As other nations have warmed up to mainland
 
China's communist government, Taiwan had demonstrated that reliance on 
market forces brings greater economic rewards compared to the listless­
ness and inefficiency of state-directed and state controlled 
economic 
life in mainland China. Taiwan's economic ties with other nations have 
thrived despite the shock of America's withdrawal of diplomatic 
recognition in 1979.
 
Political power in Taiwan is shared between the Kuomintang Party,
 
the armed forces, and the 
 president, Chiang Ching-kuo, son of
 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Nationalist China's leader for nearly four
 
decades. Although locally-born Taiwanese have taken over more and more 
middle-level and top positions, remnantsthe of the original mainlanders 
who fled China in 1948 are still plearly in charge. Taiwan maintains a 
formal written constitution, with division
a of powers among the
 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, and elections
 
are held for members of the legislature and local government offices. 
But this constitutional facade should not mask the reality in which the 
Kuomintang maintains firma grip on political life. There is no serious 
or effective opposition to the Kuomintang.
 
The government has become something of a gerontocracy. Both the 
parliament and the separate national assembly, whose job it is to choose 
the president, were elected in 1948 before the Nationalists left the 
mainland. Of the 760 members of parliament originally elected, fewer 
than 300 remain and all but a handful are over 70. The national 
assembly's 
ranks, almost 2,700 when elected in 1947, have thinned to
 
about 1,000. 
 Reflecting a growing political liberalization, one quarter
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of the members of parliament (who now number some 400) have been elected 
from the Taiwan provincial population; the remaining 300, shrinking each
 
day, still "represent" all the other provinces and regions of the 
mainland. The key lesson to be drawn from this brief exposition of 
Taiwan's government is that persistent political stability has allowed 
officials to take a long-run view of the economy and adopt economic, 
fiscal, and other policies conducive to rapid economic growth.
 
Resources. The province of Taiwan is made up of one large semi­
tropical island and a few adjacent small islands, which have virtually no 
development potential, comprising a total land area of about 36,000 
square kilometers. 1 3  One-fourth of the land area is arable; the rest 
mainly mountainous. Its climate consists of a long, wet summer, with a 
short, mild winter. Like Hong Kong, it suffers the threat of violent 
typhoons and torrential rains in late summer. However, its overall
 
favorable climate permits multiple-cropping and year-round farming.
 
Taiwan is poorly endowed with mineral resources. Its main reserves 
are inferior quality coal, exceptionally high quality marble, natural 
gas, and few other minerals. Taiwan must therefore largely import the 
bulk of its raw materials for industry. 
During their occupation between 1895 and 1940, the Japanese
 
developed the p, ier iridustry, built a network of railways and highways, 
and improved the econoLic infrastructure for their own economic goals. 
However, much of this was destroyed by allied bombing and the lack of 
maintenance during World War I. The repatriation of Japanese personnel 
at the end of the war reduced the number of skilled and managerial 
personnel on the island, severely retarding industrial rehabilitation 
efforts. Taiwan's economy faced an uphill climb.
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Land Reform. The first major economic policy was a comprehensive 
land-reform program designed to augment agricultural output and secure 
the Nationalists' political base in the countryside. 14 
 The Nationalists
 
had failed utterly on the mainland 
in coping with landlords in their
 
limited efforts landat reform, thus abetting the Communist advances in 
rural areas. 
They would not fail twice.
 
Beginning in 1948, the government began to sell some 
public land to
 
tenant farmers. The next was the
step compulsory sale of land by
 
landlords. Privately-owned 
land in excess of specified amounts per
 
landower had to be sold to the rovernment, which would, in turn, resell 
that land to tenants. The purzhase price was set at 2.5 times the annual
 
yield of the main crops. Landlords were 
paid 70 percent of the purchase
 
price in land boads denominated in kind, and 30 percent in industrial 
stock of four public enterprises previously owned by the Japanese. 
Between May and December of 1953, tenant households acquired 244,000 
hectares of farmland, 16.4 percent of the total area cultivated in Taiwan 
during 1951-55. 
The distribution of landholdings changed dramatically between 1952 
and 1960. Families owning their own plots of land rose sharply, and the 
proportion of land cultivated by tenants fell from 44 percent in 1948 to 
17 percent in 1959. The ratio of owner-cultivators to total farm 
families increased from 36 percent in 1949 to 60 perent in 1957. By 
1957, part-owner 
families and owner cultivators owned more than 83 
percent of total farm land. 
Private ownership of land fostered more efficient farming practices,
 
since families now owned the full proceeds of their production. 
Agricultural output rose sharply. Land was worked more intensively. 
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Responding to market forces, farmers grew less of low-valued rice and
 
increased their production of more profitable crops, such as vegetables, 
fruits, livestock, and poultry.
 
In Taiwan, market forces largely set agricultural prices, letting 
farmers reap the benefits of their rising output. The government did not 
set up an "agricultural development board" to procure agricultural 
products at below market prices, a policy that other poor countries have 
employed to tax their rural seotors, which invariably depresses output 
and rural living standards. 
Industrialization. The Korean War strengthened military ties
 
between the United States and the government in 'Taiwan. Billions of 
dollars in foreign economic and military aid poured into the island. 
During the 19509, U.S. aid financed approximately 40 percent of Taiwan's 
import bill. This huge volume of foreign aid allowed the financial 
authorities to grossly overvalue Taiwan's currency, which subsidized 
domestic consumers who could purchase imports at less than half of world 
prices. Each New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) bought more U.S. dollars, and thus 
commanded greater international purchasing power, as a result of 
overvaluation. Behind this shield of foreign aid, Taiwan embarked on an
 
inwardly looking import-substitution policy of industrialization. The 
intent was to develop industries that produce for the local market, 
protected behind a shield of tariffs and quotas. The overvalued exchange
 
rate meant that domestic manufactured goods were not price-competitive in 
overseas markets, since production costs denominated in NT$ translated 
into higher US$ trading prices.
 
All seemingly good things must come to an end. In retrospect, the 
1960s and 1970s demonstrated that massive foreign assistance may have 
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hampered, not helped, Taiwan's 
economic growth. When the United States
 
government in the late 1950s anounoed phase
plans to out its massive
 
economic assistance, the government of Taiwan placed greater emphasis on
 
export promotion. 
To increase exports would require massive infusions of
 
private foreign capital and technology. To earn foreign exchange, trade,
 
not aid, would have to become the watchword of developmental policy. 15
 
From 1958, the government moved convincingly in a new direction.16
 
It promulgated a Program for Improvement of Foreign Exchange and Trade 
Control. An initial exchange rate of NT$5 to US$1, which had led to a 
complex multiple exchange-rate system 
and repeated devaluations, was
 
replaced by an 
official uniform exchange rate, reflecting market supply
 
and demand, which stabilized at NT$40 to US$1 
by August 1958. This 
simplification eliminated advance, deposit requirements and other strict 
import 
and foreign exchange controls; administrative costs were also
 
sharply reduced. 
 As a result, the real effective exchange rate for
 
exports remained stable during 
the 1960s and 1970s, which led to
 
accelerated export expansion. 
The reason is that a correct exchange rate
 
links internal prices (based on efficient, least-cost production) to 
world markets on a competitive basis. To compensate for distortions 
imposed on 
 exporters, which had characterized the prior import
 
substitution regime, the government undertook a number of concrete steps.
 
It gradually liberalized and finally abolished the commodity import quota
 
system. Tariffs were reduced. Import controls were liberalized. It 
granted three-year income tax exemptions. to certain categories of 
industries to stimulate investment. It revised the Income Tax Law and 
the Company Law. began toIt relax controls over the establishment of 
factories. It considered setting up a stock market fosterto local
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equity participation in the economy. It instructed the Bank of Taiwan to
 
raise interest rates to encourage private saving. These steps were a
 
modest precursor to massive new changes in law, which took effect in 1960
 
with the promulgation of the Statute for the Encouragement of Investment.
 
Key elements in the 1960 financial reform package granted those
 
export-oriented productive enterprises, which met the statute's criteria,
 
a five-year income tax holiday, set the maximum rate of profits tax
 
(including surtax) at 18 percent, compared with the ordinary 32.5 percent
 
rate, allowed all reinvested undistributed profits to remain free of tax,
 
gave a tax deduction for exports equal to 2 percent of annual export 
proceeds, exempted or reduced productive enterprises from stamp taxes, 
and permitted 7 percent of profits before taxation to be set aside as a 
reserve against losses due to exchange rate revisions. Annual tax 
refunds due to these new incentives, as a percentage of total income, 
stamp, customs, and commodity taxes, ranged from a low of 19 percent in 
1963 to a high of 52.4 percent in 1972, with the annual average in the 
30-percent range. Taiwan's remarkzable economic growth, in part, is 
directly linked to these sharp reductions in tax rates.
 
Adding more of a good thing, the government revised and expanded the
 
scope of the investment statute in 1965, authorizing the creation of
 
duty-free export processing zones. Developmental strategy had now become
 
wholly export oriented. Three zones grew so fast that by 1970 they
 
provided 7 percent of all jobs in manufacturing and turned out a tenth of
 
all exports. In some years, the entire balance of merchandise trade 
surplus could be traced wholly to the trade balance within the zones. A
 
necessary accompaniment to an export strategy was the steady reduction in
 
the rate of protection provided by tariffs throughout the 1960s and 
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1970s. 
A summary of Taiwan's export incentives includes reimbursement of 
customs duties and harbor dues imposed on imported contents of export 
products, refund of the commodity tax on products for export, extension 
of foreign exchange loans 
for the import of raw ma,%rials for export
 
processing, extension of low-interest export loans, exemption of income
 
tax and business tax on export transactions, cash bonuses for exports,
 
establishment of bonded warehouses, and export processing zones. 
 A $100
 
million trade that haddeficit largely been financed by U.S. aid was 
thereafter more than offset from increased export earnings.
 
Other Reforms. Tax concessions for exports, to neutralize the prior
 
bias of the import-substitution period, is only one part of Taiwan's 
growth strategy. Other dimensions include incentives to mobilize
 
domestic savings, control inflation, and produce domestic goods on an
 
efficient basis. Overall, the government has adopted sound fiscal and
 
monetary policies. It was first necessary 
to establish and maintain
 
exchange rates that would not overvalue the Taiwan dollar, since an 
overvalued currency would discourage exports and encourage imports. 
Between 1954 
and 1960, the government therefore carried 
out four
 
successive devaluations which adjusted an exchango rate of NT$15.55 to
 
US$1 to a more realistic rate NT$40 to US$1. remainedof It in place 
until i973, when the Taiwan currency was revalued upward to a rate of 
NT$38 to one U.S. dollar, a compromise between the revalued Japanese Yen 
and the devalued U.S. dollar, the currencies of Taiwan's majortwo 
trading partners.
 
The effect of a correctly valued Taiwan dollar that
means 
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oommodities and equipment imported into Taiwan were sold to end users at
 
realistic, rather than subsidizod, prices, thus minimizing waste and
 
inefficiency. Most important, a devalued Taiwan dollar enhanced the
 
competitiveness of Taiwan goods on world markets. Exports correspond­
ingly rose at fantastic rates.
 
Since 1960, Taiwan has maintained a gold standard rule, balance of 
payments, fixed exchange-rate monetary system, coupled with nuch 
discretionary monetary policy measures as changes in reserve 
requirements, and raising deposit rates of interest. The currency enjoys 
one hundred percent external oacking in such forms as gold, foreign 
currencies, and other financial instruments. Taiwan's exchange rate 
remained virtually constant during the 1960s as the government ran 
substantial budget surpluses; public borrowing from the banking system 
declined from 45 percent of domestic credit in 1962 to 9 percent in 1970. 
During the 1960s, inflation averaged 3.4 percent. From time to time 
during the 1970s, huge balance of payments surpluses brought domestic 
monetary expansion and inflation as external balances wer3 converted into 
local currency. On one occasion, Taiwan authorities lifted restrictions 
on luxury imports to produce a trade deficit, and a concomitant monetary 
deceleration. An upward revaluation from NT$40 to NT$38 in 1972 was 
followed by another shift to NT$36 in 1978. In 1979 a foreign exchange 
market was established which allowed a daily float. Domestic inflation 
in the late 1970s brought a devaluation to NT$38. 
The government has set all institutional interest rates in Taiwan 
throighout the period 1960-1981. Taiwan's ficancial system is dominated 
by government-owned banks, which often behave like a department of the 
Ministry of Finance. Only since the late 1970s have the commercial banks
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been allowed to vary their interest rates within a range set by the
 
government. Thus the government could exercise a direct levex- on the 
supply and demand of domestic credit by its interest rate policy. To 
encourage savings, and to insure that credit would only be used by more 
efficient borrowers, the gover,.ment raised the interest rate on savings 
deposits in the Bank of Taiwan and other banks. This pulled more savings
 
into the banking system, and while it meant higher charges on bank loans,
 
it also insured that only efficient firms would have a call on the 
nation's scarce savings. Bank rates on secured loans rose as high as 
23.4 percent in 1954 and, as the supply of savings increased, fell 
gradually in steps to 11.3 pereent in 1972. Private and government 
consumption fell as an increasing share of national output was channeled
 
into capital formation. Gross saving as a percentage of GNP increased 
from less than 10 percent during the 1950s to surpass 20 percent during 
the 1960s. To encourage saving, earnings from savings accounts were 
granted income tax exemption.
 
Fiscal policy has placed no strain on the island's central bankers.
 
Overall policy is, taking one year with another, to maintain a balanced 
budget. The experience of the Nationalist government during its mainland
 
rule of the late 1940s with rampant inflation, one of the five worst in 
world history, which also contributed to their downfall, insured that 
inflationary issue of banknotes would forsakenbe as a method of 
financing g&verrnment spending on Taiwan. 
Despite major tax cuts in 1960,
 
deficits in the four fiscal years through 1964 were quickly transformed 
into a string of steady, uninterrupted budget surpluses, which reached a 
high uf 25 percent of annual spending in 1974.17 Low taxes have 
stimulated high rates of economic growth which, in turn, have raised more 
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than sufficient revenue to sustain sharply rising levels of government
 
spending on both defense and social progrbms, sharply reducing the
 
government's borrowing needs.
 
In 1974, the Minister of Finance, K.T. Li, noted that "placing too 
much emphasis on increasing tax revenue is detrimenital to economic 
development, and without economic development there can be little 
increase in national income. Only when national income is on the rise 
can the people afford to pay more taxes." 18  A conservative budgetary
 
policy, predicated on low taxes, has eliminated inflationary pressures
 
and promoted a regime of stable prices. With the money supply largely
 
determined by the balance of payments, and a market determined exchange
 
rate, Taiwan has enjoyed rapid growth and relatively stable prices.
 
Results. Export expansion fueled economic growth and created
 
millions of new jobs. Even as higher productivity reduced the need for 
labor, sharply rising exports during the three periods 1961-66, 1966-71, 
and 1971-76 generated net increases in employment of 377,000, 1,015,000, 
and 925,000. Rapid expansion of exports created jobs fast enough to 
allow the economy to reach full employment by 1971, and maintain that 
status throughout the 1970s. Export growth made it possible to maintain 
full employment despite steadily rising productivity and continuous 
migration from agricultural areas into the cities. 
At the end of World War II, per capita income in Taiwan was a low, 
low US$70. It rose so rapidly that it reached US$2,280 in 1980.19 Until 
the 1960s, population also grew at the high rate of 3.5 percent, but has 
since levelled off at about 2 percent. Real gross national product has 
grown at the astounding annual average rate of 9.2 percent over the past
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three decades: 8.2 percent in the 1950s, 9.4 percent in the 1960s, and
 
9.9 percent in the 1970s. 
 Real GNP has doubled every seven years since
 
1963. By 1980, real GNP was eleven times that of 1952. The whole
 
country was literally transformed from poor to middle-income in just one
 
generation.
 
The structure of the economy changed to reflect the prominent role 
of manufacturing for export. Employment in agriculture decreaseu from 
51.4 percent of total employment in 1952 to less than 30 percent in 1979,
 
while employment in the industrial sector increased from 20.4 percent to
 
41.8 percent during the same period.
 
The labor force was successfully absorbed during the 
1960s. The
 
unemployment rate from
fell a worrisome 6.5 percent in 1952 to 1.2
 
percent 
in 1979. The annual growth rate of manufacturing real wages
 
reflected this process of labor absorption, rising by 2.7 percent in the
 
1950s, 6.2 percent in the 1960s and 10.7 percent in the 1970s. 
 Increased
 
use of unskilled labor during the 1966-71 period seems to have caused the
 
wage rate for unskilled labor to rise more rapidly than that for skilled 
labor. 
 The poorest paid members of the work force derived the greatest
 
benefits from the export-led industrialization of Taiwan.
 
The various savings reforms worked their wonders too. The average
 
ratio of net domestic savings to national income from 1951 through 1959
 
was only 5 percent and from 1960 to 1962, 8 percent. The savings ratio
 
jumped to 13 percent and more after 1963. 
 Since 1967, the savings ratio
 
has exceeded 20 percent of national income; in the 1970s it 
was around 30
 
percent.
 
Almost half of all investment before 1962 was financed by U.S. aid.
 
Almost no private foreign capital flowed 
into Taiwan before 1961, but
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this changed dramatically after 1964. Private foreign investments from 
1962-69 came to US$378 million. Foreign investment was about US$150 
million every year in the 1970s, increased to US$330 million in 1979, and
 
US$466 million in 1980. Private foreign investment contributed
 
significantly to Taiwan's prosperous transformation. In 1976, exports by
 
private foreign and overseas Chinese firms amounted to US$2.2 billion, or
 
29 percent of Taiwan's total expcrts, reaching 82 percent of exported
 
electronics and electrical products.
 
In the mid-1970s, the government of Taiwan embarked on a series of
 
major development projects that entailed substantial government
 
involvement in the economy. Ten basic construction projects were
 
announced that encompassed a national freeway, railw&y electrification, a
 
new railway line along the east coast, a new modern international
 
airport, a nuclear power plant, and two harbor projects--these all fall
 
within infrastructure development. However, the projects also included a
 
giant shipyard, a steel mill, and a petrochemical complex, in a
 
state-directed effort to develop heavy industry to accompany Taiwan's
 
dependence on light industry. These latter three have not been
 
profitable ventures and there are no current plans to embark on a new
 
series of major projects once these Lre completed. While these projects 
are massive, they do not presage a substantially greater role for 
government in the future evolution of the economy.
 
Scholars worry a great deal about the effects of rapid economic 
growth on the distribution of national income. Rapid growth is all fine 
and well, they say, if it does not produce marked gaps between rich and 
poor that foster unrest and political instability. The experience of 
Taiwan confounds these critics, because Taiwan is now regarded, after 
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three decades of very rapid growth, including strong performance in the 
reformed rural sector, 
as a low inequality country. The poorest
 
quintiles of the population enjoyed increases in real household income
 
more 
rapidly than the richest, thus narrowing the gap between rich and
 
poor.20 Illiteracy has given way to near 
universal literacy. Life
 
expectancy is 
on a par with Western societies. Ownership of cars, homes,
 
telephones, and refrigerators, to name a few durables, is more reflective
 
of Western standards of living than of Asian. 
 Taiwan is prosperous en
 
mass. 
 All this in just three decades, on 
a relatively resourceless
 
island, that must commit a large portion of its annual budget to defense
 
spending.
 
C. Korea
 
South Korea (hereafter Korea) differs from Singapore and Taiwan in
 
several respects. It is a peninsula, not an island. 
 It is populated by
 
Koreans, not Chinese. 
 Its climate is temperate, not tropical 
or
 
semi-tropical.
 
To even the most casual 
observer, Korea resembles Singapore and
 
Taiwan in many other respects. It suffered the ravages of war 
in the
 
early 1950s, which literally decimated the country. It survived on
 
foreign aid in the first few years of its postwar rehabilitation. 
It had
 
to cope with precipitous withdrawal of U.S. economic assistance in the
 
early 1960s. It is a relatively resourceless country, which must import
 
the bulk of its raw materials for industry. 
 It has leaped from the
 
status of impoverished to middle-income nation in the short span of two
 
decades. 
 It has enjoyed a good measure of political stability. Export
 
expansion was its primary engine 
of economic growth. Private sector
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enterprises have led the way in investment and job creation, though the
 
government has played a leading part in setting interest rates and
 
allocating credit.
 
Resources. Korea is a small and densely populated country of 37 
mil]ion people.21 Its total land area of 99,000 square kilometers, just 
over triple that of Taiwan, is largely mountainous. Only 23 percent of 
its land is cultivated. 67 percent is forested mountain slopes, and the 
cities, industrial facilities and roads are concentrated into a small 10 
percent. The ragged topography and harsh winters limit the productive 
potential of agriculture. Mineral resources are also limited, largely 
confined to poor quality coal. Korea's population density of 363 persons 
per square kilometer of land is among the world's highest. However, 
population pressures have abated substantially in the postwar era, 
falling from 3 percent annual growth in 1961 to 1.7 percent by the 
mid-1970s.
 
Political and Economic Background Before 1960. Japanese success in
 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) led ;o its military occupation of Korea
 
in 1905 and outright annexation in 1910.22 During thirty-five years of
 
rule, the Japanese brought capital, new agricultural practices, and
 
developed the foundations of an industrial base, bringing Korea into the
 
modern economic world.
 
Korea was liberated from Japanese occupation at the end of World War
 
II, but was immediately partitioned along the 38th parallel between South 
Korea and North Korea. The South had a majority of the population, its 
most productive agricultural land, and the bulk of light industry; most of 
the heavy industry and more than 90 percent of the electricity-generating 
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capacity were the
in north. 
 What industrial facilities the south
 
inherited were largely destroyed during the Korean War of 1950-1953. Thus
 
South Korea's economic development had to overcome three obstacles in the 
first decade of its modern independence: withdiawal of skilled Japanese 
managerial personnel, partition, and wartime devastation.
 
Massive United States and United Nations assistance was required to
 
rehabilitate its war-ravaged economy. 
 Virtually the entire of the
 
country had suffered extensive destruction. Three-fifths of the
 
cultivated land 
had been laid to waste, property damage exceeded $3
 
billion, most industrial facilities had 
been demolished, the death toll
 
was estimated at over 3 million (both sides included), and approximately
 
one-quarter of the population 
roamed the countryside as refugees. Ten
 
million people were 
homeless and five million survived purely on relief.
 
Reconstruction began immediately with foreign grants. 
 Although inflation
 
quickly subsided, the economy registered only modest gains. During its
 
period of dependence on 
aid, which totalled $2.3 billion, investment was
 
inadequate, exports grew slowly, and output increased at much too low a
 
rate to bring about full employment and rising real wages. Growth
 
averaged 5.5 percent from 1954 to 
1958, but fell to an annual average of
 
3.6 percent between 1959 and 1962.
 
Behind a shield of foreign aid, Korea erected barriers of tariffs 
and quotas in pursuit of an import-substitution industrial policy. By 
now, we should not be surprised that Korea initially chose an import. 
substitution strategy, achieved only modest gains from it, and abandoned
 
it in the early 1960s in favor of an export-expansion policy.
 
The regime of Syngman Rhee held sway all through the 1950s, but its
 
increasing autocratic rule culminated in 
a student revolt of 1960 which
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toppled the goverrznent. Rhea resigned in April 26, 1960, and elections 
were held the following July. Factional struggles and political turmoil 
after the election paved the way for a military takeover in 1961. Its 
leader, General Park Chung Hee, firmly ruled without interruption until 
his assassination in October 1979, thus providing 18 years of political 
stability within which Korea dashed for development on a pace that 
rivalled Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. When the political and 
with aeconomic dust had settlod in 1962, Korea was a very poor country 
per capita income of US$87, total economic output just $2.3 billion and a
 
high population growth rate of 2.9 percent. The prognosis for growth was
 
not good. 
Korea, too, underwent a land reform program, but it was largely 
completed more than a decade before rapid economic growth began and
 
it.23  
contributed little to Japanese occupation had imposed an
 
oppressive land tenure system on Korea, which passage of a. Land Reform 
Act in June 1949 began to remedy. The proportion of the rural population
 
owning l.and rose from 16.5 to 71.2 percent between 1947 and 1974,
 
reflecting greater equitability.
 
However, private ownership of land did not bring dramatic gains in 
output and rural incomes because the government sustained a policy of 
grain pricing and procurement that did not reflect market forces. Rhee's 
government and Park's first decade subsidized urban consumers at the 
expense of rural producers. Not until the 1971 election revealed that 
Park was losing support in rural areas did the government substantially 
increase producer prices. It had been able to suppress prices because 
PL 480 grain imports alleviated grain deficits, simultaneously generating 
local currency with which to help win the government. When the United 
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States changed PL 480 commodities into dollar repayable loans by 1971,
 
grain imports became a drain on foreign exchange. During the 1970s, the
 
government improved rural incentives, sharply increasing grain prices to
 
stimulate increased yields and improve rural incomes.
 
In retrospect, 
the PL 480 foreign 
aid program was a critical
 
deterrent to reform 
of national grain pricing policies, allowing the
 
Korean government to hold down grain procurement prices. 
U.S. withdrawal
 
of soft PL 480 commodity loans forced the Korean government to increase
 
grain prices to encourage greater output, in the process raising rural
 
incomes. 
Land reform, begun in 1949, did not bring full benefit to rural
 
dwellers until pricing policies were reformed in the 1970s.
 
The reduction of foreign aid the was
in 1960s a blessing in
 
disguise. It prompted the Korean
new leadership 
to adopt growth­
oriented, outward-looking policies. 
 The key to growth would be an
 
emphasis on rapid expansion of exports. 
This decision brought changes in
 
the areas of taxation, new incentives for exporters, and modifications in
 
interest rate policy and, especially, the exchange rate. 
 Dividends were
 
immediate and massive: 
 Korean exports averaged over 30 percent in annual
 
growth from the early 1960s through the late 1970s, predominantly in the
 
form of labor-intensive 
manufactured goods, in which Korea 
enjoyed
 
comparative advantage in low-cost labor. 
 In 1960, industry supplied 20
 
percent of national income; in 1980, the share had more than doubled to
 
42 percent. Agriculture's share fell from 38 to 16 percent over the same
 
period. 
Thus the economy was literally transformed in two decades.
 
Economic, Fiscal, and Monetary Reforms. As U.S. aid was scheduled
 
to be cut off, the government 
reformed the exchange rate of its
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currency.24  Since imports in the 1950. had bcen largely financed from 
aid, not trade, it had not been necessary to adopt a realistic exchange 
rate. An overvalued Korean currency, the won, subsidized domestic 
consumers of imports, but retarded the growth of exports. In 1960, for 
example, more than half of Korea's foreign exchange receipts were earned 
on government transactions, of which military procurement was the single 
largest item. Korean officials found they could get more dollars per 
soldier in uniform, whose costs were stated in Korean Won, if they kept 
the official won exchange rate overvalued against the dollar. This
 
method of absorbing foreign aid was devastating for the development of 
commercial exports. (By 1975, after exchange rate reform, government 
transactions produced less than 3 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 
while that of manufactured exports had grown to 74 percent.) The 1962 
rate of 130 won to the U.S. dollar was sharply devalued to 256 per dollar 
in 1964. A unitary floating exchange rate was put in place in March 1965 
and the value of the won steadily fell to 1184 to one dollar by 1974, 
where it remained during the balance of the 1970s. In effect, the 
successive currency devaluations produced a uniform exchange rate at a 
level near the free-trade exchange rate, which is the exchange rate that 
would exist in the absence of both protective measures against imports 
and export incentives.
 
The net real exchange rate for exports was kept steady between 1961
 
and 1972. Export incentives were granted to offset the higher production
 
costs that domes3ic inflation brought. Korea pegged the won to the US 
dollar from 1974 at W4f34 to US$1. The won was devalued in January 1980
 
oy 16.6 percent and subsequently pegged to a currency basket and
 
depreciated further. It is now on a managed floatp falling to W745 to
 
-64­
US$1 by late 1982. Despite the highest inflation rate among the gang of 
tour, export incentives were freely.used to sustain a high export growth
 
rate. 
The government holds a controlling interest in all 
the national
 
banks, and owns all the special banks and development institutions, which
 
are thus subject to comprehensive government controls. Although the 
government has begun denationalizing state-ovmed banks in 1982, it 
dictates interest rates, lending policies, customer service, and other 
aspects of banking. Until 1979, 
when the Korean Bankers' Association
 
began to fix deposit and loan 
rates within ranges established by the
 
Monetary Board, the government set all institutional iaterest rates. The
 
government doubled nominal deposit rates as part of the 1965 financial 
reform, which sustained a relatively high real rate of interest through 
1971. 
 Since 1973, however, real doposit rates have been negative.
 
The government has used its control over the banking system to
 
allocate credit and has made extensive use of selective credit policies. 
About 60 percent of bank lending is for government-designated purposes, 
such as export support. 
 Loans for exports have consistently carried
 
rates below the deposit rate. Subsidized loans for priority sectors are
 
usually eligible automatically for special rediscount rates at the Bank 
of Korea. Government guarantees 
have also been provided for foreign
 
borrowing of almost any firm showing a capacity to export. 
The effect of
 
selective credit allocation at below market rates has been to hold down
 
deposit rates of interest. In turn, lower interest rates reduce the 
quantity of deposits (the banking system's deposit liabilities) and the 
total volume of funds available to lend 
 (the banking system's loan
 
assets). 
 The resulting shortage of domestic saving has compelled Korean
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businessmen to borrow abroad, which has generated a large foreign debt.
 
During the post-1965 export boom phase of Korean development, 
monetary policy has consisted largely of imposing reserve requirements on 
bank deposits, which has varied from 12 to 35 percent, often changing 
sharply overnight. The virtually au'omatic rediscount mechanism which 
supports priority loans for export finance tends to produce excessive 
monetary expansion, despite the reserve requirement provision.
 
Institutional interest rates remain consistently below their free market 
levels as credit is rationed to exporters at below market prices. From 
time to time, credit ceilings have been used as instruments of monetary 
policy to get control of inflation. The overall effect of selective 
credit allocation, which has entailed negative rates of interest for 
savers, has been to reduce national saving and credit availability, 
perhaps slowing the overall rate of economic growth.
 
Compared with Singapore and Taiwan, foreign investment has played a 
relatively smaller role in Korea's industrialization, amounting to about 
$1.5 billion. Government guarantees of overseas borrowing by Korean 
businessmen encouraged foreign borrowing. 
Apart from maintaining an effective free trade exchange rate through 
using export incentives to offset domestic inflation, the government 
implemented a series of trade liberalization and tariff reform measures 
to achieve greater internal economic efficiency. In pursuit of export
 
expansion, exporters were granted preferential credit. Other steps
 
included indirect tax exemptions on inputs into export promotion and 
export sales, a 50 percent reduction on income taxes from export earnings
 
(abolished in 1973), tariff exemption on imported raw materials and 
equipment for export production, and a "wastage allowance" on imported 
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raw materials for production of exports. Following the exan.. -e of the 
successful Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone in Taiwan, the Korean
 
authorities passed legislation creating several tax-exempt and duty-free
 
zones of their own in the late 1960s, which generated tens of thousands 
of jobs in a few short years. These measures should be viewed as m,'ving 
the overall tax and fiscal system in the direction of greater neutrality 
to compensate for the bias imposed during the import-substitution phase 
of postwar Korean development.
 
Broadly speaking, the government allowed tho forces of supply and 
demand to prevail in labor markets., It imposed no statutory minimum 
wages or other labor cost-increasing measures. As a result, the ecornomy 
achieved full employment by the late 1960s, after which real wages rose 
sharply. 
The Korean public sector comprises the central government, local 
governments, and various public sector enterprises. 25  Most budget
 
transactions occur at the level of th central government. Its budget,
 
in turn, consists of a general account, an economic development special
 
account, and a variety of other small special accounts. Funds are 
transferred back and forth across these accounts for a variety of current
 
and capital expenditures. What is important is to note, first, that
 
total government spending has typically been less than 20 percent of GNP,
 
though from time to time it has reached as high as 23 percent. In 
aggregate terms, the Korean public sector has not crowded out its private 
sector. Nor have taxes discouraged work, savings, or investment. Direct 
taxes only take 5 percent of GNP, with the remaining 16 percent of GNP 
collected from a value-added tax, excise taxes, customs duties, and
 
several miscellaneous charges. The income tax takes inflation into 
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account through regular increments in exemptions. Also, the government 
has reduced the top marginal rates in the late 1970s from 70 percent to 
55 percent on incomes exceeding $99,000; it plans still further tax rate
 
cuts in the 1980s. The level of company taxes has been consistently
 
monitored, and the rate was reduced from a prior level of 33 to 38 
percent to 20 percent in 1982. High rates of economic growth have 
enabled the government to implement periodic tax rate reductions at the 
same time still enjoying overall increases in tax receipts. Korea's 
public finances are well managed.
 
Overall, the government allocates about 30 percent of the general 
budget to its investment and loan accounts, which largely represent 
investment expenditure. Thus public sector funds have not been frittered 
away on consumer subsidies.
 
In 1962, foreign transfers, largely U.S. aid, represented 8.8
 
percent of GNP. It declined to 1.2 percent by 1975, reflecting both U.S.
 
aid reductions and increasing Korean self-reliance. In its placqt the 
country turned to external borrowing to take up the slack. An external 
debt of a few billion dollars in 1971 rose tenfold past $20 billion by 
1981, when Korea had become the world's third largest borrower on
 
international capital markets behind Brazil and Mexico.26 The percentage
 
of export earnings needed for interest and repayment still remains low at
 
about 12-13 percent. In borrowing so heavily abroad, Korea's pall-mall 
rush to industrialize parted company with its three Asian cousins, who 
eschewed external debt financing as a vehicle for growth. The Koreans 
have paid a stiff price for overheating their economy: GNP fell 6.2 
percent in 1980 and real wages fel. for the first time in many years. 
For the moment, Korea's modern miracle has shipwrecked on the shoals of 
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excessive foreign debt. By contrast, because Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore followed more neutral monetary and 
financial policies, their
 
economic growth was largely self-financed. Korea may face slower growth
 
rates in the near future compared with its geographical cousins.
 
From the vantage point of a Monday-morning quarterback, it is easy 
to criticize the Koreans trying move fast thefor to too into modern 
technological age. However, compared with dozens of other third world 
countries still struggling to surpass a poverty level of existence, the 
achievements of Korea's last two decades nothingare short of heroic. 
Starting from a lower, base, the country's rate of growth in exports has 
outpaced that of Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. But the Chinese
 
threesome, unburdened with debt, may find the path to future growth less 
strewn with thorns.
 
Results. 
 From a per capita income of $87 in 1962, two decades of 
rapid growth have propelled per capita income to about $1,600 by 1982.27 
Though still lagging behind Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the gains
 
in Korea are nonetheless impressive. 
A GNP growth rate of 2.2 percent in
 
1962 reached 6.9 percent in 1964, 8.1 percent by 1968, and has averaged 9
 
percent through 1979. A trivial $41 million of exports in 1961 grew to
 
$8 billion by 1976, rising more 
than 30 percent every year between 1960
 
and 1979. (As an aside, per capita income in North Korea, which
 
inherited the bulk of pre-liberation heavy industry, is about one-fifth 
to one-fourth that of the South.) Predictably, rapid export growth, 
chiefly manufactured goods, created millions of new jobs: the open 
unemployment rate declined from 8.2 percent in 1963 to a low 3.9 percent 
in 1976. Throughout this period, the average increase in real wages 
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exceeded 7 percent. Rising wages, in turn, fostered significant gains in
 
nutrition, literacy, longevity, infant mortality, and the consumption of
 
automobiles, refrigerators, and other consumer goods. Throughout this
 
period of export-expansion, labor productivity grew 7 percent a year.
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V. Ivory Coast 
Africa boasts no spectacular growth stories to compare with the 
Pacific Area Basin. Statistics published in the World Bank's annual 
World Develoment Report reveal that annual increases in per capita 
income of three percent are extrely rare. In some cases, per capita 
incaes have barely grown at all. Sor moet, the rate has ranged between 
one and two percent. An annual average increase of 3 percent puts one 
in the African ledger of aucess stories. 
At the top of this ledger sits the Ivory Coast, with a per capita 
income in 1980 that exceeded oil-rich Nigeria. More than any other 
African nation, the Ivory Coast has been a model of andpolitical 
econmic stability since self-rule, which began in 1960. It would be 
difficult to tell from an examination of postwar econmic, fiscal, and 
monetary policies when the French stepped dn and the Ivorians stepped 
in. President Felix Hcuphouet-Boigny, the only president Ivorians have 
known, has himself defined the country as "partial to a policy of 
liberalism, and to foreignopenness investors." 1 Let~s begin with a 
demographic, historical, and economic profile of Africa's best exymple 
of the free market model of developAent. 
Historical. Political, and Ecoramc Persective. The Ivory Coast 
was formed by French colonizers in 1893 as a geographical entity out of 
more than fifty ethnic groups. Coffee and cocoa, first in French and 
then later also in African planter hands, were the country's main 
products. Timber ocprised the third main export. The postwar 
transition from French to Ivorian rule took place peacefully, with the 
country's sole president maintaining close economic, political, and 
cultural ties to France. 
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The pre-1960 economy was largely a primary plantation export 
econumy. Raw materials were shipped abroad, chiefly to France, for 
processing. In turn, the Ivory Coast was a market for French 
manufactured goods. The French also bilt a sound infrastructure of 
harbors, railways, roads, and canals that reinforced the economy's 
outward orientation. 
President Hluphouet-Boigny has formed and led the country's only 
political party, the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast, for its entire 
existence. There is no effective political opposition to him or one 
party rule. As a result, the Ivory Coast has enjoyed unbroken political 
stability, which has enabled the government to take a long-run view of 
econmic policy. 
The president's policy of "liberalism and openness" shows up in the 
country's population and appoach to immigration. 2 Of the 6.7 million 
residents in 1980, 50,000 were French, about 100,000 were of Lebanese 
and Syrian extraction, and nearly two million arrived from neighboring 
African countries: nonIvorians comprise 30 percent of the total 
population. Since indepndence, the Fcench population bas increased, 
filling high level positions in both the public and private sectors. 
The French have played a major role in the development of universal 
French-language edwcation as the government's chosen means of unifying 
the country's fifty different tribal groups. Growth of the agricultural 
sector, the most important part of the econmny, has depended heavily on 
immigrant African labor. 
Unlike many newly-independent developing countries, the Ivory Coast 
has maintained close ties with its former colonial master, France. The 
French connection shows up in monetary palicy, trade, and education, 
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buttressing the general outward orientation of economic policy. The 
Ivory Coast briefly experimented with iqport-substitution industrial 
policy in the 1960s, but has emphasized its traditional external 
orientation in the 1970s and 1980s. Although competitive markets dc not 
prevail in every aspect of the country's econoy, economic policy more 
closely mirrors the textbook conditions of economic efficiency than 
anywhere else in Africa. 
Monetary Policy. The Ivory Coast does not bave a separate national 
currency or monetary policy. 3 It does not set its own interest rates. 
It participates in an externally managed monetary system which 
guarantees foreign investors the right to convert local money into 
French francs at a fixed rate, and insures 'the free repatriatin of 
profits and capital. 
The Ivory Coast, with the majority of old French African colonies, 
is a member of the West African Monetary Union. A 1962 treaty with 
France established a common central bank, the BCW (Banque Centrale des 
Etats de l'Afrique de l*Ouest), which issues a single currency and 
guarantees its free convertibility into French francs at a rate of 
CFAF5O to one. All member country foreign (non-franc) reserves are 
centralized in an operations account with the French treasury. The 
treaty also provides for free circulation of capital within the union. 
Member countries deposit their foreign currency proceeds in this French 
operating acount and entitled to draw forare on it their own foreign 
currency requirements. The system gives member countries considerable 
flexibility in drawing reserves--a country may enceed its separate 
balance under certain conditions-but credit lines limited by grossare 
foreign reserve positions. BCAO rest grant prior approval to all 
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lending in the union in excess of CFAF100 million. 
Interest rates on deposits, moving up or down reflecting mrket 
forces, are set by the Monetary Union, not the governments of menber 
countries. No distinction is made between foreign and domestic firms 
for purposes of lending; the bulk of local credit has typically gone to 
foreign-owned enterprises in the post-independence period. Given the 
open structure of the Ivory Coast's economy, the rate of inflation 
depends on inflation in the rest of the world and changing market prices 
for its main exports. Although the- CFA franc depends on the stability 
of the French franc for its own stability, the 1962 treaty provides for 
a proportional revaluation of member countries foreign balances in the 
French Treasury in the event of a devaluation of the franc. Financial 
reserves of the Ivory Coast are thus insulated fram irresponsible French 
monetary policy. 
To summarize, the monetary system *in the Ivory Coast insures free 
movement of capital within member countries and between member countries 
and France, international convertibility at guaranteed exchange rates, 
interest rates set near market levels, and a limited, prudent access to 
credit for local lending. The Ivory Coast cannot print its own money 
nor discourage exports by maintaining .-n overvalued currency. Local and 
foreign investors thus enjoy confidence in the country's money, in the 
same way that Singapore's Currency Board insures hlders of that 
nation's money. 
Public Finance. 4 Let's begin with taxation. During the 1970s, 
taxes avereged about 25 percent of GDP. Although the ratio of taxation 
to GDP in the Ivory Coast is high compared with most developing 
countries, the structure of tax rates does not erode individual 
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incentives. Income taxes supply 20 percent of current revenue, with 
camodity taxes-excise, import and export taxes--comprising the 
balance.. Wealth taxes are virtually non-existant. 
Profits tax is set at 35 percent, with a five-year exemption for 
any new factory. A salaries tax is levied at a 5.5 percent rate for 
local staff and 10.5 percent for expatriates. There is also a graduated 
personal income tax, but the effective rate is low since family members 
can subdivide income. equally among themselves (splitting) for tax 
reporting purposes. 
The Value Added Tax is set at 19 percent. It is complemented by 
customs dities on imports that range from zero--capital goods imported 
for the establishnent of new industries and raw materials not available 
locally are exempt froi customs duties--to as high as 90 percent of the 
CIF (customs, insurance, freight) value. (See next section on economic 
policy.) Export taxes on coffee, cocoa, and cotton have contributed 
about one-fifth of current revenue.
 
In general, taxation has not been used to redistribute income in 
the Ivory Coast. Only the income tax is structured to be progressive, 
and its splitting provisions minimize any redistributional effects. 
Thus while the aggregate level of taxation is high by third world 
standards, the rates of taxation are generally low on all economic 
transactions, save imports. Thus a relatively neutral tax system does 
not impede economic efficiency apart from the distorting effects of 
tariffs on a modest amount of industrial activity. 
Public spending consists of both current and capital outlays. In 
general, public spending has grown more rapidly than either current 
revenue or domestic savings, forcing the Treasury to resort indreasingly 
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to borrowing to finance the difference (since the government can't print 
its own money). Current spending as a share of GDP rose from 14.6 to 
16.6 percent during 1965-1975; as a proportion of current revenue it 
rose from 73 to 83 percent, reflecting burgeoning education and housing 
programs. 
Public investment spending has risen even more rapidly than current 
spending. Apart from massive spending on infrastructure, the goverment 
operates twenty-six state enterprises, contributes to the support of 
twelve public institutions, and holds a majority participation in 
nineteen mixed companies. -ublic enterprises have increased their 
proportion of total public investment from 30 to 60 percent in the 
decade spanning 1965-1975, sometimes with qcestionable efficiency. It 
is generally conceded that financial control over public enterprises 
could be strengthened. 
Resources for public investment come from budgetary transfers (from 
any e)cess of current revenue over current expenditure), transfers fLam 
an agricultural Stabilization Fund, modest local borrowing, and a 
growing dependence on foreign borrowing. (The Stabilization Pind, in 
the Ministiy of Agriculture, stabilizes prices paid to producers of 
export crops, chiefly cocoa, coffee, cotton and vegetable oils, and 
profits from the difference between export casts and export prices. 
Emess profits are transferred to the Treasury for general use.) 
On indeperdence in 1960, public investment amounted to about 7 
percent of GDP. By 1975, its share had more than doubled to 15 percent. 
Unfortunately, the expansion was financed mainly from external sources. 
Taking 1975, for example, the budgetary surplus, the Stabilization Fund, 
and other public enterprises contributed about 9 percent of GDP to 
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national savings, but public debt service payments abroad drained 4 
percent. The 10 percent difference was made up from foreign borrowing. 
Between 1969 and 1975, the Ivory Coast's external public debt increased 
fran $388 million to $1,536 million. As concessionary loans diminished 
and hardening of terms of foreign loans increased, the debt service 
ratio (percentage of exports) doubled from 5.9 10.9 percent. Debtto 

service payments grew from CFAF5.5 billion in 1965 
 to CFAF33 billion ten 
years later. In the same decade, the share of public borrowing in the 
financing of total public investment rose frcal 30 to 50 percent; the 
proportion from the nation's own resources correspondingly declined. A 
ratio of public to private investment of 42 to 58 in 1960 was virtually 
reversed to 60 to 40 by 1975. Long-run growth cannot be sustained if 
the public sector gobbles up all investment funds. An overly ambitious 
public investment program, coupled with proliferating public 
enterprises, have the economy at risk.put the future growth of Rising 
debt service payments transfer capital abroad, lower national savings, 
and makes the country even more dependent on external resources to 
finance necessary infrastructure. Moreover, to the that publicextent 
investment results in inefficient projects, economic growth will slow, 
domestic savings will further diminish, and the burden of debt service 
will proportionally rise.
 
Reflecting increasing reliance on foreign borrowing, the Ivory 
Coast shifted from a positive net foreign reserve position in the West 
African Monetary Union to a negative position for the first ti-e in 
1975.
 
It is clear that both the growth rate of current spending and 
public investment cannot be sustained at the high rates. of the past 
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10-15 years, lest the entire economy and its people be imprisoned by 
debt service charges. The 1976-1980 five year plan, recognizing these 
dangers, emphasized a greater role for private foreign investment. 
&:onomic Policy. Fran its inception, the Ivory Coast has largely 
maintained an outward orientation. Economic policy can be described as 
"controlled liberalism." 5 The goverrment has been favorably disposed 
toward foreign capital (foreigners own 67 percent of the equity of local 
manufacturing companies), entrepreneurs (witness the 100,000 
Lebanese-Syrians and 50,000 resident French), and open borders (two 
million neighboring African laborers work in the Ivory Coast). It has 
lapsed from liberal grace by regulating agricultural prices, setting 
minimum wages, and distorting the structure of internal industry through 
a limited policy of tariff-protected import substitution. 
Before independence, the Ivory Coast was a plantation economy, with 
a wholly outward, largely French, orientation. On independence, the 
government set out to diversify the economy through an inclstrial policy 
stressing import substitution. It imposed a tariff structure that 
ranged as high as 100 percent on some items, and adopted an investment 
code that granted a five year exemption on business profits. As a 
result, the contribution of import taxes to current revenue rose from 24
 
to 36 percent between 1965 and 1975. Priority firms were granted 
duty-free import privileges in an attempt to boost local manufacturing, 
which stood at a modest 4 percent of GDP. Some firms prospered. 
However, high effective protection often meant inefficient output from 
others, which developed excess capacity. Exemptions on capital imports 
biassed sane firms in favor of capital-intensive techniques and 
industries, despite high urban unemployment. It turned out that the 
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chief beneficiaries of the protective tariff shield were large foreign, 
rather than smaller domestic, firms. 
In the 1970s, the Ivory Coast reemphasized its historic export 
orientation for both agricultural and, now, manufactured products. The 
1975-1980 five-year plan notes that the domestic market cannot serve as 
the main factor in industrial development and that "industrialization 
based on substitutes for imports means high cost prices, [and] low 
yields. That is why the development of the industrial plant will have 
to be essentially based, in years to thecome, on creation and the 
development of long distance export activities.,,6 This new direction in
 
policy entails "an active search for private nationals and foreign 
investors," which requires a gradual reduction in tariff protection for 
local industries. In particular, Ivorian planners want to avoid 
extending the initial import-substitution policy fram light industry to 
intermediate or heavy goods, a policy many Latin American nations have 
unprofitably pursued.
 
Despite the protection of tariffs, manufacturing had only grown 
from 4 to 12 percent of GDP by 1974, much consisting of processing 
agricultural raw materials or processing imported semifinished products.
 
Thus a figure of 12 percent overstates the contribution of industry to 
economic output. Moreover, the growth rate of value inadded 

import-substituting manufacturing industries declined in the early
 
1970s, compared with the 1960s. In all, manufacturing only provided 
45,000 jobs by 1975 of a total population exceeding 6 million.
 
The return to a general policy of export orientation recognized two
 
features of the economy. First, the bulk of employment and output are 
in the agricultural sector, which enjoys considerable comparative
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advantage and which has always depended on external trade. 75 percent 
of the population earn their living and a similar percentage of export 
proceeds come from agriculture. Second, rapid job creation in the 
industrial sector cannot be achieved by manufacturing for a limite., 
home market, thus the switch to manufacturing for export. 
Compared with other African countries, the goverment has generally 
maintained a regime of high producer prices. Many African leaders have 
turned their food surplus nations into grain importers through the 
double-edged sword of an overvalued exchange rate and low producer 
prices paid by official state agencies. By reducing local currency 
earnings of agricultural producers, these policies destroy incentives 
and shrink output. In the Ivory Coast, producer prices per kilogram for 
cocoa have ranged fran as low as CFAF55 in 1965 to as high as 175 during 
1974-76, reflecting changing conditions in world markets. Similar 
variations apply to coffee and other plantation products. The 
governent also sets minimum agricultural wages, which have been held to 
a relatively low level, but high enough to attract several million 
Africans from less well-off nearby countries. The average producer 
price has been high enough to generate expansion in output of both 
industrial and food crops. Industrial crop output expanded 5 percent a 
year between 1965 and 1975, and despite a large population increase, the 
Ivory Coast as reduced its dependence on food imports. The private 
agricultural sector, owned largely by Ivorians, has responded to 
agricultural price incentives. 
Minimum wages are also imposed on the private sector, but have not 
damaged the competitiveness of the export-oriented raw material 
processing industries. 
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To the extent that the government has sought to redistribute income 
and eliminate differences among regions, it has done so through the 
expenditure side of the budg t, not through taxation. It has drawn up 
regional investment programs and has put into place an Ivorianization 
emloyment policy. However, the Ivorianization of the private and 
public sectors has been implemented with a view to ecornic efficiency 
and the maintainenance of high standards. Localization of labor and 
equity ownership has not been puirsued to the detriment of economic 
growth and the maintenance of a profitable economic environment. 
Results. The Ivory Coast has enjoyed a truly astonishing growth 
record by African standards. Its GDP grew at an annual rate of 8 
percent during the 1960s, falling slightly to 6.7 percent during the 
1970s. It has managed to sustain these high rates with virtually no 
industri al sector to speak of, relying largely on commercial 
agricultural exports. Between 1950 and 1975, exports of cocoa, coffee, 
and timber increased in volume respectively four, five, and thirty 
times. The Ivory Coast thus belies the thesis that industrialization is 
essential to strong economic gra, h. 
Recall the openness of the country's borders to population 
movements. Immigration, coupled with a high birth rate, has brought 
rapid growth in the population. It grew by an annual rate of 3.7 
percent in the 1960s and an even higher 5 percent in the 1970s. 
Subtracting population increases from GDP growth rate cuts the annual 
increase in per capita income to a less dramatic 2.5 percent between 
1960 and 1980. Still, by 1980, residents of the Ivory Coast enjoyed the 
highest per capita income in Sub- Saharan Africa, including oil-rich 
Nigeria. In 1950, with a per capita income of around $70, the Ivory 
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Coast was an extremely poor nation. By independence in 1960, income had 
risen to $145, in 1974 to $450, and by 1980, to $1,150. The trend 
groith rate has been steadily upward.
 
To the extent that economic growth slowed moderately in the 1970s, 
this can partially be attributed to the sharp expansion in public 
spending and the nation's heavy debt burden. By ±980, external public 
debt reached $4,265 million, equal to about 42 percent of GDP. Its 
international reserves had fallen to no more than two weeks of import 
coverage. The Ivorf Coast is following more closely in Korean footsteps 
than in those of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, in which pWblic 
investnent has been financed from internal sources. 
Has rapid economic growth in the Ivory Coast increased or decreased 
the inequality of income distribution? The World Bank mission to the 
Ivory Coast in 1975 concluded that among 13 African nations, the Ivory 
Coast qualified as a low inequality country. 7 This distribution of 
income is all the more remarkable in light of a large French population 
with incomes ten-to-twentyfold that of the African population. One 
reason for the more evenly distributed income is that per capita farm 
income is not much lower than per capita salary payments, due to a 
regime of high producer prices. The Ivory Coast has not excessively 
taxed its farmers to support urban dwellers or industrial develolcent. 
Price incentives in agriculture have been a major factor in the 
country'*s strong economic performance. 
Summary. The Ivory Coast has been and remains a primary commercial 
crop exporting nation. Coffee, cocoa, timber, and othez cash crops 
contribute most of the nation's export earnings and jobs. This has 
necessitated an economic policy of outward orientation. To all intents 
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and purposes, the country has conducted a free-trade regime, save for a 
modest amount of import-substitution light industry. A stable monetary 
system, free convertibility at a guaranteed exchange rate, open borders, 
and a minimum of internal regulation have allowed market forces to 
dictate the scope and structure of development. The modest distorting 
element of tariffs on internal prices is now gradually being reduced. 
The worrisome elements in the econcmic policy mosaic are the trend 
growth ratts in current public spending, public enterprise activity, and 
especially the accumulation of external public debt. 
What makes the Ivory Coast such an excellent example of the market 
model of development is its convincing proof that industrialization need 
not he the sole route to successful growth. 
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VI. Chile
 
Since 1973, the economic policy of Chile's military regime has come
 
to be known in financial, academic, and media circles as the "Chicago
 
experiment." Many informed lay persons see Chicago as the spiritual and
 
intellectual home of free-market economics. Economists identify Chicago
 
with attempts to use notions of price theory and competition in the
 
marketplace to explain a wide variety of real world economic behavior.
 
A number of the key economic policy makers in Chile, known as the
 
"Chicago boys," hold advanced economics degrees from the University of
 
Chicago. In just a few short years, they have transformed a closed,
 
highly regulated economic system into an open, free market economy. In
 
the span of six years, they reduced triple digit inflation to one and
 
two digit levels, virtually abolished import duties, privatized a
 
neavily nationalized economy, balanced a budget in deep deficit, and
 
converted a balance of payments deficit into a surplus. Despite these
 
incredible changes, critics of the military government hold the Chicago
 
boys responsible for the severe recession that hit Chile in 1981, which
 
reduced real GNP by 14 percent in 1982. Even those who favor the
 
regime's free market policies dislike its stern political
 
authoritarianism. Nevertheless, critics of the military regime
 
acknowledge the post-1973 policies as moving the country "Towards a Free
 
'
 Market Economy."
 
Background to Liberal Refo-m. Chile consists of a 2,600 mile long 
strip of territory, 250 miles across at its widest point, located in 
South America between the rugged Andes and the Pacific Ocean. The 
northern deserts contain large deposits of nitrates and copper. In the 
center is a long, rich agricultural valley, where the population--a 
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spanish-speaking, 
Roman Catholic mixture ol' Europeans, mestizos and
 
Indians--is concentrated.
 
The country initially developed an
as 
 area of large pastoral
 
landholdings, subject to Spanish rule 
by the viceroyalty of Peru. A
 
military 
uprising in 1818 won independence from Spain. Chileans
 
fashioned their first constitution in 1830, which laid the 
basis for
 
later emergence of parliamentary 
government. Longstanding border
 
disputes with Bolivia and 
Peru were climaxed 
by the War of the Pacific
 
(1879-1884), 
which gave Chile rich nitrate teposits and other minerals.
 
Exploitation 
of these mineral resources 
brought wealth and developed
 
railways, but Chile 
became heavily dependent on world markets for its
 
prosperity.
 
The Great Depression hit Chile -extremely hard. 2 
 In 1930, imports
 
fell 13 percent in 
value, real mining product fell 27 percent, and per
 
capita real GDP fell 14 percent. Chile, maintaining its gold standard
 
monetary policy, suffered a 29 percent 
decline in gold reserves,
 
resulting in credit restrictions, a fall in wholesale prices, and a rise
 
in the Central Bank interest rate. 
 The economy further declined through
 
1932, when per capita GDP fell to. 49 percent of its 1929 level. The 
League of Nations asserted that the Great Depression hit Chile.the most 
severe of all nations. By 1939, per capita GDP had only recovered to 76
 
percent of the 1930 level and the dollar value of its exports only to 53
 
percent.
 
As a consequence of this bitter decade, the prevailing economic 
philosophy switched from a liberal, open economy to a closed, heavily 
regulated system. The government decided 
to aevelop internal industry
 
to reduce dependence on foreign imports. For the next quarter century,
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Chile's leaders imposed a regime of multiple exchange rates, a myriad of 
indirect taxes and surcharges on imports, direct taxes on the major 
export producers, explicit and implicit subsidies, tax rebates, and 
regulations concerning direct investment and capital movements. The 
government substantially expani.ed its regulation of and intervention in 
the economy. It established a quasi-public development corporation in 
1939, which controlled or influenced a high proportion of financial and 
real investment.
 
A rapidly deteriorating internal situation led to the first of
 
three postwar shifts in economic policy in 1956. 3 It consisted of
 
simplification and partial unification of the exchange rate system,
 
several major currency devaluations, a loosening of import restrictions,
 
and the elimination of automatic wage adjustments to the increase in the
 
cost of living index in the previous year. A deteriorating economy 
orotight a new regime into office in 1958 which set out to attract 
foreign capital. Commercial banks were freely allowed to buy and sell 
foreign exchange. The currency was again devalued to bring interal 
Chilean costs in line with world prices. Licensirg was removed for 
permitted imports and the list was made virtually all-inclusive. 
Liberal depreciation allowances for tax purposes were introduced for 
large-scale mining, and tax exemptions were granted for foreign 
investment in particular industries.
 
A balance of payments crisis in 1961 forced the government to
 
terminate the free market in foreign exuhange and imports were severely
 
curtailed. A burgeoning government deficit' and exhaustion of foreign
 
exchange reserves led to further restrictions on trade and fueled
 
inflation. The third switch in postwar economic policy moved the
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country in the direction of more government control in 1965. Key
 
provisions included Chileanization of large-scale mining, and 
a major
 
ecpansion in domestic social programs for the purpose of redistributing
 
income and political power toward the lower economic classes.
 
The presidential election of September 
 1970 brought Salvador
 
Allende to pr4er. Representing a coalition of Communist and Socialist
 
parties, he announced a long-run aim of transforming the economy. He
 
proposed to reduce external dependence ana the role of the private
 
aector in Chile. 
The state would take over the basic natural resources,
 
banks, foreign commerce and other strategic sectors. Short-run
 
components of policy included state-guaranteed production contracts,
 
containing inflation by strict price controls, a 
minimum readjustment of
 
wages and salaries of 100 percent of past price increases to workers,
 
housing and other social subsidies, agrarian reform, government
 
generated employment, ultimately turning Chile into a socialist country.
 
All large-scale copper mining was nationalized.
 
The economy responded poorly to these measures throughout 1972 and
 
1973. Per capita GDP fell, inflation reached 500 percent, real exports
 
declined, international reserves dissipated, the currency depreciat. I,
 
exchange controls were imposed, and martial law was invoked on several
 
occasions. Strilces frequently immobilized the economy. Political
 
instability brought a military coup 
on September 11, 1973. The new
 
regime suspended civil rights and the constitution and set out to 
reverse economic policy. Against this backdrop, the free market 
experiment began. 
Fiscal Policy. As Allende's policies took effect, a year end 
increase in wholesale prices of 21 percent in 1971 took an 
exponential
 
leap to 143 percent in 1972 and to an incredible 1,147 percent annual
 
rate as 1973 closed. Small wonder tfe country was in turmoil during
 
1973.
 
The proximate cause of this inflationary outburst was the collapse 
of government finances. When we add the formal budget deficit to the 
subsidies granted public enterprises, the overall public sector deficit 
rose from 3 percent of GDP in 1970 to an astonishing 24 percent, in 1973. 
To finance this monumental deficit, government borrowing rose from 56 to 
88 percent of total domestic credit--the private sector was completely 
crowded out of the credit markets. The bulk of new credit required to 
finance the rising deficits came from the printing presses of the 
central bank. In 1973, the creation of new high-powered money was 
equivalent to 21 percent of GDP. 
Bringing inflation under control thus required gaining control over
 
public finances. The new economic team set out both to increase tax
 
collections and improve the efficiency of public enterprises. They
 
consolidated service and turnover taxes into a coruprehensive value-added
 
tax imposed at a uniform rate of 20 percent. They also sharply reduced 
central bank subsidies to state commercial enterprises. Current
 
revenue, which consists of taxes plus the operating surplus of public 
enterprises, virtually doubled in one year from 16.5 to 31.4 percent of 
GNP. A huge deficit in 1973 was transformed into an overall surplus of
 
3.7 percent by 1976, and the budget remained in surplus for the balance
 
of the decade. By 1978, credit subsidies to the private sector had also
 
been effectively eliminated. Public spending fell by 6 percent of GDP
 
between 1974 and 1978.
 
The need for the central bank to print money to finance these
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deficits diminished as the government's credit appetite dropped from 88
 
percent of total domestic credit in 1973 to 10 percent in 1980. The
 
issue of high powered money fell sharply to a low 2 percent of GDP by
 
decade's end. All money supply growth indicators were a small fraction
 
of their 1973 levels.
 
Price increases steadily moderated. The end of year increases in
 
wholesale prices fell from the thousand percent level in 1974 to 570,
 
411, 152, 65, 39, 58, and 28 percent by 1980. In 1981, the rate fell to
 
single digit levels. To all intents and purposes inflat.on was
 
curtailed. The very painful task of balancing the budget, by raising
 
taxes, reducing subsidies to public enterprises, and cutting overall
 
spending, was successfully completed despite a major world recession in
 
1974 that severely affected Chile's export markets.
 
Liberalization of Trade. The "Chicago boys" set out to attain both
 
external and internal free trade. 5 Prior to the military coup, domestic
 
producers enjoyed an average nominal tariff of 94 percent, with rates on
 
some items, for example 
cars, that reached 500 percent. In addition,
 
the Allende government had imposed a variety of nontariff restrictions
 
on imports that included quotas, outright prohibitions, restrictions on
 
obtaining the necessary foreign exchange, multiple exchange-rate 
practices, restrictive licensing, and so on. Many of these measures 
were a response to an overvalued exchange rate and the unavailability of
 
foreign exchange.
 
Trade liberalization required both the elimination of trade 
t 
barriers and the correction of an overvalued exchange rate. The new 
government quickly unified exchange rates and instituted a policy of 
minidevaluation, gradually adjusting the exchange 
rate (more Chilean
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escudos, later pesos, per dollar) to correct an overvalued currency,
 
which produces an anti-export and pro-import bias. The combined general
 
rate rose from Escudos 280 to the dollar in 1973 to 860 in 1974, to
 
12,500 (12.5 pesos) by June 1976. From June 1976, the periodic
 
minidevaluations gave way. to a daily change. By year's end, the
 
currency fell 39 percent to 17.42 pesos to the dollar. This sequence of
 
devaluations had the purpose of trying to neutralize the impact of
 
domestic inflation on prices in Chile compared with world prices.
 
By 1976, the government eliminated all restrictions on overseas
 
payments for current transactions; all nontariff barriers had been
 
eliminated. As well, it had announced as early as 1974 a plan to
 
progressively diminish protection for producers of import substitutes.
 
An average nominal tariff rate of 94 percent would fall, in biannual
 
steps, to an average and top rate of 10 percent by mid-1979. Ron
 
McKinnon has called this experience "the _st remarkable unilateral move
 
toward free trade since the Manchester liberals repealed the corn laws
 
'6
 
and other protectionist measures in mid-nineteenth century Britain."
 
Non-copper exports soared from 20 to 60 percent of total industrial
 
and agricultural exports as their prices became increasingly competitive
 
in world markets. Industrial exports alone rose from 8 to 20 percent.
 
The industrial sector responded positively to a reduction in tariff
 
protection. All indices of industrial production were higher by the end
 
of the decade. Meanwhile, at home, import substitutes were steadily
 
replaced by a growing variety of goods produced all over the world. To
 
repeat, by 1980, Chile had moved from an autarchic to a free-trade
 
country.
 
Domestic inflation remained well ahead of' world levels throughout
 
-90­
the 	post-1973 period, which necessitated continued adjustments in the
 
exchange rate to prevent currency overvaluation, and maintain the real 
exchange rate. Chile continued its policy of exchange rate adjustments 
during 1977, but in early 1978 	 adopted a tabular exchange rate system 
designed to break inflationary expectations. The system consisted of a
 
preannounced path of devaluation over an extended period, in which the 
Central Bank stood ready to buy and sell dollars as in a fixed exchange 
rate system. On June 30, 1979, accompanied by a slight devaluation from 
36.89 to 39 pesos to the dollar, the authorities imposed a fixed 
exchange 	 rate system. 
What was the logic of transforming a policy of, first, periodic 
discrete devaluations, and second, preannounced daily devaluations, into
 
a fixed exchange-rate regime? As devaluations steadily bring domestic 
prices closer to world levels, that is, as thae higher rate of internal 
inflation slows reducing the large gap between domestic and
 
international inflation, a fixed exchange-rate regime will finally bring
 
domestic price inflation in line with international rates. (A risk of 
fixing the exchange rate is importing inflation if the international 
economy becomes unstable.) A crucial assumption in this package is that 
fiscal and wage policies remain under control, lest internal costs rise
 
out of line with world price increases. By mid-1979, the budget was in
 
surplus and wage increases had been restrained. Under a fixed
 
exchange-rate regime, Chile's monetary 
policy became a classic gold
 
standard, balance of payments system. 
The foreign exchanges completely
 
dominate the country's monetary and financial policies. Domestic oredit
 
at the Central Bank is targeted toward a desired path for foreign
 
exchange rates, and the fixed exchange rate determines the domestic
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price level. Under this regime, internal and external prices are in 
equilibrium.
 
In mid-1979, then, Chile maintained a pure fiat currency, unbacked
 
by any explicit currency cover (as in the traditional currency board
 
over sufficient foreignsystems). So long as Chile can command control 
reserves to maintain the assigned fixed-exchange rate, the country's 
money supply depends on the overall balance of paym..its, expanding in 
the presence of surpluses and contracting under deficits. Thus the 
balance of trade and capital flows determine the overall activity of the
 
economy. Should wage increases or government deficits get out of hand,
 
goods would quickly lose theircausing an overvalued currency, Chilean 
and a flood of cheap imports wouldcompetitiveness in world markets 
necessitate new trade barriers. 
Accompanying the movement to external free trade and free movement 
of capital was a policy of internal laissez-faire and a desire to reduce 
the role of the state in the economy.7 It did so by trying to shave the
 
and selling off public enterprises tooverall level of public spending 
As already noted, public spending fell by about 6private hands. 

percent of GDP between 1974 and 1978. Inheriting 507 public enterprises
 
in four years andin 1973, the government reduced its ownership to 70 
(The Allende regime had dramatically
set a target if just 15 by 1980. 

to 507 in its three
increased the number of public enterprises from 46 

reversed the process of agrarian reform year administration.) It also 
by returning a significant share of expropriated land to old owners. As 
withdrew banking, share financial resourcesthe state from the of 
rose from 7.5 to 64.7
private institutions
deposited in financial 

1979. The state also terminated its
 percent between 1974 and 
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developmental assistance to small producers in the agricultural, mining,
 
and industrial sectors.
 
Reflecting diminished state control over the economy, public sector
 
employment fell 20 percent between 1974 and 1978. Between 1964 and
 
1974, public employment had risen from 210,000 to exceed 360,000, but
 
declined to 293,000 by 1978.
 
Organized labor was excluded from the process of internal
 
liberalization. Collective bargaining was disallowed and strikes were
 
forbidden. These measures were relaxed in 1979, but at no time in the
 
process of liberal reform was a free market in labor eier permitted.
 
Results. Taking into account the severe recession of 1975, induced 
largely by a recession in Chile's export markets, the statistical 
indicators of economic performance reveal a generally upbeat picture. 
Real GDP rose 4.2 percent in 1974, fell sharply by 16.6 percent in the 
1975 recession year, and then increased in annual amounts of 5, 8.6, 6,
 
and 7.2 percent. Consumer price increases declined from three-to-four 
digit levels to moderate two digit numbers. A colossal fiscal deficit
 
yielded to actual Treasury operating surpluses. Non-traditional exports
 
tripled as a share of overall expor3s. In real terms, net capital 
inflows increased six fold between 1974 and 1980, moving the balance of 
payments into surplus and increasing foreign reserves. A disquieting 
feature was the unemployment rate, which remained stuck in the 12 to 14 
percent range between 1976 and 1980, suggesting that many did not share 
in the otherwise stunning economic transformation. 
Since 1981, Chile's free market experiment has fallen on hard 
times. It is imperative both to acknowledge economic hard times and 
search for its causes. In particular, to assess how the regime's 
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economic policies may have been a culprit.
 
Recent Economic Performance. Four factors pushed Chile's economy 
into a sharp tailspin: wage policy, a sharp fall in the price of 
Chile's main export, a fixed-exchange rate currency, and massive 
external borrowing. 
A 13 percent unemployment rate in early 1975 surged to 20 percent
 
within one year due to a reduction in public sector employment and 
spending, and a world recession that drove copper prices sharply lower.8
 
World recovery restored the unemployment rate to 13 percent by March 
1977, but it remained at that level despite strong growth through the 
end of the decade. One reason for the stagnation in unemployment was 
the adoption of an inflationary, domestic wage-indexing procedure when
 
the government switched from its passive, periodic devaluations to its
 
preannounced downward crawling peg in February 1978. Nominal wage
 
increases were granted on the basis of past domestic price increases, 
rather than on the basis of forward movements in the planned exchange 
rate. As a result, wages rose much faster than the prices of tradeable
 
goods, especially after the exchange rate was fixed. To buy peace with
 
labor, the government permitted free collective bargaining beginning 
June 1979, and employers were forbidden to reduce real wages (interms
 
of the domestic CPI). The real wages index rose 12.7 percent in 1977,
 
and by 14, 10.8, 8.7, and 8.9 percent over the next four years. During
 
the same five years, real GDP rose at the much slower rate of 9.9, 8.2,
 
8.3-1 7.5, and 5.3 percent. The result of this policy must be that over
 
time domestic costs would rise above internal market clearing and world
 
levels, thus retarding the creation of new jobs, and prevent the economy
 
from adjusting smoothly to changing circumstances. The 1979 Act meant
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that supply and demand for labor did not determine real wag6 rates. 
A second factor in Chile's economic downturn was the world 
recession, which severely reduced the prices and volumes of its 
principal exports. Copper, which comprises nearly half of Chilean 
exports, suffered a drop in its price from 99 to 79 cents a pound 
between 1980 and 1981. 
 Along with other export goods, total overseas 
sales fell US$745 million, or about 3 percent of GDP. Copper prices 
failed to recover throughout 1982, plummeting to 60 cents a pound in 
November 1983 despite a strong U.S. economy recovery, thus depriving
 
Chile of several billion dollars in export earnings.
 
A third factor was the clinging to a fixed-exchange rate. As a 
rise in international interest rates pushed the US dollar sharply higher 
against other currencies, the Chilean peso, due to its fixed nominal 
exchange rate, correspondingly appreciated, thus overpricing exports and 
cheapening imports. The resulting balance of payments problem forced a
 
devaluation in mid-1982 and the switch to a floating rate in August of 
the same year.
 
A final. factor was the explosive rise in external debt. Between 
1977 and 1981, real GDP grew at an annual average rate of 7.8 percent. 
Strong growth meant an extraordinary increase in the demand for both 
capital and consumer goods. Foreign lenders were eager to finance much
 
of this demand. As a result, private sector foreign debt rose from $3.4
 
billion in 1979 to $6 billion in 1980, to $10.0 billion by the end of 
1981. Including the public sector, total foreign debt during these 
three years rose from $8.5 billion to $15.6 billion. Interest payments 
alone on this debt reached $1.4 billion in 1981. The current account 
deficit of the balance of payments hit $4.8 billion during 1981, about 
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15 percent of GDP. The country was spending well beyond what it earned,
 
in the process sliding increasingly into debt. Pushed up by rising
 
interest rates, debt service payments alone threaten future growth.
 
The inflexibility of wages forced unemployment up sharply from 11
 
percent in late 1981 to 19 percent by mid-1982. Real GDP fell sharply
 
by 14 percent during 1982. To bring Chilean prices in line with world 
prices, the currency was devalued by 18 percent in June 1982, the 
estimated degree of overvaluation. This devaluation set off a wave of 
speculation against the Chilean peso which drained dollar reserves. 
Central Bank intervention to maintain the real exchange rate led to 
further losses in international reserves. By late 1982, Chile faced 
external foreign debts exceeding $17 billion, while holding
 
international reserves of only $2.5 billion. The country successfully 
negotiated an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for $825 
million in 1982, which entails an austev.ity program (for the public
 
sector) and currency devaluations, which reached nearly 100 percent
 
during the second half of 1982, to encourage the production of tradeable
 
goods for world markets.
 
There was no way Chilean planners could insulate their economy from
 
the shock of world recession. However, wage rigidity and a currency
 
fixed to a rising US dollar exacerbated the mismatch between Chilean and
 
world prices. The logic of a fixed-exchange rate system remains in 
force only if domestic wages are set by market forces, not political 
agreements, and if public finances aiid international transactions remain
 
in balance. In the case of Chile, wage rates rose excessively fast, 
public finances lapsed into deficit from 1979, and trade flows moved
 
against the country. A floating rate would have permitted a smoother 
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transition to, but not prevent, a lower level of economic activity, and
 
would have fostered a quicker recovery.
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VII. Democracy and Development in Sri Lanka
 
Unlike Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, the Ivory Coast, and
 
Chile, Sri Lanka is a democracy with universal suffrage. Many attribute
 
the economic successes of these Pacific Rim economies and of other
 
select Latin American and African societies to the imposition of liberal
 
economic policies by colonial government, political strongmen, one-party
 
states, military regimes, or authoritarian governments. _Such a
 
correlation raises the question if liberal economic policies, which
 
generate high growth, are compatible with western-style democracy. The
 
extent to which free market economic policies remain in force and foster
 
strong growth in Sri Lanka would demonstrate that free elections and
 
free markets are compatiblep that a liberal economy need not preclude
 
I
 
democracy and the franchise.

By worldwide standards, Sri Lanka is a very poor country, with a
 
per capita income below US$200 a year. Since 1798, the island had been
 
ruled by the British, until in 1948 it was granted independence. Under
 
British rule, the island had developed a sound administrative and
 
physical infrastructure, external financial reserves, and a high
 
literacy rate in English. But between 1948 and the 1970s, the country
 
slowly disintegrated economically and was only kept afloat by massive
 
infusions of money from the international-aid-to-Sri Lanka club, to
 
which the United States was a major contributor.
 
Sri Lanka's history dates back 2,500 years to its original
 
settlement by the Sinhala people from the South Asian subcontinent. The
 
Sinhala were followed in turn by the Tamils from South India, Arab
 
traders, Portuguese spice merchants, Dutch traders, and lastly the
 
British. Ceylon (as the island was named und3r British rule) developed
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as a plantation economy, exporting tea, rubber, and coconut. 
 Its modern
 
day political 
evolution developed from the westernization of its
 
indigenous elites in 
 the early decades of the twentieth century.
 
Political progress was rapid. Universal suffrage 
was granted in 1931
 
and peaceful independence in 1948. Since then, however, island politics
 
have not been so tranquil. Nationalist sentiments have dominated 
politics during much of the past thirty-three years.2 Political
 
disputes between Sinhala and Tamil have often flared into violence, most
 
recently in July 1983, resulting in the establishment of martial law.
 
Up-country Buddhists have continued to feud with lowland, coastal 
English-speaking leaders, and one prime minister has been assassinated.
 
On the economic front, socialism and state-control have steadily
 
replaced private ownership and the market economy. The export-oriented
 
plantation sector has been heavily taxed to finance free education, free
 
medicine, free water, sanitation, subsidized food, and cheap transport.
 
When the plantations were finally nationalized in the mid-1970s, the
 
public sector controlled more than 90 percent of the economy. Although
 
these policies may have increased literacy and lowered infant mortality,
 
they were accomplished only through government pre-emption of resources
 
and the destruction of incentives to 
the total detriment of economic
 
growth. As economic stagnation set in, further government efforts 
to
 
redistribute income resulted only in a redistribution of poverty. The
 
government of socialist-leaning Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike (1970-1977)
 
ruled through a perpetual state of emergency, which was declared in the
 
course of a violent youth rebellion in 1971 and remained in force until
 
1977. Her economic policies beset the economy with 
import controls,
 
foreign exchange controls, price controls, and a plethora of state
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industrial and trading monopolies. She nationalized land, banks, and
 
businesses. The results were food and.other shortages, black markets,
 
and widespread evasion of controls and taxes. Her strategy of import
 
substitution fostered inefficiept, overprotected industry. Low food
 
prices and food rations for all, regardless of income, eroded producer
 
incentives, even for those subsisting on their own land. A massive
 
publin sector smothered the remainsof private sector initiative, and a
 
great deal of the country's talent decided to migrate oversaas. The 
country's external reserves were run down and massive budget deficits, 
financed by new money creation, brought a ruinous inflation. By 1975 
economic life had virtually ground to & halt. 
In past elections, communal rivalry between Sinhala and Tamil had
 
invariably dominated all other issues. In the 1977 election, which had
 
been postponed since 1975, economic issues were paramount. In fact,
 
this election marked the first time in democratic Sri Lankr that any new
 
general election had not been held on schedule. Promising a new 
direction in economic policy, the United National Party, under the 
leadership of J.R. Jayewardene, swept to a landslide victory. The new 
government immediately set out to reverse thirty years of socialist 
economic policies. 
Jayewardene's landslide rests on the perception that socialism and
 
state controls have Utterly failed in Sri Lanka, and were largely
 
responsible for rising unemployment, shortages of essential goods,
 
widespread nepotism and corruption, and an inefficient and unresponsive
 
public sector. Sri Lanka's new president is a close friend of
 
Singapore's dynamic Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew. Despite the
 
differences between the urbanized Chinese city-state of Singapore and 
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rural Sri Lanka, there is growing admiration in Sri Lanka for what is
 
called the "Singapore model" of development: competition, free trade,
 
tax concessions, and foreign investment. 
 Public servants in Sri Lanka
 
are sent to Singapore to learn about its administrative skills and
 
techniques.
 
Before 1977, economic policy in Sri Lanka had stressed import
 
substitution. 
Sri Lanka's new economic policy is now predicated on the
 
belief that a small home market defeats an import su'istitution strategy
 
and that Sri Lanka has always fared best as an export-led economy.
 
Therefore, economic growth mist 
come from encouraging both traditional
 
plantation exports and new manufactured goods. To this end, a spate of
 
new economic and fiscal policies has been adopted.
 
New Economic Policies. The government has eliminated the old, 
fixed exchange rate system that overvalued the Sri Lanka rupee.
 
Although this policy held down the costs of food imports, It discouraged
 
exports and led to a system of price controls and rationing that created
 
shortages, queues, and an incomprehensible rjaze of producer taxes and 
consumer subsidies to compensate for the effects of price distortions. 
Now the rupee is allowed to float. This new realistic exchange rate 
system has restored producer and export incentives, eliminating the need
 
for price controls and rationing. The price mechanism, not the
 
bureaucracy, now allocates goods, and corruption has been significantly
 
reduced.
 
A policy of licensing imports to control the inflow of foreign 
goods has been replaced with a commitment to the open economy and the 
application of very select"d. tariff protection. Liberalized imports 
have forced inefficient, protected industries and public monopoly 
enterprises to compete with private enterprises. The government has
 
closed some public firms and reduced the subsidies of others. In 1979,
 
general subsidies to state industries were slashed by nearly 80 percent,
 
from Rupees 1,486 million to Rupees 300 million. Public industries have
 
been instructed, by the new government to become commercially viable,
 
which has forced them to raise prices to meet higher production costs or
 
go out of business. The new liberal import policy increased activity in
 
the business and manufacturing sectors so much that despite a
 
significant, reduction in the business turnover tax rate in 1978,
 
revenues from this source nonetheless rose 62 percent in 1979.
 
To move quickly from an import-substitution to an export-led
 
strategy for economikc gowth, the government has granted a large number
 
of tax concessions and reductions. In 1978, it created the Greater
 
Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC), which exercises jurisdiction over
 
160 square miles of land extending north from the capital, Colombo, to
 
the airport. Within this territory, the GCEC has established several
 
free trade zones that offer investors a variety of incentives, with no 
limit on foreign equity participation. These include (a) up to ten 
years of full tax holiday on salaries, profits, dividends, with a 
potential extension of fifteen more years; (b) no income tax on the 
salaries of foreign personnel; (c) free remittance of dividends, no 
exchange controls, and tax free status for non-resident shareholder 
dividends; (d) free transfer of shares; (e) no import duty on raw 
materials, machinery, and so on. The GCEC goes out of its way to 
eliminate "red tape" to all Investors. 
By December 1982, the GCEC had approved 174 projects, representing
 
investors from 21 different countries. Pz3viding employment for 25,000
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people, the fully developed zone will employ 50,000 people. To see the
 
importance of this figure, total industrial employment in the entire
 
country in 1979 stood at about 150,000. In the first five years of
 
operation of the GCEC, total foreign investment in the free trade zone
 
came to Rupees 4,800 million (US$250-300 million). As a result of this
 
economic program, ind,-strial exports rose substantially.
 
Phase One of the first free trade 
zone has bean fully let. To
 
speed up development in the second phase, the GCEC has turned over to
 
private developers the opportunity to supply housing and administrative
 
facilities, thus. reducing government expenditure and further 
bringing
 
market forces to bear on the process of industrial development.
 
In addition to GCEC investments, a Foreign Investment Advisory
 
Committee (FIAC) also authorizes joint ventures between foreign
 
businessmen 
 and local equity participants. Five-to-ten-year tax
 
holidays on profits, dividends, and non-resident management fees are
 
granted in a variety of approved investment or business areas including
 
hotels, urban development projects, companies that construct power and 
irrigation projects, pioneer industries, gem exports, and so on. Total
 
approved investments by 1982 came to Rupees 10,400 million (over US$500
 
million) and envisaged new jobs from these approvals are estimated at
 
67,000.
 
To complement the Investment opportunities, Sri Lanka has 
established offshore banking in the form of Foreign Currency Banking
 
Units, which offer offshore banking facilities to all non-residents and 
UCEC enterprises. Permissible currencies include French and Swiss 
francs, Japanese yen, Dutch guilders, English pounds sterling, German
 
deutschmarks, and US dollars. Peofits from the operation of offshore 
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uanking are tax free. Total assets and liabitttea rose from Rupees 596
 
million in late 1979, when the FCBUs were authorized, to Rupees 13,000 
million by December 1982 (US$650 million).
 
Tax holidays to encourage investment have been accompanied by a 
variety of other fiscal relief measures. Included are such measures as 
exemption for interest earnings up to Rupees 2,000 on deposit with the 
National Savings Bank (a measure to spur savings), and exemption of up 
to one-third of assessable income if such income was spent on purchase 
of shares in new approved businesses, a contribution to a retirement 
fund, the purchase or construction of a houue, or was classified as a 
research and development expenditure.
 
In 1980, both individual and corporate tax rates were cut. 'he 
maximum tax rate of '0 percent on individuals' income was lowered to 55 
percent. Corporate rates were cut to 40 percent foil companies with 
publicly quoted shares. Capital gains on publicly quoted companies are 
exempt from tax.
 
In the November 1981 budget, import and export duties were further
 
reduced. However, an income tax nurcharge ranging between 5 and 15
 
percent was levied on business firms and individuals to increase
 
revenue. As well, a decision was taken to eliminate the tax holiday on 
new investments on March 31, 1983, which led to a raft of new share 
offerings to beat the deadline. Facilitating the capital markets was 
the establishment of a stock exchange, set up on September 29, 1982.
 
The 1983 budget proposed a general sales tax increase from 2 to 4
 
percent, and an across the board increase in the various turnover tax 
rates, along with a modest restoration of a 5 percent import duty on 
hitherto free items. The government of Sri Lanka has thus tried to 
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raise additional revenue from its 
own sources, even as it increased its
 
reliance on foreign sources.
 
Universal subsidization of all 
Sri Lankans in foodstuffs has been
 
replaced with a selective subsidy in the form of "food stamps" to those
 
with monthly incomes below Rupees 300/month (US$18/month). Food prices
 
now realistically reflect local or overseas production costs.
 
State industrial and trading monopolies have been gradually reduced
 
or eliminated. In 1977, 
some 90 percent of the economy was controlled
 
by the public sector; this percentage fell to two-thirds by 1981 and the
 
government hopes to continue in this direction.
 
The government has begun to shift public spending from consumption
 
subsidies to investment in economic infrastructure, largely in the
 
fields 
of irrigation, hydroelectric power (needed to support growing
 
industrial 
 demands on power), transportation, and communications.
 
Consumption subsidies are scheduled to fall as a share of the budget.
 
The Results. Economic statistics that 
are thus far available are
 
encouraging. Unemployment fell from a peak level of 24 percent in 1973
 
to about 
15 percent in 1980 and, if recent rates of economic growth can
 
oe sustained, is expected 
to fall to the single digit level in the
 
1980s. 
 Since 1977, real rates of economic growth have doubled. During
 
the regime of Mrs. Bandaranaiko, economic growth averaged 3.1 percent
 
per year, a gain of about 1.5 percent per capita. Since 1977, the
 
economy has grown at real annual rates of 8.2, 6.3, 5.8, and 5.8 percent
 
respectively through 1981, and increases in per capita incomes are
 
nearly threefold that in the prior regime. These higher growth 
rates
 
since 1977 have been achieved despite 
the worst cyclone in decades, a
 
worldwide economic slowdown, oil price hikes, and a severe drought.
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Economic reforms often move in fits and starts. The United
 
National Party government, taking office in mid-1977, inherited an
 
economy in severe disrepair, suffering high inflation due to a 30 
percent growth in the money supply fostered by the Bandaranaike
 
government's poliry of consumer subsidies. The Jayewardene government 
set out to fix both of these problems. First, it got the growth rate of 
the money supply down to 11 percent in 1978, thus slowing inflation. 
But it also embarked on an ambitious program of public spending on dams, 
power projects, housing, and other,public works to make up for years of 
public neglect of the nation's infrastructure. Public spending outpaced 
the nation's internal and foreign aid resources, generating massive 
budget deficits. The Central Bank was forced to buy Rupees 6,800 
million of new treasury bills in 1980 (virtually tripling central bank 
holdings of government debt in one year), and bv~h the money supply and 
inflation accelerated to an annual growth rate of 30 percent. Central 
Bank purchases of treasury debt came to Rupees 3,800 million in 1981 and 
Rupees 3,300 million in 1982. Budget deficits averaging nearly Rupees 
15,000 million for the three years 1980-1982 have also necessitated a 
substantial increase in foreign loans and grants. By the end of 1982, 
external debt stood at Rupees 35,600 million (US$1.75 billion) while the
 
domestic debt had reached Rupees 36,600 million. Debt service payments
 
for the 1983 budget are estimated at 29 percent of total current
 
expenditure. By the end of 1982, total external 
reserves were
 
sufficient to finance only approximately three months worth of imports.
 
Since the Jayewardene government has taken office, the Sri Lanka 
Rupee has depreciated approximately 30 percent against the US dollar. 
The government has been unable to get its fiscal house in balance. It 
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has relied on inflation financing of a substantial portion of its annual
 
budget deficits by Central 
Bank purchases of government debt. As a
 
result, consumer prices doubled from 1977 and 1982. the
However, 

floating exchange rate has prevented the currency from becoming
 
overvalued and has not damaged the export performance of the economy. 
Without continued massive financialforeign assistance, the economy
 
would surely have grown at a lower rate.
 
Another obstacle to economic recovery is the slow process of 
denationalization. Since the former government had nearly destroyed the
 
private sector, the process of returning to a market economy is a slow, 
painful one. Two-thirds of the industrial and trading sectors remain in
 
public hands, but this is a considerable reduction from the more than 90
 
percent that prevailed in 1977.
 
In 1963, the Jayewardene government overwhelmingly won a national 
referendum to continue the present government for another six years,
 
bypassing, in the process, the normal election schedule. 
 Investors are
 
thus promised another 
six years of relative continuity in economic
 
policy. If the economy can 
sustain its strong growth throughout this
 
second term of office, it will have scored notable gains in 
a little
 
more than one decade.
 
Although government policy has maintained the real exchange rate,
 
internal inflation threatens to be a serious problem the
if budget 
deficits are not slowly curtailed. Sri Lankans will need to temper 
their rush to development with fiscal prudence, lest their path to 
progress be strewn with thorns of debt and economic instability.
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VIII. Free Markets and Economic Growth: An Empirical Summary
 
The principal goal of economic policy is to insure that scarce
 
resources are allocated as efficiently as possible. It is generally
 
recognized that the community's scarce resources can be efficiently
 
allocated only by the price mehanism. For the pricing mechanism to work
 
requires that neither the government nor a collusive private sector
 
regulate prices or restrict entry and exit for buyers or sellers. Free
 
competition insures the lowest possible prices for consumers and
 
least-cost production.
 
Of course, in every society the government plays a major economic
 
role in providing such services as national defense, public safety, and
 
public works. It also provides the institutional framework within which
 
economic exchanges take place. However, too often government undertakes
 
responsibilities it cannot afford and interferes in the economy by
 
subsidizing or taxing different economic interests. The extent to which
 
a government pursues sound policies has an important effect on overall
 
economic efficiency.
 
This discussion paper documents seven cases of postwar economic
 
growth built largely on a free-market foundation. The seven reflect
 
differences in historical development, geography, climate, population,
 
resource endowments, culture and tradition, and postwar political
 
structures. Although no two have undergone the same exact experience,
 
one can distill a core of policies that foster growth and also identify
 
other dimensions of policy nat play a supportive role.
 
Most developing countries depend heavily on trade. The seven are
 
no exception. They export primary products, raw materials, and
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manufactured goods, importing, in turn, a wide variety of foodstuffs and
 
finished products. The mechanism which links the internal costs and
 
prices of a country's goods and services with overseas buyers 
and
 
sellers is the exchange rate. A rate that is too high (an overvalued
 
currency) harms the competitiveness of exports in world markets.
 
Imports become artificially cheap. These circumstances invariably lead
 
to a balance of payments problem, and motivate the government to impose
 
a variety of tariff and nontariff restrictions on imports. Protection,
 
imposed either 
to preserve scarce foreign exchange or to deliberately
 
assist the growth of import substitutes, typically results in
 
inefficient production, since producers are spared the test of market
 
competition. Thus the price of domestic 
inputs into locally produced
 
goods rises above lea=it-cost levels. A correctly valued exchange rate
 
is absolutely central in equating domestic and world prices. 
 A correct
 
exchange rate is 
one that would prevail under conditions of free trade:
 
no restrictions of any sort on imports and exports. Under free trade,
 
buyers and sellers conduct their exchanges in domestic or world markets
 
on a least-cost basis, and each country 
can exploit its comparative
 
advantage in any good or service.
 
What stands in the way of maintaining a correctly valued currency
 
or, as is all too often the case, preventing an overvalued currency? 
Large public sector deficits frequently force inflationary central bank 
purchases of public debt by issuing currency. The inflation tax becomes 
a primary vehicle by which a public sector deficit is financed. In the 
process, domestic prices rise above world levels. 
 Unless the currency
 
is correspondingly devalued, the exchange rate 
becomes overvalued. In
 
addition, as public debt grows, debt servicing payments rise, further
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straining the public finances. Those countries that have avoided public
 
debt, domestic or foreign, have enjoyed the most rapid growth. Sound 
public finance goes hand-in-hand with free trade. 
Another serious obstacle to a correctly valued currency is 
government regulations, such as minimum wage standards, that push local
 
costs above world levels, thus pricing local goods out of world markets.
 
External free trade is the best way to insure internal free trade.
 
It is desirable that domestic producers have access to all the factors
 
of production, labor, raw materials, goods and services, and capital, on
 
a least-cost basis. Policies that raise wages above market levels (as
 
set by supply and demand), or distort the cost of borrowing through 
selective credit allocation, or unnecessarily increase the costs of any 
input above market levels means a loss in efficiency. External free 
trade makes domestic regulations extremely costly and the effects 
readily visible, since any unwarranted increase in domestic costs 
damages external competitiveness. 
In short, free trade, free entry, free movement of capital, no wage
 
and price controls, coupled with a balanced budget, set in an
 
environment of political stability comprise the essential ingredients in
 
the recipe for growth. Other dimensions of economic policy can also
 
acelerate or retard growth, but appar to be less important. The seven
 
case studies suggest, for example, that the particular structure of a
 
monetary system is not as important as maintaining a correct exchange
 
rate, which offsets domestic inflation against world prices. The seven
 
countries include examples of fully backed "currency board" currencies
 
that appreciate, currencies that remained pegged to major international
 
currencies such as the US dollar and French franc, or those that float, 
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typically downward. 
 Trouble 
arises when the currency is allowed to
 
become overvalued, 
as in the Chilean situation in 1981.
 
Savings and investment policies also hikAder or help long-run growth
 
prospects. The 
most prudent strategy is to finance investment from
 
domestic savings or foreign investment, rather than from borrowing. 
 A
 
burgeoning public debt drains 
resources away from investment into debt
 
service and often implies higher future taxes to repay this debt, which
 
discourages new investment. It also cramp3 
fiscal flexibility. Hong
 
Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have relied on domestic savings and private
 
foreign investment. 
 Korea, the Ivory Coast, Chile, and Sri Lanka have
 
borrowed heavily on both domestic and overseas financial markets. These
 
latter countries face a more unsettled economic future because of their
 
heavy indebtedness. A rapid rise world
in interest rates, such as
 
occurred in 
the early 1980s, imposed an unexpected rapid increase in
 
debt service payments that countries like Chile could ill afford.
 
Although specific tax incentives can promote investment, incentives
 
per se are less important than tb,3 maintenance of a neutral, low-tax
 
environment, which does not destroy incentives to work, save, or invest.
 
Hong Kong maintains a flat tax; others mix graduated income taxes with a
 
variety of indirect taxes. 
 But the overall burden of taxation rarely
 
exceeds 20-25 percent. This aggregate percentage may be high by third
 
world levels, but the rates on any given tax are not punitive. In three
 
cases, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, tax 
receipts are sufficient to
 
fund public spending. 
The other four face the prospects of higher taxes
 
or lower public spending to get their fiscal houses in order.
 
It is sometimes alleged that economic growth depends 
on industrial
 
development, of which the urban, city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore
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are cited as two prime examples. Taiwan and Korea are also noted for 
rapid growth based on manufactured exports. However, these two 
medium-sized nations retain large agricultural sectors. The Ivory Coast 
and Sri Lanka, by contrast, depend disproportionately on their primary, 
crop-producing rural sectors for the bulk of their national incone and 
employment. A policy of high producer prices in the Ivory Coast is 
largely responsible for the health of that country's economy, whereas 
food subsidies were a main culprit in Sri Lanka's ill fortunes until the 
late 1970s. Chile looks to its exports of natural resources. Thus the 
claim that growth requires rapid industrialization is suspect on the 
evidence. Free trade is just as beneficial to agricultural and mineral 
producers as to manufacturers. 
To summarize, a policy package of free trade, a correct
 
(free-trade) exchange rate, a domestic business environment free from
 
restrictions on prices and entry, an absence of cost-raising labor
 
regulations, buttressed by balanced budgets and low levels, of taxation
 
is the magic formula for economic prosperity. Few countries adopt this 
mix or sustain high growth rates. If it is not possible to put an 
entire free-market policy package into place, it may still be feasible 
in a particular political context to adopt one or more modest 
incentive-enhancing measures to increase efficiency. In the remaining 
portions of this paper, a catalogue of proven modest reforms is 
assembled from which leaders of developing nations can select in pursuit 
of improved economic efficiency.
 
IX. A Piecemeal Approach to Market Incentives
 
Wholesale application of free-market 
 policies in developing
 
cruntries has been rare. A handful of island tax havens, added to the
 
seven detailed case studies, yields 
no more than a dozen or so third
 
world economic systems in which Adam Smith would 
find himself at home.
 
The economies of the more than one 
hundred remaining nations reflect a
 
large measure of government direction and control that cuts across 
the
 
entire spectrum of economic policies. One typically finds in these
 
countries 
a broad range of subsidies, both to industry and consumers,
 
wage and price controls (often to 
the detriment of local agriculture),
 
tariff and nontariff restrictions on imports, export imposts, capital
 
controls, large budget deficits, a raft of state-owned enterprises (the
 
bulk of which are poorly managed), and often shockingly steep income tax
 
rates that hit the small middle class very hard. 
All too often, massive
 
government involvement in local economies has ?etarded growth,
 
exacerbated conflict in divided and
ethnically societies, fostered
 
widespread corruption.
 
Proponents of a Hong Kong economic system are told that such 
policies are politically infeasible in most poor countries, whose people
 
ana leaders will not tolerate unlimited foreign investment and ownership
 
or let the marketplace allocate incomes and wealth. 
 Considerations of
 
local control, distribution of income (often referred as
to equity),
 
self-reliance 
(which explains why so many countries pursued import
 
substitution strategies of development) dominate the policy agenda in 
most developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
Once a full
 
panoply of government programs and controls is put in place, it is very
 
difficult 
 to overcome the political obstacles that resist its
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withdrawal, the uyriad of individuals and organized groups that benefits
 
from special privileges, protection, regulations, or preferential access
 
to credit, licenses, subsidies, an official exchange rate, and so forth.
 
In the same breath, leaders of poor countries increasingly cast an 
admirable glance at the performance of the supergrowth economies. 
Indeed, in Taiwan, the government has established a center to which 
delegations from many poor countries have come to learn how to establish 
and operate a duty-free export processing zone. Throughout Asia, eyes 
turn with respect to Singapore. Thirty years of experimentation with 
heavy government involvement in economic development has brought new 
sympathy for economic experiments that restore and improve incentives 
through the efficiency properties in the pricing mechanism. The example
 
that has a strong impact on the largest population bloc in the world is
 
the introduction in 1979 of the rural production responsibility system
 
in China that makes greater use of decentralized decision-making in
 
investment and production in rural enterprises and farms, stronger
 
incentives that link material rewards with the work of liouseholds and 
individuals, and greater use of the market mechanism in allocating 
resources.1 In particular, farmers can sell crops beyond a state quota 
in markets governed purely by supply and demand. As an incentive, the 
Chinese government has reduced the size of the :ixed quota. During 
1978-1982, gross agricultural output rose at 5.6 percent a year, roughly
 
double the average rate in the preceding twenty years. Higher prices
 
have increased farmers' real incomes by 10 percent per year. Not
 
surprisingly, the quality and quantity of produce available in urban
 
areas has markedly improved.
 
These incentive-enhancing, market-oriented reforms have not brought
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private ownership of land or agricultural equipment, nor the abolition
 
of minimum state quotas, in which quantities and prices are imposed on a
 
variety of crops subject to compulsory delivery. Nor have they
 
radically altered the landscape of overall economic policy which
 
continues to find the Chinese government exercising the dominant role in
 
production and allocation decisions throughout the breadth of the
 
economy. Yet the introduction of liberal reforms in the rural sector,
 
on a miniature free-market scale, has yielded large gains in efficiency
 
and personal well-being of millions of people. Market reforms in rural
 
China demonstrate that it is both politically feasible and economically
 
oeneficial to inject market forces into an otherwise heavily controlled
 
economy.
 
Nor is China's rural experiment an isolatod instance. Several
 
dozen countries have injected market-based policies in a variety of 
areas encompassing private provision of public services, contracting out
 
of public services, rational pricing of public enterprises (which 
typically means raising prices to reflect full opportunity costs), 
tariff reduction and simplification, divestiture of state-owned 
enterprises, allowing private sector firms to compete with state 
enterprises, closure of inefficient public enterprises, a whole raft of 
selective tax incentives to promote investment and exports, and so on. 
A comprehensive list of possible reforms can be assembled around the
 
categories of taxation, expenditure, provision of public services,
 
budgetary r>tcy, trade, regulation, and monetary policy. Taken
 
together, this set of reforms constitutes a total developmental package,
 
resembling the general strategies of the Hong Kongs, Ivory Coasts, and
 
other free-market economies. Viewed separately, each item represents a
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new reliance on market forces that is likely to foster greater
 
efficiency in that sector of the economy to which it is applicable. A
 
detailed classification, category by category, would include the
 
following reforms.
 
Taxation: Establish 	a duty free port--no import duties or export taxes
 
Maintain low direct rates of taxation
 
Rely on consumption taxes to promote savings
 
Grant tax holidays
 
Permit accelerated depreciation
 
Provide for loss carryover
 
Grant reinvestment allowances
 
Move toward greater tax neutrality
 
Expenditure: 	 Eliminate general and specific subsidies to business
 
Reduce the overall size of the public sector
 
Eliminate food and other consumer subsidies
 
Budget: 	 Balance the budget
 
Avoid deficits and borrowing
 
Public Enterprises: 	 Put on commercial basis
 
Rely on user fees where possible
 
Contract out to private enterprise
 
Make public enterprises independent and profit
 
maximizers
 
Lease cut public enterprises to private
 
management
 
Divest publicly owned enterprises
 
Allow private competition with publicly owned
 
enterprises
 
Abolish state marketing boards
 
Internal Regulation: Install clear, simple, inexpensive general
 
business requirements
 
Maintaln lenient labor regulations,

Eliminate government monopoly privileges for trade
 
unions
 
Eliminate protection for industry
 
Eliminate rent controls
 
Abolish minimum wage legislation
 
Avoid excessive severance pay requirements
 
Decentralize decision making
 
Eliminate system of permits, licenses, and
 
monopolies over private enterprises
 
Don't hold down agricultural prices
 
Eliminate nm kabing board levies
 
External Regulation: 	 Allow free movement of capital 
Mal tain a duty free port 
Promote free trade 
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Remove quantitative restrictions on imports and
 
exports

Attract private foreign investment
 
Minimizo dependence on foreign aid
 
Establish export processing zones
 
Provide free repatriation of capital, interest,
 
and dividends
 
Provide guarantees against expropriation
 
Monetary Policy: 	 Maintain correctly valued exchange rate
 
Eliminate foreign exchange controls
 
Eliminate credit rationing

Increase veal rates of interest to promote saving
 
Reduce and control inflation
 
Establish offshore banking privileges
 
Maintain currency convertibility
 
Examples of partial free-market policies abound in such countries 
as Argentina, India, Thailand, Turkey, Brazil, Kenya, Pakistan, Jamaica,
 
Bangladesh, the Cameroons, Malawi, and Somalia, to name a few. These 
countries represent much
as 
 social, ethnic, geographic, economic, and
 
political diversity as is found throughout the less prosperous regions
 
of Asiap Africa and Latin America. With countries as large as China and
 
India, as politically diverse as Somalia and Turkey, the above checklist
 
of measures gives political leaders considerable choice in selecting 
reforms that are 	 feasible and desirable within their own 	 countries and 
the confidence that such changes promote much sought-after gains in 
efficiency.
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X. Case Studies of Market Reforms in Poor Countries
 
It is a fair statement that postwar economic policy in the
 
developing world has emphasized state participation in or direction of 
the economy. Governments have interfered in foreign and domestic trade,
 
set exchange rates at artificially high levels, subsidized or taxed on a
 
discriminatory basis, and directly supplied a raft of goods and
 
services. In addition to government spending and investment, public
 
sector enterprises in these countries alone typically account for 7 to 
15 percent of Gross Domestic Product. 1 In Allende's Chile and Mrs. 
Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka, for example, virtually the entire economy had
 
come under the direct or indirect control of the central government.
 
State-owned industry and nationalized agriculture produced as much as 90
 
percent of national output. In neither country was there any private
 
sector to speak of.
 
Chile and Sri Lanka are two extremely rare cases in which the
 
government switched policy horses from state control to placing maximum
 
reliance on the free market. Chile's Chicago boys virtually
 
denationalized the entire economy; Sri Lanka's reformers have made 
a
 
good start in the same direction. As previously discussed, both
 
countries also undertook major tariff and exchange-rate reformp and used
 
tax incentives to attract foreign investment. Searching the postwar
 
record yields almost no other country in which economic policy underwent
 
such a dramatic transformation. Most developing nations have clung 
tenaciously to widespread government control over their economies.
 
The reasons for large-scale government economic involvement are 
diverse, ranging from the need to integrate ethnically distinct rogions,
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to ideological convictions in the superiority of socialism, or the
 
belief that capitalism unfairly allocates income, or a desire to be rid
 
ef foreigners. But the 
successes of Asia's supergrowth economies have 
not gone unnoticed. In recent years, many poor countries have begun to
 
experiment with modest reforms intended to 
inject greater efficiency
 
into their 
economies. These reforms have encompassed changes 
in the
 
scope and activities 
of state-owned public enterprises, tax policy,
 
subsidies, economic regulationsp and trade and exchange-rate policies.
 
However, public sector enterprises have received the most attention. One
 
reason is that the accounts of public enterprises have shown enormous
 
deficits because they have been used deliberately to substdize consumers
 
and provide employment. Other reasons 
include the lack of competition,
 
and access 
to public funds, which means that public enterprises are not 
forced to shut down if they lose money. Few public firms follow 
commercial procedures, thus prices rarely 
reflect full opportunity
 
costs. Waste, inefficiency, and corruption are 
rampant. Concurrent
 
aith 
rising interest rates and third-world indebtedness, government
 
officials have been forced to take an economically more hard-headed look
 
at public enterprises.
 
In this final section, I first examine a variety of successful 
reforms that largely involve public enterprises, including 
 the
 
introduction of private competition, pricing on a commercial basis,
 
privatization and divestiture, contracting out, and outright shutting
 
down of inefficient firms. 
 Next I discuss examples that reflect changes
 
in internal regulation to foster increased domestic competition. Other
 
topics include fiscal policy, trade tariff
and liberalization, and
 
monetary policy. 
 Domestic reform is predicated on increasing the role
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of prices and competition; international changes are intended to link
 
dome tic and international price levels in accord with market conditions
 
of supply and demand.
 
A. 	Reform of Public Enterprises
 
Introduction of Private Competition. World Development Report
 
1983, the most recent annual yearbook of the World Bank, has documented 
several successful examples of the beneficial effects of allowing 
private firms to compete with government-run monopolies. 2 In many 
cities, bus services are dominated by publicly owned or highly regulated 
companies operating full-size buses. Most require government subsidies 
to cover their deficits. In several cities, Buenos Aires (Argentina), 
Calcutta (India), and Chiengmai (Thailand), private companies running 
smaller buses have been allowed to provide service: All offer better
 
service and are profitable.
 
Fifty private companies have been licensed to operate in Buenos 
Aires. Although the government sets their routes, they compete with 
each other in price and quality of service. Virtually every route is 
served 18 hours a day with well-maintained buses. In the late 1950s, a
 
large public company failed to provide service on these routes, losing
 
$44 million in 1959 alone, finally dissolving in 1962.
 
The experience of municipal Calcutta is starker still. Private
 
buses were permitted to compete with the Calcutta State Transportation
 
Corporation in 1966. They charged identical fares. The private firms
 
earned a profit, while CSTC lost money. On similar routes, CSTC
 
requires a monthly subsidy of $1 million. The private firms flourish
 
through quicker repairs, better fare collection (public bus conductors
 
lack this incentive), and higher labor productivity. Private buses now
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supply two-thirds of all bus trips.
 
In. Chiengmai, the government has allowed the 
introduction of
 
ninibuses, whose operators 
set their own routes and fares, usually
 
double that of public transportation. The service is so popular that
 
private minibuses account for 90 percent 
of all trips at a modest
 
profit, while the main bus company loses money.
 
Minibuses also operate in Nairobi, Istanbul, and Hong Kong, in each
 
case serving less accessible neighborhoods, often providing only
the 

means of transportation for residents 
in squatter areas or 
narrow
 
streets. Earnings of private bus operators typically exceed 
those in
 
public firms.
 
Private Provision 
of Public Services. It is not necessary for
 
government to manage the 
provision of such public services as 
fire
 
protection, water supply, 
sewerage service, parks roads
and and 

maintenance, to name 
a few, just because the services are supported by
 
public revenues. It is becoming increasingly attractive to contract out
 
the provision of public services 
to cost-conscious private firms. In
 
the Ivory Coast, for example, water and sewerage service is managed by a
 
private company, of which 52 percent of the shareholders are Ivorians.3
 
Although the Ministry of Public Works 
plans and builds new water
 
projects, the private water 
company, SODECI, is 
paid a fee related to
 
the volume 
of water sold, which covers costs of staff, equipment,
 
energy, 
and a small profit margin. The fee also covers 
debt service.
 
Unlike most other West African water companies, which operate at a loss
 
and require subsidies, water charges 
in the Ivory Coast reflect full
 
opportunity costs. Consumption is metered, 
waste and losses are low,
 
and receipts are sufficient to finance required expansion of the system.
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Water provision in the Ivory Coast reflects the general rule that
 
consumers, not taxpayers, pay for the service they receive, with a
 
concession to poor, small users. SODECI is guaranteed independence from
 
central government intervention, retaining the right to hire and fire
 
its own staff.
 
Limited evidence also suggests that private firms can maintain 
national roads at lower cost than government departments. 4 Since 1979, 
private contractors have taken over the maintenance of about half the 
national road network in Argentina. In Brazil, the federal highway 
authority reduced its road maintenance by 75 percent, in favor of 
private firms, between 1970 and 1980. Private maintenance in the 
Slovenian region of Yugoslavia has drastically reduced costs and
 
staffing requirements.
 
One reason for more cost-effective provision is the tender process,
 
which generates keen competition among private firms for the work. One
 
comparative analysis in Brazil demonstrated that private contractors
 
were 37 percent cheaper than a reasonably efficient government
 
department.
 
Commercial Orientation. Public enterprises invariably run huge 
deficits. The reason is that they usually price their services on the 
basis of political considerations, rather than economic costs. 
Subsidies are a way of life for public enterprises, which means fewer 
resources are available to the private sector for investment or use in
 
other government programs. Moreover, any service which is subsidized
 
inevitably creates excess demand, which leads to wasteful use of scarce
 
resources that are priced artifically low.
 
One simple solution is for governments to instruct their public
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enterprises to set prices which directly reflect costs. 
 The most vivid
 
illustrations of well-run public firms are those which, given 
a free
 
Land in pricing, have tried to 
equate costs with prices. The Turkish
 
fertilizer industry is a case in point. 5 A detailed analysis of the
 
industry revealed that eight of seventeen fertilizer plants had serious
 
shortcomings arising out of the scarcity of 
foreign exchange, which 
inhibited imports of raw materials and needed credit to finance working 
capital. Wage controls also discouraged competent personnel from 
entering the industry. Older plants could not be modernized to use less 
energy. In 1980, the government raised fertilizer producer prices to 
world levels, in the process restoring the viability of most companies, 
which have since expanded output and invested in improvements. Wage 
controls were lifted, and staff quality has improved. The results? 
Capacity utilization rose from 41 percent in 1979 to 67 percent in 1981. 
In Malawi, a one-party state under the direction of President 
Banda, the public sector's share of investment stands at about 75 
percent of the total. 6 There is very little of what we would call a
 
private sector in the country. Most business enterprises are owned by 
various combinations of multinational firms, public holding companies, 
development banks, or a trust owned and directed by the President. 
Despite an overwhelming public presence in the day-to-day economy, 
public firms are generally instructed to set prices at levels which 
reflect full opportunity costs. Wage rates reflect supply and demand,
 
not politically attractive, official pronouncements, and are lower than
 
in surrounding African countries. 
Not all sectors of the economy enjoy 
free movement of prices, but the overall thrust is to let market signals 
dictate trade, investment, and production decisions. Tariffs are kept 
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low and import quotas do not extst.
 
In response, Malawi has enjoyed sustained high per capita growth of
 
2.9 percent per year between independence in 1964 and 1979, despite a
 
condition of relative resouroelessness, a landlocked location, the
 
absence of an indigeneous entrepreneurial class, and an initially
 
bankrupt fiscal house. A March 1983 Agency for International
 
Development evaluation concluded that broad application of market
 
incentives permitted the successful operation of public enterprises, 
which contributed to the strong growth of the economy.
 
A final illustration is contained in the experience of the Kenya
 
Tea Development Authority, a state-owned entertrise in business since
 
the early 1960s to process and export black tea. 7 KDTA and the growers
 
it serves rely overwhelmingly on world market prices, riding a roller 
coaster of good or bad times in accord with market conditions. The 
agency has not tried to protect itself by building up large reserves 
through excessive levies on producers; it has, therefore, sustained high
 
incentivos to growers, operated efficiently, avoided government
 
subsidies, and, over the long run, helped build a viable agricultural
 
export industry.
 
Divestiture and Privatization. Several countries have begun to
 
experiment with divestiture of public enterprises, or privatization of
 
state economic activities. These terms reflect the selling off of all
 
or part of the operations of public enterprises to private firms and
 
individuals. Prior illustrations include Chile and Sri Lanka. Other
 
illustrations can be found in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, and
 
Jamaica.
 
The Government of Bb ladesh has recently reformed its fertilizer
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distribution arrangements which shifted functions from public agencies
 
to private traders. 8 Heavy population pressure on the land means that 
higher agricultural output hWs to come from greater use of fertilizer, 
since new land is not available to put into production. By the 
mid-1970s, the government had concluded that the nation's distribution 
system could not supply these higher quantities. 
Procurement and marketing of all agricultural inputs, including 
fertilizer, was in the hands of the Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation (BADC), which employed 7,000 staff, operated 67 intermediate 
and 423 local level warehouses, and ultimately sold fertilizer to 20,000 
active private dealers at a fixea price that afforded private dealers 
little room for profit. Dealers were confined in their operations to a
 
carefully defined local area. As a result, some areas faced shortages 
of fertilizer, and Qthers lacked adequate transport and storage 
facilities. 
The United States Agency for International Development financed a 
project that supported construction of additional storage capacity but 
also phased in greater private sector involvement in fertilizer 
distribution. Under the scheme, BADC is withdrawing from fertilizer 
sales; instead, it sells primarily to wholesalers. All private dealers 
and cooperatives are permitted to buy from all BADC warehouses. Private
 
movement of fertilizer is largely unrestricted. Farmers were permitted
 
to buy from any trader. Licensing of traders was eased, and official 
prices were lowered thus affording dealers slightly higher profit 
margins. 
Preliminary evidence shows an increase in sales, because each 
trader has an incentive to sell as much as he can under the free 
marketing distribution arrangements, a fall in retail prices due to
 
competition between traders, effective movement of fertilizer from
 
surplus to deficit areas (to take advantage of higher prices), and the
 
development of a whole new class of private wholesalers, who respond to
 
market forces, not the dictates of an official agricultural agency. It
 
took, altogether, approximately five years to bring the wholesale
 
function of fertilizer distribution into the private sector, but this
 
success has produced plans to transfer seed and pump operations from 
BADC to the private sector.
 
Privatization and divestiture have been prominent features of
 
recent policy initiatives in the African nation of Somalia.9 In order
 
to promote agricultural development, in 1977, the government loosened
 
its restrictions on private land purchases in a region known as the
 
Upper Shebelli, which take the form of 50 year leases. Between 1978 and
 
1982, over 4,800 leases were granted to cooperatives, private companies,
 
and individuals that totalled just under 150,000 hectares. To
 
facilitate irrigation and mechanization, the government gave away 38
 
pumps that had been lying idle, and sold off some 330 wheeled tractors
 
that had been received as a gift from Iraq. A third change was a
 
reduction in the role of the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC),
 
a marketing monopoly, which had held a monopoly of foodgrain purchase.
 
Since May 1981, farmers need no longer sell their grain to ADC and can
 
store as much of their annual output as they wish. A marketing monopoly
 
has given way to virtual free trade in grain. Although ADC guarantees 
producer prices, free market prices are typically higher, which means 
that few farmers now sell to ADC. 
In parallel, a state trading company, ENC, has lost its import 
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monopoly on many basic gcods. 
 In its place, the government now grants
 
letters of credit to private importers.
 
Fishing has also been privatized. Government created
 
"cooperatives" and state 
 fishing units working under the Coastal
 
Development Agency failed to maintain a fleet of motorized boats, due to
 
the lack of individual incentives among fishermen. The government price
 
policy paid fishermen far below the market 
price. Other problems of
 
public ownership and management surfaced, too. Free provision of inputs
 
discouraged routine maintenance, nor were penalties imposed for improper
 
handling of equipment. In 1981, the government undertook to sell off 
the motorized boats to private individuals: formerly 85 percent of the
 
boats in government service were out use; today,
of 85, percent in
 
private hands are in service.
 
On a final note, the government has closed and handed to private
 
agents four public enterprises and autonomous agencies: 
 the Livestock
 
Development Agency, 
the Agency for Building Materials, the Agency for
 
Textiles anc 
Jousehold Appliances, and Somalfish, and is considering the
 
abolition of other agencies.
 
In a report prepared for the U.S. Agency for 
 International
 
Development, Elliot Berg Associates concluded that the process of
 
divestiture and privatization in Somalia had brought a strong surge in 
private agricultural activity, largely due to the government's new 
emphasis on private farming.
 
On a smaller scale, efforts at divestiture are being made in 
Jamaica. The newly elected government, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Edward Seaga, has closed two of eight government-owned sugar
 
mills and leased five others 
to 
domestic and foreign sugar producers.
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Some 20,000 acres of land hold by the Government Agricultural 
Development Corporation are being assessed for possible divestiture. In 
the tourism sector, four hotels have been leased to private firms. 
Others have been converted to office space.
 
Elsewhere, the Peruvian government that took office in July 1980
 
announced its intention to sell its shares in some 70 state-owned
 
enterprises. In Pakistan, two small engineering firms were returned to
 
the private sector, along with a rice mill and two sugar mills. The
 
Government of Zaire abolished a number of agricultural public 
enterprises in 1978, and the Sudanese government has returned the public
 
bus system in Khartoum to private ownership.
10
 
Closing- Public Enterprises. Some governments have taken the
 
extreme measure of simply shutting down unprofitable public enterprises.
 
In Malawai, for example, Spearhead Limited, a mini-congolerate that 
encompassed petrol stations, tobacco estates, tea and coffee estates,
 
garment factories, and other pursuits, had flourished by the dubious
 
11  
procedure of bank overdraft under Treasury guaranty. Due to poor 
management, increasing politicization of management, a lack of equity 
capital, and poor investment decisions based on prestige instead of 
profit, the firm fell into financial difficulty. President Banda, sole 
trustee and owner of the firm, placed the firm in receivership and 
instructed Price Waterhouse to sell off potentia.ly profitable 
operations and close down the rest. 
3. Domestic Regulatory Reform
 
The prior treatment of privatization in Somalia encompassed a 
number of internal reforms that, strictly speaking, were really
 
exercises in deregulation. As mentioned, these included the practical
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abolition of the government's agricultural marketing monopoly and major
 
state trading company, which effectively restored free market prices in
 
a ricultural production, and opened the import business to internal
 
competition among numerous traders.
 
A vivid demonstration of the beneficial effects of unregulated 
pricing on economic activity is found in Cameroon. 12  Although the 
government tries exercise control the
to overall of economy, it
 
generally maintains a hands-off approach toward important sectors of the
 
economy. The government sets producer prices in the case of major
 
agricultural export crops 
 often below world price levels. The
 
differential between export prices and farmers' payments goes partly to
 
infrastructure development and general budgetary purposes. 
 However,
 
despite the maintenance of a nominal price control system of certain 
essential commodities, and virtually all locally manufactured products 
and all local industrial products and services, it is largely unenforced
 
and thus inoperative. "Private sector development has thus been
 
relatively unhampered by Government intervention in the area of
 
prices."13 AID's evaluation suggested that setting producer prices in
 
agriculture closer to world levels, which has come about due to a fall 
in world prices, would have a beneficial effect on output and rural
 
incomes.
 
Labor regulation is a crucial part of any developmental policy. It
 
has played an extremely important role in the development of Singapore,
 
the Ivory Coast, and other rapidly growing countries. The cardinal aim
 
of labor regulation is to insure that wage increases do not rise out of 
line with increases in productivity, thus pushing domestic costs above 
world levels. The Government of Malawi has been able to keep wage rates 
-129­
in line with the opportunity costs of labor. African manufacturing 
wages in neighboring Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, and Tanzania are all 
substantially higher than in Malawi. As a result, Malawi's costs of 
production are very low for many industries, making Malawi's goods 
competitive on world markets.14  Another beneficial impact of this 
policy has been to cause wage employment to rise more rapidly than 
growth of GDP. 
C. External Regulatory Reform
 
Examples of external regulatory reform include reform and removal 
of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, and currency reforms, most 
often devaluations, to bring domestic costs in line with world prices. 
Perhaps the best -example of the beneficial effects of trade 
liberalization and currency adjustment is the case of Brazil, when 
liberal reform propelled increases in annual economic growth to 10 
percent levels and produced what came to be known as the "Brazilian 
miracle." 
Much has been written about the postwar growth of the Brazilian 
economy, with its switching back and forth between import substitution 
and export promotion.15 Although the boom period of tremendous growth, 
1968-1974, followed a series of liberalizing measures, at no time did 
the Brazilian economy reflect an overall free-market approach as, for 
example, in Chile. Indeed, by 1974, the prevailing economic system
 
could best be described as state capitalism: estimates of the total 
government share of GDP range as high as 50 percent, with the public 
sector acconting for some three-fifths of total investment. Government 
firms dominated public utilities enterprise. electric power generation, 
the banking sectors, steel, and chemicals. 16 However, within this 
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state-directed capitalistic economy, the government adopted in the 
mid-1960s several trade and tax pclloies that sharply improved the 
efficiency of the pricing mechanism in linking the Brazilian economy to 
world markets, and thus setting off a boom.
 
From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1960s, Brazil
 
followed a policy oriented towards import substitution. Its policy
 
mosaic consisted of the use of multiple exchange rates, high tariffs on
 
imports, the exclusion of imports whenever a similar domestic product
 
existed; in short, a highly protectionistic program. Protection for 
manufactured goods ranged up to 100 percent and more; for primary goods 
other than coffee, the rate was about 50 percent. At first, domestic 
production grew rapidly. After 1960, however, growth slowed down, when 
further attempts at import substitution in capital goods and 
intermediate products encountered increasing difficulties. Meanwhile, 
high domestic protection discriminated against exports, both by lowering
 
the exchange rate and by raising the cost of inputs used in export 
production. Protective measures, all together, reduced exporters' 
earnings to about one-fourth less in terms of Brazilian cruzeiros for
 
dollars earned than what they would have received in a free-trade 
regime.
 
The performance of the Brazilian economy between 1948 and 1967
 
reflects the diminishing benefits of industrialization via import
 
substitution. 17 From 1948 through 1960, CDP growth averaged 6.8
 
percent, translating into an annual increase in per capita income 
of
 
just under 4 percent. 1961 was a boom year: GDP rose 10.3 percent and
 
per capita income 7.2 percent. The next six years, 1961-1967, were less
 
robust. GDP ranged from a low of 1.5 
to a high of 5.3 percent during
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the period, with increases or decreases in per capita GDP ranging 
between -1.3 and 2.3 percent. Industrial growth, imports, and exports
 
all stagnated, but inflation exploded from the low double-digit level 
(12-20 percent between 1948-1960) to the high double digit level of 87 
percent in 1964. The balance of payments and the government's budget 
both incurred substantial deficits, the latter amounting to 4 percent of 
GDP by the early 1960s. Monetization of these deficits is the primary 
culprit of accelerating inflation. The economic slowdown contributed to
 
growing social unrest, which fostered the military coup of 1964. 
Having secured its political position, the new regime installed a
 
reform of the incentive system in the late 1960s.18 The new policies 
included the elimination of tax discrimination against exports of
 
manafactured goods, and the introduction of various export subsidies. 
Second, rates of import protection were reduced and the exchange rates 
were unified. Third, mini-devaluations were introduced, similar to the
 
Chilean crawling peg, in place of intermittent and unpredictable changes
 
in the exchange rate, to bring an overvalued cruzeiro down to its
 
correct trading level. Fourth, public entity deficits (such as in the
 
railroad system) were reduced and revenue-increasing tax reforms helped
 
lessen the inflationary impact of the government budget. Fifth, the
 
introduction of indexing for financial assets made it easier for the
 
government to finance its remaining deficits in a noninflationary way.
 
Taking these up in somewhat more detail, exemption from federal 
indirect taxes enhanced the profitability of exports. Exports we,.'e then
 
exempted from state indirect taxes, taxes on financial operations, and 
the special tax on fuel and oil. These measures were largely aimed at 
eliminating prior tax discrimination against exports, thus moving the 
-132­
system towards greater tax neutrality, but from 1968 oap additional 
export subsidies were granted in the form of federal and taxstate 
cedits, exempting export profits from income taxes, and preferential 
credits for exports. Since Brazil never fully operated under a free 
trade regime, export subsidies served the purpose of compensating for 
the discrimination exports resulted from anagainst that overvalued 
currency and the higher cost of domestic inputs associated with import 
protection. To repeat, subsidizing exports involved superimposing a 
system of export incentives on a system of import protection, which 
tried to neutralize the adverse effects of an overvalued currency and 
the higher costs of domestic inputs into the manufacture of export 
goods.
 
Tariff reduction took place in fits and starts. In early 1967, 
tariffs on manufactured goods were out by about half, raised again in 
1968, but again put on a downward track through 1973. By 1973, the 
average tariff on manufactured goods stood at about 57 percent of its 
1966 level. Whereas the tariff wall in Chile had been virtually 
dismantled, in Brazil, import substitution industries continued to 
benefit from a substantial protective shield. 
A series of mini-devaluations begun in 1968 depreciated the 
cruzeiro. In prior years, the exchange rate had been changed at 
infrequent intervals, wich gave rise to large variations in real 
exchange rates and created uncertainty for exporters, who could not 
accurately forecast the cruzeiro equivalent of their dollar earnings. 
Devaluations on a monthly basis restored a large measure of certainty in
 
the foreign exchange markets, thus eliminating this obstacle to export
 
growth.
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Finally, some remaining measures included reducing public sector 
deficits through a payroll tax, increasing prices for public
 
enterprises, indexing of financial asssets, and a more favorable
 
treatment accorded to the inflow of foreign capital.
 
The period 1968-1974 has come to be known as the Economic Boom, as
 
the performance of the economy was truly exceptional.19 Aggregate
 
indicators reveal that GDP grew at annual rates of 11.2, 10.0, 8.8,
 
13.3, 11.7, 14.0, and 9.8 percent respectively. On a per capita basis,
 
GDP growth averaged 8.2 percent, exceeding, for a short while, the Asia 
superstars. Exports and imports rose from a combined figure of just 
under $4 billion in 1968 to surpass $20 billion by 1974. Industrial 
output increased by about 13 percent a year, and the inflation rate fell 
sharply from 55 percent in 1965 to the teens in the early 1970s. The 
volume of total exports grew at an average annual rate of 10.2 percent, 
but since exports of primary products remained stagnant, this figure 
translates into an annual average growth of 18 percent for 
non-traditional primary and manufactured goods. Only Korea's export 
growth exceeded Brazil's during this period. 
Responding to a more attractive set of incentives, foreign capital
 
flowed in. The ratio of foreign savings to gross domestic investment 
rose from 0.4 percent in 1966 to 7.7 percent in 1973, fueling a rise in 
the share of gross domestic investment in GNP from 22.3 to 27.5 percent 
in the same period. Increased profitability in a more open economy 
attracted rising levels of foreign investment. Small wonder from this 
statistical display that Brazil earned the nickname of an "economic 
miracle." 
Since 1975, the economy has staged a mild retreat, with an
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accelerating downturn in the 1980s. Between 1975 and 1980, per capita 
3'DP grew at the much slower annual rate of just under 4 percent. 
Inflation accelerated sharply to the hundred percent level. Increases 
in industrial output declined. 
 And, the country incurred a tremendous
 
increase in both public and private foreign debt, rising fron 
a
 
relatively modest $12.6 billion 
in 1973, to $32 billion ir, 1977,
 
surpassing $90 billion in 1983.20 (The stock 
of foreign direct
 
investment grew much more modestly.) As a result, the 
debt-service
 
ratio on public and private debt (amortization plus interest payments 
expressed as a proportion of export earnings) rose from an already heavy
 
35.3 percent in 1973 to a burdensome 50.7 percent in 1977, and to an 
economy-wrecking 350 percent in 1983. The country is literally
 
bankrupt, scrambling from week to week to afloatkeep on its foreign 
debt obligations. All economic growth goes into debt service, with none
 
left for internal investment.
 
Since Brazil is dependent upon imported oil for about 80 percent of
 
its petroleum usage, the 1974 oil shock dealt its economy a severe blow.
 
However, 
the Asian growth economies were dealt even proportionately
 
greater shocks, and yet sustained their highest growth during 
the
 
1975-1980 period. 
 Thus, the oil price increase cannot be cited as 
a
 
primary reason 
for economic retrenchment. 
 We must look elsewhere for
 
the causes. A key place to look, in addition to the massive running up 
of foreign debt, is in the decision to reverse policy courses back 
towards import restrictions. Beginning in 1974, there were widespread
 
tariff increases, with some individual items being increased by 100
 
percent. These were coupled with 
an increase in nontariff barriers,
 
including an 
import deposit system, the withholding of import licenses
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for a variety of finished consumer goods, and the installation of a
 
variety of incentives to encourage import substitution in intermediate
 
and capital goods, with heavy doses of subsidized official credit. An
 
open economy was gradually closed. Brazilian policymakers responded to
 
the 1974 recession by running up debt and restricting imports. A more
 
approrpriate policy mix would have entailed exchange-rate depreciation
 
and less recourse to foreign borrowing.
 
Prudent fiscal policy has been replaced with massive budgetary 
deficits, which have brought concomitantly large increases in the money 
supply and hyperinflation. The public sector deficit as a share of GDP 
has reached double digit levels. Inflation has become the chief vehicle 
for additional taxation to close this deficit, which has led to controls 
over interest rates in the banking system. Financial markets are 
considerably repressed and interest rates beceae heavily negative. The 
exchange rate policy, which tried to offset higher domestic inflation 
through regular devaluations, gave way to growing overvaluation of the 
cruzeiro, with further adverse effects on xport performance.
 
In short, a retreat from liberal reforms imposed in the mid-1960s,
 
which brought the great boom of 1968-1974, has resulted in a 
corresponding contraction of the economy. In retrospect, it seems 
astonishing that international bankers should have lent so many billions 
of dollars to the Brazilian public and private sectors without careful 
guarantees that such investments would be used profitably. The 
relatively high growth of the economy in the post-1975 years is due to 
heavy reliance on foreign borrowing, a policy that could not be 
sustained indefinitely. Korea, Chile, the Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, and 
Brazil have all put the future growth prospects of their economies at 
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risk 	on the retrospectively unwise 
recourse to excessive foreign
 
borrowing.
 
To conclude, at no 
time 	did Brazil ever embark on a wholesale free
 
market experiment. 
 Rather, its leaders undertook a series of moderate 
liberalizing reforms in the mid-1960s, largely with respect to trade and 
currency adjustments, which brought both an export and overall growth
 
boom. Retreat from these 
policies in the mid-1970s, a return to the 
historic policies 
stressing protectionist import substitution, slowed
 
the performance of the economy.
 
D. 	Fiscal Reforms
 
An emphasis on supply-side economics, especially tax 
cuts, in the
 
early 1980s has created the mistaken impression that budget deficits are
 
relatively unimportant so long as tax rates are set at low levels. 
Nothing could be further from 	 the truth. The reduction of public aector 
deficits, through a combination of revenue-enhancing reforms, reductions 
in public enterprise subsidies, and an overall shrinkage of public 
spending, significantly aids the fight against contrilling domestic 
inflation and preventing an overvalued currency. 
 An excellent 
illustration of conservative, prudent fiscal policy is found in 
Cameroon. 
Since independence, Cameroon has practiced a conservative fiscal 
policy. In the footsteps of Hong Kong, it has 	 more often recorded 
surpluses 
than deficits. A conservative fiscal policy 
has 	gone
 
hand-in-hand with membership in the pegged 
CFA 	franc West African
 
Monetary System. 
 The 	Bank of Central African States (BEAC) sets credit
 
policies for 	 member countries within the context of the monetary 
position of the multi-country area as a 	 whole, supervises banking and 
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credit operations within each member country, and also provides short­
and medium-term rediscounting facilities to member country banks. 
Within BEAC, Cameroon has always been the most financially conservative 
country, keeping its deposits with the Bank of France in excess of 
required amounts.2 1  Since interest rates are regulated by the Central 
Bank, Cameroon enjoys little monetary policy autonomy. 
The effect of these arrangements is that real interest rates on all
 
types of loans have generally been positive, encouraging savings and 
investment. Interest rate ceilings have not been much lower than market
 
clearing rates. Cameroon has experienced high investment rates, in some
 
years exceeding 20 percent of GDP, and has corresponding enjoyed an
 
average annual increase in per capita income of 2.9 percent sinc:
 
independence in 1960 and 1981.
 
The example of prudent fiscal and monetary policies in Cameroon 
reflects a steady hand in these areas, rather than any new departure in
 
public policy since independence. Two decades of stable public finances
 
and consistent monetary policy are valuable lessons that all developing
 
countries could profitably emulate. 
Summary 
This final section has touoLd upon multiple mini-reforms that have 
been profitably implemented in a oross-section of less developed
 
countries. They have ranged from improving the efficiency of public 
enterprises to liberalizing trade to the maintenance of sound fiscal and
 
monetary policies. It has been possible to put comprehensive
 
free-market policies into place into only a handftil of countries. The 
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examples in this concluding section demonstrate that a piecemeal 
approach to liberal reform, adopting Ju3t, one or more efficiency 
enhancing measures, can pay handsome dividends. Of course, the more 
comprehensive the reforms, the more likely that the pricing mechanism 
can better do its job. 
 But a small stop towards market efficiency is a 
step in the right direc- .on. It may indeed be politically infeasible in 
most poor countries to impose a Hong Kong-style comprehensive free 
market economic regime. It should, however, be possible in virtualiy 
every country to locate some area of the economy in which it is feasible 
to improve efficiency. It is the local people who are the beneficiaries
 
of such measures.
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Annex Table - Basic Economic Indicators
 
GNP per capita
 
Area Average
 
Population (thousands Annual Growth
 
(millions) of square Dollars (percent)
 
Mid-1981 kilometers) 1981 1960-81
 
Hong Kong 5.2 1 5,100 6.9
 
Singapore 2.4 1 5,240 7.4
 
36 2,500 6.6'
18.0
Taiwan 

S. Korea 38°9 98 1,700 6.9
 
Ivory Coast 8.5 322 1,200 2.3
 
Chile 11.3 757 2,560 0.7
 
Sri. Lanka 15.0 66 300 2.5
 
Life
 
Average Annual Adult Expectancy
 
Rate of Inflation Literacy at Birth
 
(percent) (percent) (years)
 
1960-70 1970-81 1980 1981
 
Hong Kong 2.4 18.4 90 75
 
Singapore 1.1 5.2 83 72
 
raiwan 4.1 10.3 82' 72
 
66
S. Korea 17.5 19.8 93 
Ivory Coast 2.8 13.0 35 47 
Cnhile 33.0 164.6 .. 68
 
Sri Lanka 1.8 13.1 85 69
 
---------------- 
--------------------------------- 
-------
(Annex Table cont'd.)
 
Average Annual Growth Rate (Percent)
 
Gross
GDP Industry Domestic Investment
 
1960-70 1970-81 1960-70 1270-81 1960-70 1970-81
 
Hong Kong 10.0 9.9 so 
 0. 6.9 14.1
 
Singapore 
 8.8 8.5 12.5 9.0 20.5 7.2
 
Taiwan 
 9.2 8.0' 16.4 12.9* 16.2 8.2
 
S. Korea 8.6 
 9.1 17.2 14.4 23.6 12.2
 
Ivory Coast 8.0 
 6.2 11.5 9.3 12.7 12.1
 
Chile 4.4 
 2.1 4.4 0.7 
 9.9 3.0
 
Sri Lanka 4.6 4.3 
 6.6 4.2 
 6.6 9.4
 
Average Annual Growth Rate (Percent)
 
Public 
 Private
 
Consumption 
 Consumption
 
1960-70 1970-.81 1960-70 1970-81 
Hong Kong 8.6 9.9 8.6 9.9
 
Singapore 12.6 6.3 4
.. 6.8
 
Taiwan 
 4.5 5.4* 8.3 6.8
 
S. Korea 
 5.5 7.8 
 7.0 7.1
 
Ivory Coast 11.8 10.1 8.0 5.8
 
Chile 
 5.1 2.2 
 3.7 0.8
 
Sri Lanka 

..... 
 2.1 2.7
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Average Annual Growth Rate (Percent)
 
Expqrbs Imports
 
1960-70 1970-81 1960-70 1970-81
 
----------------- m---------------nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn 
Hong Kong 12.7 9.7 9.2 12.1 
Singapore 4.2 12.0 5.9 9.9 
Taiwan 23.7 9.3' 17.9 9.1 
S. Korea 33.4 22.0 20.6 10.9
 
Ivory Coast 8.7 5.1 9.7 5.7
 
Chile 0.7 9.8 4.8 3.5
 
Sri Lanka 4.6 -1.5 -0.2 1.4
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Debt Service as Percentage of:
External Public Debt 
 Exports of
 
as Percentage of GNP 
 GNP 
 Goods and Services
 
19M 1970 198 1970 1981 
Hong Kong 0.1 1.2 .. 0.8 .. .. 
Singapore 7.9 10.2 0.6 1.8 
 0.6 0.8
 
Taiwan 10.6 12.16 1.4 2.6' 4.5 4.4'
 
S. Korea 20.8 
 32.1 3.1 
 5.8 19.4 13.1
 
Ivory Coast 18.3 54.4 
 1.1 13.2 2.5 22.5
 
Chile 25.8 14.1 
 3.0 5.3 18.9 27.2
 
Sri Lanka 16.1 36.6 
 2.0 2.1 10.3 5.7
 
Note: The figures for Taiwan are current to 1978.
 
Source: For all countries except Taiwan, WorldDevelo 
 ent Report 1983 (New

York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1983), Annex

Tables 1, 2, 4, 9, 16 (pp. 148-9, 150-1 
 154-5, 164-5, 178-9).
 
Statistics on Taiwan come from Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis, and
John C. H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story (Boulder, Westview Press,
1981), pp. 7, 12, 23, 27-30, and from World Development Report 128,
the last year Taiwan was included in World Bank reports.
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Footnotes
 
II. The Role of Government in the Free Market Economy
 
1. The harmful effects of the PL 480 grain shipments to Korea
 
between 1955 and 1971 are set forth in David I. Steinberg, "Development
 
Lessons from the Korean Experience--A Review Article," Journal of Asian
 
Studies, XLII, No. 1 (November 1982), pp. 96-97.
 
III. Hong Kong
 
1. This section draws heavily from two of the author's prior
 
books. See Alvin Rabushka, Value for Money The Hong Kong Budgetary
 
Process (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1976) and Hong Kong: A Study in
 
Economic Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
 
2. Current figures are found in Hong Kong Annual Reports. My
 
figures are taken from Hong Kong 1982. Report for the Year 1981 (Hong
 
Kong Government Press, 1982).
 
3. For a thorough treatment of the history, analysis and
 
prescription of Hong Kong's monetary system, see the entire
 
November-December 1982 issue of Asian Monetary Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 6,
 
pp. 1-69, published in Hong Kong.
 
4, S.C. Chow and G.F. Papanek, "Laissez-Faire, Growth and
 
Equity--Hong Kong," Economic Journal, 91 (362), June 1981, pp. 466-85.
 
IV. Vignettes of Growth: Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea
 
1. I have made substantial use of several sources in preparing 
this brief description of Singapore's postwar development. For a 
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comprehensive history of Singapore from its founding until the
 
mid-1970s, see Mary Turnbull, History of Sijnpore 1819-1975 (Singapore:
 
Jxford University Press, 1975). 
 On more concrete topics of economic
 
development, see Lee Soo Ann, SinpPgore Goes Transnational (Singapore:
 
Eastern Universities Press, 1977); Goh Keng Swee, The Practice of
 
Economic Growth (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1977); Theodore
 
Geiger, Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong
 
and Singapore (Washington, D.C.: 
 National Planning Association, 1973);
 
Chow Kit Boey and Amina Tyabji, External Linkages and Economic
 
Development (Singapore: 
Chopman, 1980); and Nicholas Harman, "The
 
sovereign municipality," The Eonomist 
December 29, 1979. A detailed
 
analysis of the transition to and results of Singapore's export oriented
 
policy appears in Augustine H.H. Tan and Ow Chin Hock, "Singapore," in
 
Bela Balassa, Development Stratej es in Semi-industrial Economies 
(Baltimore and London: Publiravd for the World Bank by the Johns
 
Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 280-309.
 
2. Goh Keng Swee, The Practice of Economic Growth, p. 2
 
3. This political and economic history is summarized in Ibid.,
 
pp. 2-3.
 
4. Theodore Geiger, Tales of Two City-States, p. 15.
 
5. Ibid., p. 159.
 
6. Ibid., p. 192. 
See also Lee Soo Ann, Singapore Goes
 
Transnational, p. 60-63.
 
7. Theodore Geiger, p. 163 and Lee Soo Ann, pp. 22-23.
 
8. Richolar Harman, "The sovereign municipality," The Economist, 
December 29, 1979, pp. 9-11. 
9. In writing this section on Singapore's public finances I have
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consulted the annual Singapore Yearbook, Singapore's annual budget
 
documents, and the annual report of the Board of Commissioners of
 
Currency. Thoughtful accounts of the Monetary Authority of Singapore,
 
the currency system, the CPF, and their links to the budget are found in
 
The Financial Structure of Singapore (Economics Department, Monetary
 
Authority of Singapore, June 1980); Tan Chee Huat, Financial
 
Institutions in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
 
1978); and John R. Hewson, "Monetary Policy and the Asian Dollar
 
Market," in Papers on Monetary Economics (Singapore: Published for the
 
Monetary Authority of Singapore by Singapore University Press, 1981),
 
pp. 165-94.
 
10. Theodore Geiger, p. 189.
 
11. Statistics on the performance of Singapore's economy are found
 
in Chow Kit Boey, pp. 3-5, 14, 26, Theodore Geiger, pp. 168-69, and Lee
 
Soo Ann, pp. 31, 35, 60-63, and Economic Survey of Singapore 1980,
 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, entire volume.
 
12. This treatment of Taiwan in the postwar era depends heavily on
 
several sources. The first is a collection of speeches delivered
 
a major figure in the economic
between 1959 and 1974 by K.T. Li, 

planning of the Taiwan government, having long held the most important
 
post as Minis.er of Finance. It is entitled The Experience of Dynamic 
Mei Ya Publications,
Economic Growth on Taiwan (Taipei and New York: 

Inc., 1976), and contains a valuable appendix of statistical.tables.
 
Another is a book-length treatment by Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis,
 
and John C.H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved
 
Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952-1979 (Boulder: Westview
 
Press, 1981). A third is T.H. Lee and Kuo-shu Liang, "Taiwan," in Bela
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Balassa, Development Strategies, pp. 310-50. Also useful is Hugh
 
Sandeman, "An island on its own," The Economist, July 31, 1982. For a
 
thorough review of monetary and fiscal policies, see Maxwell J. Fry,
 
"Financial Structure, Monetary Policy and Economic Growth in Hong Kong,
 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, 1960-1981," (University of California,
 
Irvine: March 1983, mimeo).
 
13. "Public Policy and Economic Development," in K.T. Li, The
 
Experience of Dynamic Economic Growth on Taiwan, pp. 35-40.
 
14. Shirley W.Y. Kuo, et al.., The Taiwan Success Story, pp. 48-55.
 
15. See Terutomo Ozawa, Mt'ltinationalism, Japanese Style
 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 84. He shows that
 
Taiwanese anticipation of the cessation of U.S. economic aid in 1965
 
brought the outward export-looking policies, which gave birth to
 
Taiwan's "economic miracle," into being.
 
16. Details of these policies appear throughout K.T. Li's public
 
essays and speeches and are found in Shirley W.Y. Kuo, pp. 73-84.
 
17. See Appendix, Table 16, 1'1t Revenues and Expenditures--All
 
Levels of Government," in K.T. Li, p. 519.
 
18. "The Role of Fiscal Policy in Economic Development," in K.T.
 
Li, p. 470.
 
19. The statistics reported in this section come from Shirley W.Y.
 
Kuo, pp. 7, 12, 23, 27-30
 
20. The distribution of income is treated in Ibid., pp. 34-38.
 
21. My exposition of Korea's postwar economic development is
 
largely drawn from the following sources: Parvez Hasan, Korea:
 
Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy (Baltimore: The Johns
 
Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1976); Parvez Hasan and
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D.C. Rao, coordinator authors, Korea: Policy Issues for Long-Term
 
Development (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press for the
 
World Bank, 1979); Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, Growth and
 
Structural Transformation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979);
 
Larry E. Westphal and Kwang Suk Kim, "Korea," in Bela Balassa,
 
Development Strategies, pp. 212-279; Hugh Sandeman, "Asia's most
 
ambitious nation," The Economist, August 14, 1982; and Major Statistics
 
of Korean Economy 1979 (Seoul: Economic Planning Board). This
 
section's summavy of resources is suimarized from D.C. Rao, "The Pattern
 
of Economic Growth, 1961-76," in Parvez Hasan and D.C. Rao, Korea, p.
 
15.
 
22. Further information on Korea's historical setting is found in
 
Parvez Hasan, Korea: Problems and Issues, pp. 25-29.
 
23. For a comprehensive analysis of Korea's land reform and grain
 
pricing policies see Sung Hwan Ban, Pal Yong Moon, and Dwight H.
 
Perkins, Rural Development (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies,
 
Harvard University Press, 1980). See also David I. Steinberg's review
 
of this study in "Development lessons froi the Korean Experience--A
 
Review Article," Journal of Asian Studies, XLII, No. 1 (November 1982),
 
pp. 96-97.
 
24. See Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, Growth and Structural
 
Transformation, p. 45. For a checklist summary of the full set of
 
economic reforms, see p. 161 of the same volume.
 
25. Marinus van der Mel, "Public Finance," in Parvez Hasan and D.C.
 
Rao, pp. 327-364.
 
26. Hugh Sandeman, "Asia's most ambitious na ion," The Economist,
 
August 14, 1982, p. 17.
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27. Rich details are contained in Major Statistics of Korean
 
Economy 1979.
 
V. Ivory Coast
 
1. "Excerpts from the speech of the President of the Republic
 
given at the VI th Congress of the PDCI-RDA (16 October 1975) in Summary
 
of the Five Year Economicaly Social and Cultural Plan, 1976-1980,
 
Republic of the Ivory Coast, Ministry of Planning, p. 10.
 
2. The most comprehensive English-language treatment of economic
 
progress in the Ivory Coast is found in Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, Iaory
 
Coast: The Challenge of Success (Baltimore and London: Published for
 
the World Bank by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). This
 
section draws from pp. 11-19.
 
3. Ibid., pp. 16, 54-61. See also Jean Masini, et al.,
 
Multinationals and Development in Black Africa: 
 A Case Study in the
 
Ivory Coast (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 18.
 
4. Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, Ivory Coast, pp. 62-94, 103-116.
 
5. The phrase is found in Ibid., p. 20. See also pp. 20-54,
 
95-99. A summary of the country's economic policy is also found in Jean
 
Masini, Multinationals and Development, pp. 5-34.
 
6. Summary of the Five Year Plan,"Chapter 5: Industry," p. 32.
 
7. Bastiaan A. den Tuinder, Ivory Coast, pp. 130-39.
 
VI. Chile
 
1. Alejandro Foxley, "Towards a Free Market Economy: Chile
 
1974-1979," Journal of Development Economics 10 (1982)9 pp. 3-29.
 
2. Jere R. Behrman, Macroeconomic Policy in a Developing Count.
 
-1119-

The Chilean Experience (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company,
 
1977), pp. 22-25.
 
3. Ibid., pp. 34-77.
 
4. Statistics and analysis of Chile's changing public finances are
 
found in Alejandro Foxley, "Towards a Free Market Economy;" pp. 3-12;
 
Arnold C. Harberger, "The Chilean Economy in the 1970s: Crisis,
 
Stabilization, Liberalization, Reform," Carnegie-Rochester Conference
 
Series on Public Policy 17 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
 
Company, 1982), pp. 115-22; Ronald I. McKinnon, "The Order of Economic
 
Liberalization: Lessons from Chile and Argentina," Carnegie-Rochester
 
Conference Series on Public Policy 17 (Amsterdam: North-Holland
 
Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 160-69; and Chile 1980 Economic Profile
 
(Published by the New York Offioe of the Chilean Development
 
Corporation), pp. 30-32. These authors rely on data published by the
 
Central Bank of Chile, the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), the
 
Ministry of Finance, the Chilean Development Corporation, though
 
McKinnon also draws from the International Monetary Fund, International
 
Financial Statistics Yearbook and Government Finance Statistics
 
Yearbook.
 
5. Arnold C. Harberger, "The Chilean Economy in the 1970s," pp.
 
127-32, and Ronald I. McKinnon, "The.Order of Economic Liberalization,"
 
pp. 172-78.
 
6. Ronald I. McKinnon, p. 174.
 
7. Alejandro Foxley, pp. 10-16.
 
8. Arnold C. Harberger, pp. 133-38, and Ronald I. McKinnon, pp.
 
164, 175.
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VII. Sri Lanka
 
1. This section is based on direct field research conducted by the
 
author in March 1981 and draws from his article "Adam Smith in Sri
 
Lanka," Policy Review, Fall 1981, pp. 54-62. 
For statistical data, I
 
have made extensive use of the Monthly Bulletin pablished by the Central
 
Bank of Ceylon (Colombo: Sri Lanka, March and April, 1983)9 the Annual
 
Budget Speeches of the Minister of Finance and Planning, and the Central
 
Bank's Annual Review of the Economy.
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Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory
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